• Introduction
• I. Gandhi vs. Nehru
• II. The Nation-state and Development
• III. Communities, Cultures and Traditions
• Conclusion
• Tables

Like a majority of nation-states in the world today, India is a new nation. Created after in 1947, it is the political invention of a generation committed to freedom from colonial domination. The main objective of the new nation -state was not only political sovereignty but also economic independence, the forging of a democratic and egalitarian society, and the economic and social modernisation of the country partitioned after terrible violence into India and Pakistan.

54 years later India’s record of economic and political achievements is inspiring for some, disheartening for others. The judgement depends partly on which areas one focuses on - self-sufficiency in food, diversity of industrial production, a vibrant democracy, a free press and a strong civil society, or whether one has in mind the endemic poverty, high illiteracy and environmental degradation. The judgement will also depend on whether one emphasises the immense economic progress since the colonial devastation of the economy or whether one focuses on the modest results compared to what could have been achieved.

The image of India in the western media is characterised by a focus on population explosion, widow burning, bloody sectarian strife and natural disasters. These representations are indeed one - sided, biased and sensational. But they cannot be corrected by merely emphasising in contrast the modernity of the country, the stability of its political structures, the emergence of modern mass media and a 100 million strong middle class or by pointing to the civilizational genius, intellectual traditions and rich cultural heritage of the subcontinent. For India is characterised by its complexity and contradictions, a society both backward and modern, democratic and plural but also hierarchial and authoritarian in a distinct way. Its sheer size and its regional diversity make it almost impossible to make meaningful generalisations about India.

Contemporary India is characterised as much by her bullock carts, Bombay films and Bangalore software firms; economic liberalisation, and the grassroots movements resisting it, one of the largest military forces in the region and an independent atomic policy as it is by a plurality of castes and religions, linguistic, ethnic and cultural differences, so confusing for the outsider observer. Against all prognoses of modernisation theories, these differences have not disappeared. In fact, they have gained in importance, though oft in a new, altered form. The Indian trajectory of modernity can only be understood with reference to these particularities. The development of the economy, democracy and nation-state in India cannot be understood as a mere re-enactment of a western scenario, but it cannot be analysed without reference to western models either.

The relationship between European and Indian modernity’s can be thematised variously

1. as a problem of the transfer and translatability of western categories (religion, secularism);
2. as the promises of, and disappointments with, European institutions and models of democracy and development;
3. as a problem of the asymmetrical relations between the two in the context of colonisation and in that of globalisation.

Rather than trying to draw a balance of 5 decades of India’s experiences with democracy and development, I will confine myself to an exploration of a few historical legacies and present dilemmas faced by the country, which will be of continuing importance in the 21st century --

1. the form and problems of a secular democracy
2. the model of development and the role of the nation - state.

With reference to contemporary Indian debates on these issues I would like to deal with themes like multiculturalism, reconciliation of differences in a democracy, the relationship between religion and politics, and changing role of the nation - states within a global order which are of importance to the Mac Arthur Project.

At Independence in 1947 India had a choice of two diametrically opposed visions of its future, that of Gandhi and of Nehru. Nehru’s vision was based on industrialisation using science and technology and economic growth within a central planning framework. His model of a mixed economy was a synthesis between capitalist and socialist models best suited to Indian conditions. He hoped that the rapid growth through industrialisation together with urbanisation, western education and science would end not only the poverty of 80% of the population living in rural India but also free them from the shackles of ignorance, superstition, the tyranny of tradition and the backwardness of village existence. He envisaged a rapid modernisation of the country under the leadership of its western elite using the transformative agency of the new nation - state.

Gandhi was opposed to the western model both as an end and as a means to the India of his dreams. He saw in industrialisation the root of all evil, inequality, oppression and violence. As early as 1927 he wrote, "God forbid that India ever take to industrialism after the manner of the West. The economic imperialism of a single tiny island (England) is today keeping the world in chains. If an entire nation of 300 million took to similar economic exploitation, it would strip the World bare like locusts."

His vision of India foresaw small autonomous village communities, politically self-governing with small units of production and moderate needs. Sceptical as he was of representative parliamentary democracy, he advocated participative grass-root democracy instead. Nehru’s political project tried to unite India’s past with the western experiences of modernisation. But even Gandhi’s critical traditionalism and utopia cannot be understood without reference to the European traditions of anti-modernism, which inform it. In preference to Gandhi’s universalistic utopia, the postcolonial state in India chose to realise Nehru’s vision of modernity.

Disenchantment with the promises of this state centered vision of development and with the limitations of formal democracy without social justice led from the 1970s onwards to the rise of grass roots movements, social action groups and NGOs combining in innovative ways the Gandhian vision with Marxist ideas and local traditions of resistance.

Since the beginning of the century, controversies about economic development in India have mirrored the world wide debates - between nationalists and imperialists in the 20s and 30s; on the role of state in planning in the 50s, and more recently the withdrawal of the state in favour of the market in the 80s and 90s.

Nehru’s model of the mixed economy featured responsibility of the state for heavy industry and infrastructure as well as for poverty alleviation and income redistribution. The experiences with the model were also mixed. Among its successes could be food self-sufficiency, diversification of industry, economic growth without external debt, increases in both agricultural and industrial production. However, the uneven development between regions and between classes, as well as ecological problems such as those from the `green revolution’ in agriculture and from depletion of natural resources through industry must be seen as its major shortcomings. Although poverty has decreased since 1970s, even today 39% of the population lives below poverty line and finds it difficult to meet its basic survival needs.

Often the rapid population growth in the country is held responsible for some of these problems. But, as the experience of Kerala shows, the relation between poverty, population growth and economic prosperity is rather complex. Features of the Kerala model include social justice and equity at moderately low levels of income and wealth; a reduction in birth rates within 20 years to European levels through investment in education and health; land reforms leading to economic security; high level of political participation and a traditionally high status of women.

Critique of the role of nation-state in development has come from both the conservatives and left economists. For the neo-liberals, the functioning of the state per se thwarted economic progress, whereas for Marxists the class character of the state has been responsible for the developmental deficits. The former critique has found wide middle class acceptance since the liberalisation policy and economic reforms of the 1980s - opening of economy for foreign trade and investment, dismantling of licenses and protectionism. But a thorough going privatisation of the public sector has not been undertaken unlike neo-liberal strategies in the west.

In the context of globalisation there has been a worldwide debate on the disadvantages and advantages of a `strong’ as against a `weak' state. The Indian experience shows that the question cannot be posed in these terms. The national bourgeoisie has a contradictory expectation from the state, wanting a state soft on capital but strong against labour. It wants to be free from state intervention and regulation as far as capital investments and trade is concerned but wants a strong state to keep trade unions in check and regulate foreign capital.

Although there has not been a search for alternative models of sustainable development for the country as a whole, there has been a powerful and radical critique of development in India. The critics argue that the western model of development itself is deeply flawed as it is rooted in European Enlightenment with a deep suspicion of local cultures and traditions. It is seen as tied to western science and technology and a unilinear idea of progress, which has led to the destruction of biogenetic diversity and cultural plurality. These critics therefore advocate culturally sensitive development models rooted in local traditions and using indigenous knowledge systems. They pin their hopes on the "non-party political process" involving NGOs and social movements in a social transformation from below through a strong civil society. Thanks to the new liberal emphasis on the market today, there has been a growing collusion between the state and the market in order to deprive large sections of the urban and rural poor of their access to land and common property resources and thus their means of very livelihoods. It is thus too early to write a lament at the demise of the state. But it would also be a mistake to delegitimise and discredit the state as some of its critics from the right and left tend to do. For the State is the only institution which can and should bear responsibility for distributional equality and particularly for social security as well as welfare and entitlements of the poor and marginalised among its citizens.

How persuasive are alternative political visions focusing on communities, indigenous local knowledge and cultural authenticity? Is recourse to tradition possible in order to envisage India's future? How far can post-modern conceptions draw on pre- modern values and institutions?

India has been described as a liberal democracy with a communitarian ethos. The Indian Constitution in 1950 used the Western liberal model to construct and empower an individual as a political subject. But it also took into account the existence of collective identities in Indian society. It instituted a policy of reservations to abolish caste discrimination and untouchability. On the other hand, it recognised the importance of religious communities and their distinctiveness in that it did not introduce a common civil code.

This kind of legal pluralism is unusual for European societies, which have unified family laws. But it does not violate the principle of secularism, which involves the neutrality of the state and equal treatment for all religions. How difficult liberal western democracies are finding it today to accommodate cultural differences within their boundaries can be shown using a few examples - in Germany Islam does not have the same public legal status as Christianity; the construction of every mosque is considered a threat to core western values and in France the wearing of a headscarf seems to threaten national sovereignty.

There are at least three reasons why European models cannot be of use to India with regard to multiculturalism and cultural differences.

1. In the process of secularisation, European states have historically dealt only with the separation of the state from one religion. In India the state has to establish a relationship with regard to several religions with differing demographic proportions and varying institutional structures.
2. Despite formal secularism, most European nations explicitly or implicitly privilege the religion of their majorities - i.e. Christianity, e.g. blasphemy laws in U.K. apply only to Christianity; the debate over the crucifix in German school classrooms showed that at a pinch a religious symbol of the majority can be declared to be a cultural symbol of the nation. This is precisely what the religious nationalism of the militant Hindu right attempts in India when it argues that the Babri Masjid should make way for a Ram temple as Ram is not merely a Hindu God but a national hero.
3. European multiculturalism is of recent origin due to post 1945 migration mainly from former colonies. Most European nation - states had in their formative periods exiled or annihilated religious minorities. In South Asia on the contrary a multicultural society historically predates the foundation of the nation - state and has been integrated into it. Compared to Europe, the medieval historical record shows little violent conflict between religious communities in India. This, however, is not because of some abstract Hindu idea of tolerance but because of the organisational patterns of Hindu religions and Indian society, the autonomy of castes, and the marginality of the precolonial state in most parts of the sub-continent.

Colonialism changed all that. It transformed `fuzzy’ communities with fluid and flexible boundaries into `enumerated communities' which could be mobilised for collective action and political purposes, turning traditional castes and sectarian communities into modern interest and pressure groups. The colonial census created some of these collective identities and cemented others, the colonial policy of separate electorates for religious communities and concessions to under privilege castes strengthened them and democratic politics in Independent India paradoxically gave them a new lease of life.

Today in a modern secular democracy these identities and communities are here to stay and cannot be ignored. Opponents of secularism, who see in it a legacy of European enlightenment without relevance for India, argue that these identities are prior to national citizenship and cannot be subsumed under it. They must be accommodated in the public sphere as they determine a large part of the social life of Indians, Driving religion out of them public into the private realm they claim is responsible for the loss of legitimacy of lived religious faiths. Paradoxically, they argue, it is this process which makes possible the politicisation of religion as an ideology as opposed to religion as a living faith. Militant Hinduism must be seen in this context as a political project for state power rather than a fundamentalist one with religious aims.

Critics of this position have pointed out that rather than alternatives to secularism, what are needed are alternative conceptions of secularism keeping in mind the historical and cultural specificities of the Indian context. They have argued that the anti secularists along with their communitarian advocates reify religion, tradition, and community into a historical entities. Instead of a critical appropriation of tradition, they therefore, end up with idealisations and justification of tradition. Moreover, by focusing on the violence of modernity and the oppression by the state alone, they glossed over the tyranny of tradition and the within the communities. They falsely infer from the social tolerance and existence of a plurality of communities that each community is equally tolerant of differences within it.

The failure to realise the promises of democracy and equitable development has led to the delegitimation of state and disenchantment with development paradigms. Rethinking the ties between democracy and development as well as between the nation-state and communities, we need to address issues of imbalances of power and access to resources rather than frame the issue in terms of the dichotomy between tradition and modernity or in terms of alternative modernities based on culturalist notions.

• Table 1 - HID and GDI for major states
• Table 2 - Trends in Human Development
• Table 3 - Selected indicators: rural / urban
• Table 4 - Female-male Disparities
• Table 5 - Child Survival Indicators
• Table 6 - Demographc Profile
• Table 7 - Health and Education Status
• Table 8 - Women: capabilities / opportunities
• Table 9 - Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribe Status
• Table 10 - Environment Indicators
• Table 11 - Selected Economic Indicators