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IT'S NOT THE WHAT BUT THE HOW:
A CRITICAL APPROACH TO PEACE AND VIOLENCE

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It's not the What But the How: A critical approach to peace and violence[1]

Abstract: Peace studies are currently at a crossroad, being criticized for their overwhelming research agenda, for their uncritical stance towards terminology and for their disconnection between research and action. This paper proposes a consolidation of the theoretical and conceptual peace studies core, by recovering the value of peace and framing research and action in cultures of peace. This sets out from a critique of the conventional conflict narrative terminology, which has evolved after Boutros-Ghali *An Agenda for Peace* to reflect a peace narrative terminology. This change has been more formal than operational. Even if a new political peace agenda was adopted, practical results have not reflected this transformation. We argue that peace and violence are not excludable, by adopting the concept of a continuum of peaces and violences and proposing a peace web to overcome the shortcomings revealed essentially at the level of policy implementation.

Keywords: promoting peace, keeping peace, building peace, continuum of peaces and violences, cultures of peace.

Introduction

In a post-post-Cold War setting, the way peace studies look at the international system must reflect the multi-dimensional character of peace and violence as not self-excluding. It must also reflect the multi-level dynamics (individual, communitarian, national and international) where the continuum of peaces and violences takes place. The demands of a post-Westphalian order, in contrast to a still much state-centric international system, assist in this process where an evolving nature of violence and peace approaches is visible.

Peace studies have, from their inception, argued for a paradigm change, which has fallen short of taking place. This paradigm shift is based on a connection between research and action, which requires a different approach that should be adopted regarding terminology, means, personnel, and instruments. This should start by transforming the linear conflict cycle into a peace web where different areas of intervention are intertwined and focused on peace.

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This paper starts by providing the framework for the conceptual proposal with a literature review of peace studies. This review ends with the analysis of current trends in peace studies, identifying critical issues that this conceptual proposal picks up and develops. The conceptual proposal begins by criticizing the conflict narrative underlying peace studies and the way it is rendered operational. It argues that the disconnection between research and action in peace studies results from a linear phased conflict narrative which cannot respond adequately to the challenges posed by violence, including in formal peace contexts. It then presents and develops a proposal regarding the concepts of peace, violence, cultures of peace and continuum of peaces and violences. This provides the basis for the subsequent analysis of United Nations' interventions as an illustration of both the critique and the logic of the proposal put forward. Finally, the paper suggests a peace web framework for overcoming the limitations identified in the traditional strategies of intervention. It identifies three correlated areas of intervention – promoting, keeping and building peace – that are not sequential, but have different levels of intensity. These different areas of intervention are embedded in cultures of peace and, combined, result in an overall sustainable strategy for peace.

Peace Studies: Then and now

Peace studies distance themselves from the state-centric realist paradigm in international relations, defining themselves as a 'rejectionist' approach (Dunn, 2005: 37). They also reject the security and strategic studies premises, where conflict and war are a constant and need to be managed and mitigated. Peace studies reject the assumption that violence is "a fundamentally inescapable condition associated with being human" (Dunn, 2005: 40). In reality, for strategic studies "peace has been of little significance" (Terriff *et al.*, 1999: 65), which determined that after the Second World War, peace studies were "viewed as essentially an intellectual protest movement" (Terriff *et al.*, 1999: 65).

Peace studies assume that although humans have the capability to cause harm, they also entail the capability to cooperate and collaborate, and to choose a non-violent path to resolve their conflicts. To ignore this duality and the possibility of choice, and dooming mankind to a "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" life (Hobbes, 1651: chap. xxviii), is to "distort the capacities human beings have, it is an ill-faith idealism" (Martinez Guzmán, 2005: 45-46).

Despite this 'rejectionist' approach, early peace researchers, such as Johann Galtung in Britain and Kenneth Boulding and Anatol Rappaport in the United States of America, did not

embark in a simple rejection of the interpretation of the mainstream realist paradigm's main assumptions. Following a Kantian tradition, they were interested in 'peace' itself, not in order to "manage the status quo to the advantage of one side or the other, but to change it" (Terriff *et al*., 1999: 70). The main contributions of Boulding and Rappaport "helped define particular areas of concern and method for peace studies" (Mason, 2002: 17), such as 'prisoner's dilemma', 'stable peace' and 'cultures of peace'. Their work has shifted the emphasis from violence to peace by opposing cultures of peace to cultures of violence – a change that embodies a paradigm shift.

Johann Galtung went further to define peace as more than the absence of war (direct violence), construing it in a positive way to include structural and cultural violences (Galtung, 1969). Direct violence includes physical and psychological violence exerted directly on someone. Structural violence is an indirect violence which is a result of "the social structure itself – between humans, between sets of humans (societies), between sets of societies (alliances, regions) in the world" (Galtung, 1996: 2). Cultural violence constitutes the network which legitimizes the other two types of violence, through its system of norms and behaviour (Galtung, 1996: 2). Each of these violences is a vertex in Galtung's violence triangle. The author argues that peace studies as a field of study does not (and should not) simply elaborate and apply so-called neutral theories, which are then verified by collected data. For the 'father of peace studies', values are an intrinsic part of the research this approach presents, with peace as the 'core value' (Galtung, 1996: 13). This is essential not only for the kind of conclusions drawn, but also and most importantly, for the recommended action. After all, peace studies have been defined as an approach mainly directed to action, a 'research-action' approach.

Galtung's trilogy of violences unveils the global dynamics of exploitation. And it is from this conclusion that some authors, such as Ekkehart Krippendorff, Lars Dencik and Gunder Frank, identify 'capitalism as the key source of war and violent conflict' (Terriff *et al.*, 1999: 71). This led to a line of radicalization of peace studies, calling for 'exposure of the global dynamics of exploitation and, if necessary, their resolution by revolution, a strategy that was anathema to the process of rational transformation envisaged by Galtung' (Terriff *et al.*, 1999: 71). According to these authors, traditional peace studies were portrayed as embracing the dominant paradigm, where Western development was *the* model to be adopted elsewhere if progress was to be achieved, 'and doing little more than tweaking the power

balance underlying the status quo' (Terriff *et al*., 1999: 71). Consequently, peace studies changed its focus from "the strategic relationship of the superpowers", in the end still dealing essentially with direct violence, "towards the dynamics of the North-South relationship," enlarging the object of research to include global structural violence (Terriff *et al*., 1999: 71). This enlargement, however, was followed by further stretching the peace studies' object of analysis. Soon, each and every social problem seemed to be connected with dynamics of peace and conflict and, therefore, should be analysed within peace studies (Tromp, 1981). As Håkan Wiberg put it, peace studies became a 'black hole' encompassing every social dynamics (2005: 25). Nevertheless, this broadening movement allowed for a better contextualization and definition of the concept of peace, analyzed at the individual, community, societal, regional and international levels, and finally consolidating a research approach that goes beyond the state-centric relationships of peace and conflict.

With the end of the Cold War, this 'black hole' started gaining some consistency, especially after Kaldor's 'new wars' started being discussed. Mary Kaldor (1999) argued that most of the wars of the 1990s differed from the traditional international wars. The most striking difference was that most of these 'new wars' were intrastate and, consequently, implied an erosion of the state's legitimate monopoly of the use of force; the belligerent groups were often not in uniform or organized in an army-like manner; violence was internationally (and illegally) financed and supported in a scale never registered before, having connections with arms, drugs and human trade networks; and a growing number of victims were civilians (Kaldor, 1999). Ken Booth goes further, recognizing that it is not a matter of "*either* old *or* new [wars], but rather a complex recognition of *both* old *and* new" (2001: 165). Moura (2005) further adds a new dimension to Kaldor's proposal based on the continuum of violence by highlighting war-like violence in formal peace contexts.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, most peace researchers agree that peace studies have to undergo a fundamental rethinking of its *raison d'être* (Pureza and Cravo, 2005). This concern comes from the realization of a too broad research agenda (Mason, 2002; Rogers and Ramsbotham, 1999), which came to include development (Duffield, 2001), security (Buzan *et al.*, 1997), and feminist (Brock-Utne, 1985) studies, among others. On the one hand, this broadening and interdisciplinary approach enriched peace studies, but, on the other hand, it resulted in a dilution of focus. In addition, the distinctive nature of peace

studies, visible in its research-action agenda, has lost momentum mostly due to the incapacity to successfully translate the results of peace research into concrete action.

Paul Lawler summarizes these concerns in three points that this paper seeks to analyse:

> the absence of a substantial theoretical or conceptual core, a tendency to deploy uncritically key terms such as 'structural violence' or 'positive peace', and an unclear standpoint with regard to direct violence, particularly the use of violence in the pursuit of justice or other values. (2002: 9)

This paper proposes the return and consolidation of the theoretical and conceptual peace studies core, by not only recovering the core value of peace, but also framing the research and the action in cultures of peaces. This proposal is grounded on a critique of the terminology peace research has put forward and practitioners have adopted. The unclear standpoint with regard to direct violence is addressed conceptually by the continuum of peaces and violences and the peace definition put forward here. This reflection aims, in this way, at making a contribution towards addressing the disconnection between research and action.

Conceptual Framework

The connection between research and action has followed a conflict-oriented narrative, which is too narrow and misleading. It does not allow for a working concept of structural peace and it confuses conflict with violence. As a result, peace has to be defined not as opposed to conflict, but in relation to violence. This relation is dialectic, reflecting, as argued below, a continuum of peaces and violences.

Conflict Narrative: A critique

The segmentation of the 'conflict cycle' and conflict-oriented narrative confines and directs strategies, instruments and actors to conflict: conflict prevention → conflict management → conflict resolution → post-conflict reconstruction. This understanding does not allow for a focus on the establishment of the basic structural conditions for peace, even when addressing organized physical and psychological violence (direct violence). This narrow and misleading perspective raises two main critiques. First, conflicts cannot be prevented or resolved, but only managed. Second, what 'conflict' should mean explicitly in this narrative is 'violence'.

Conflict exists in every society. However, this acknowledgement does not constitute an endorsement of the realist-hobbesian approach to conflict (Hobbes, 1651). It is understood

that conflicts cannot be resolved in the sense of being eliminated. What can be mitigated and eliminated is violence. The type of violence addressed here includes regular and organized acts of physical and/or psychological aggression widespread in society, and the lack of basic human conditions which may be economic, institutional, identitarian or other. The argument is that this type of violence can be avoided if the basic structural conditions for peace are in place. This means that in dealing with a conflict, there is always a choice between violent and peaceful means. The premise of the conceptual proposal put forward in this paper is that conflict, as well as the choice between violence and peace, is inherent to human nature. For peace studies, conflict has been the problem, but if the framework of action is bounded and rooted in conflict, the outcomes can hardly be framed outside a conflict-oriented narrative toward the core value of peace. Furthermore, there is a traditional assumption that conflict and violence are interchangeable concepts, which has resulted in this distortion of the premises underlying action.

What is Peace?

Peace is a complex concept and each attempt to better define it always finds criticism. Nevertheless, this is a central concept for peace studies which informs its vision regarding goals, instruments and policies. Consequently, peace is understood here as a holistic process that implies the existence of basic structural conditions. These include the absence of organized physical and psychological violence, the satisfaction of basic human needs, and at the institutional level, representative and proportional power-sharing structures and the promotion and protection of human rights.[2] In addition, the concept of peace is embedded in a normative framework, where peace is the core value guiding theory and action. Action should be for peace and not only to mitigate or manage organized physical and/or psychological violence.

To some extent this understanding of peace coincides with Galtung's positive and negative peaces (1969), however we assume that these should not be separated, even if only conceptually. This separation further reinforces the sequential approach to peace, where violence is first managed or eliminated and only then the structural conditions for peace are addressed. The holistic framework for peace put forward here implies the existence of

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[2] This conceptual frame has also been used by other authors, such as Håkan Wiberg: "Since the 1960s, different values were put forward to overcome the absence of physical violence; the main candidates, nowadays, seem to be the following: 1) equity and wellbeing (*i.e.*, absence of a structural violence); 2) freedom (absence of oppression); 3) identity (absence of alienation or cultural violence)." (2005: 28)

correlated areas as opposed to sequential phases of intervention, since positive and negative peaces are intrinsically connected, as explained below.

The dichotomy between peace and war is too simplistic. In order to better understand the peaceful and violent dynamics of conflict situations, one should adopt the concept of a continuum of peaces and violences, where violent and peaceful options are chosen in different intensities. This means that even in formal peace contexts violence does not disappear; it is not, however, widespread, because there are structural conditions to deal with it. Even in these cases, geographical pockets or social concentrations of widespread violence might be found, but these are not a prevalent characteristic of society as a whole. As well, in violent contexts, peace does not disappear; it is not, however, a prevalent characteristic of society as a whole. Even in these cases, individuals or groups may resort to peaceful means in their daily lives. This choice of peaceful or violent means reflects the basic structural conditions mentioned above. When these are fulfilled there is a higher tendency to resort to peaceful means in order to address conflicts, as well as the opposite. This continuum of peaces and violences frames these different contexts where peace and violence can be found in different intensities, requiring an adjustment of the strategies of intervention. For each context, the elements of peace mentioned above present different degrees of urgency and need for intervention. The continuum allows for capturing those differences and, therefore, for better informing the strategies of action devised in order for these to be embedded in cultures of peace.

Culture of peace is defined by the United Nations as "a set of values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life that reject violence and prevent [it] by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups and nations" (United Nations, 1998 and 1998a). This definition encompasses the main elements that should underlie peace intervention strategies. However, the term 'culture of peace' points to *a* culture of peace whereas, as argued, 'culture*s* of peace' better apprehends the differences in intensity along the continuum of peaces and violences. This does not reflect a relativist reading of reality, but rather seeks to capture the complexities and specificities of differentiated contexts, regarding the diversity of peace and violence intensities. In addition, the United Nations definition when translated into the field has not been able to detach itself from the rhetoric, the personnel, the means and the strategies that follow the dominant

framework of action, as discussed before. In this way, the disconnection between research and action remains an obstacle to the rooting of cultures of peace.

UN Peace Interventions as Illustrative of the Research-Action Disconnection

United Nations (UN) peace interventions are probably the best example of the above mentioned disconnection between research and action and of the shortfalls it embodies. And, yet, they are also the best example of a clear attempt to bridge this gap. UN peace interventions are understood here as encompassing different types of missions, from traditional to multidimensional peacekeeping, from peace enforcement to peacebuilding, and which are geared towards preventing, containing, and/or eliminating violence.

The analysis of these interventions focuses here on three structural aspects: the labels used to identify them; the conflict cycle logic underlying these interventions; and the organization and resources associated. There is a diverse and non-consensual terminology to characterize UN peace interventions. The end of the Cold War has become for many a defining moment influencing the nature of these peace interventions (Cottey, 2008; O'Neill and Rees, 2005), whereas others argue that although this was a fundamental change in the international system, it did not imply a structural re-definition of UN interventions (Mullenbach, 2005; Bellamy *et al.,* 2007; Jakobsen, 2002). In fact, the latter identify dynamics in the post-Cold War era that were already in motion before the end of the bipolar rivalry; certain types of functions performed by these interventions during the Cold War period are also performed nowadays; and certain trends, currently identified as new, such as regionalization of interventions, were already taking place before the end of bipolarity.

UN peace interventions have, throughout time, evolved to encompass a wide array of functions, making it difficult to label them in a meaningful way.[3] The existing typologies reflect different approaches to the dynamics of the international system and the way these are reflected in peace interventions. Consequently, some are still very much attached to a chronological overview translated in different generations, which reflect the growing complexity of these interventions (Cottey, 2008; Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; O'Neill and Rees, 2005; Doyle, 1996). They refer to classical or traditional missions; multi-dimensional, integrated, complex or multi-functional missions; peace support operations; and several identify a potential new generation, such as cosmopolitan interventions (Woodhouse

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[3] For a good discussion of this label issue in the peacekeeping literature see Fortna and Howard, 2008.

and Ramsbotham, 2005). Others still add or include in this list of generations: humanitarian interventions (Cottey, 2008) and peace enforcement missions (Doyle, 1996).

Other authors propose a different reading of this diversity, discarding the use of the term 'generations' and adopting a more flexible terminology based on types of interventions, independently of a chronological template (Bures, 2007; Bellamy *et al.,* 2007; Boutros-Ghali, 1992). For instance, *An Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) puts forward four types of UN peace interventions: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Bellamy *et al.* (2007: 5-6) advance a different typology including five types of operations: traditional peacekeeping, managing transition, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace support operations. Paraphrasing Bures (2007: 408), these labels impart nowadays "virtually no information about what type of operation is actually taking place". Consequently, this 'labeling muddle' does not contribute to overcome the research-action disconnection. Therefore, the focus should rather be on how these interventions are organized and rendered operational.

Concerning the organization of UN peace interventions, there has been an effort to connect the type of intervention with the timing for intervening in accordance to the 'conflict cycle'. As Stephen Ryan (2000: 34-35) highlights, the 'conflict cycle' offers the possibility to determine the most appropriate moment for intervention. *An Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) reflects exactly this connection.

Figure 1 - Peace Cycle

Source: Adapted from Boutros-Ghali, 1992.

Although it demarcates itself from the conflict oriented narrative, by adopting a peace terminology, the 'peace cycle' denotes a step forward, by changing linearity into circularity, but it has still not lost its sequential nature. Consequently, this demarcation is not enough to

trigger a fundamental change in the nature of the associated interventions, which remain focused on conflict, *i.e.*, violence. Despite these efforts, the underlying causes may still linger, with a potential to re-escalation, and, additionally, new causes may arise due to *the* model of reconstruction promoted (Paris, 2000, 2004; Richmond, 2001; Duffield, 2001). It is here that the relevance of cultures of peace must be highlighted. These cultures of peace must be articulated with the values and traditions of each society, in order to flourish. The incorporation of cultures of peace creates the conditions for peaceful means to be used to address conflicts, instead of violent ones. The root causes for conflicts do not disappear, but the process of dealing with them changes (conflict transformation).

The peace studies' research presents a new paradigm with a new ontology based on the core value of peace. Its concepts, terminology and vision have already seeped into the international system, framing United Nations intervention strategies, as seen above. This is clear regarding United Nations documents, strategies and mandates, where the "peace support elements, [are] themselves in part drawn from peace research terminology" (Rogers and Ramsbotham, 1999: 750).

One final aspect that should be emphasized is the fact that peacekeeping missions have become the focal point of UN peace interventions. As a consequence, UN peace interventions have, to a great extent, been defined in relation to peacekeeping (see Bures, 2007: 420). This means that peace interventions have been organized, staffed and equipped accordingly and implies that missions have followed, with different intensities, a military logic concerning command structures, personnel and equipment. However, if the idea is to promote, restore, guarantee and/or build peace, there needs to be an incorporation of cultures of peace in the planning, organization and operationalization of these missions. Despite the UN's recognition of the need for a more integrated approach to peace interventions, namely through the deployment of peacekeeping missions with a wider mandate to include peacebuilding tasks, these still fall short of this goal. Although including a greater number of civilians, the command structures and most of the personnel are still soldiers; and the mandates seem almost impossible to fulfill, since this multidimensionality becomes too broad. Furthermore, although the concept of peace in a broader sense seems to have seeped into these wider interventions, the existence of multidimensional peacekeeping missions ends up blurring the distinction between these and those of peacebuilding. Even with the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission (UNSC, 2005), the problem subsists, since the sequential nature

of the interventions is still prevalent and, to a certain extent, there is an overlap of functions, contributing to a lack of clarity on how and when to shift from peacekeeping to peacebuilding (according to the UN 'peace cycle').

These different types of interventions and the institutional efforts associated have not overcome the linearity of the phased approach nor the simplistic dichotomy between violence and peace. Therefore, this process should be taken a step further. For that effect, the different elements identified should be viewed as a complex web, where they are intertwined and developed within explicit cultures of peace.

Connecting Research and Action: New avenues for conceptual and operational peace interventions

The conceptual proposal put forward here addresses the issues discussed above by focusing on how UN peace interventions are rendered operational, instead of advancing new labels or typologies. It provides a dynamic reading of the functions inherent to these interventions, rather than adopt the linear sequential 'peace cycle'; it also distances itself from the centrality peacekeeping missions have gained within UN peace interventions.

For this effect, the peace web focuses on different areas of intervention – promoting, keeping and building peace – independently of the label used for the intervention. The argument is that each intervention should reflect different intensities of these three areas in an intertwined manner. This provides a dynamic response to the context on the ground, better reflecting it within the continuum of peaces and violences. Moreover, the 'peace cycle' linear and sequential natures are in this way overcome, since the underlying logic becomes instead a peace web. Although keeping peace remains one of the areas of intervention, promoting and building peace are equally central areas of intervention in the peace web. This responds to the need for an integrated, dynamic and flexible approach towards peace interventions.

Within the web, the relations between the nodes are bi-directional and non-linear. In other words, every node is influenced and influences each of the others. For this approach to have peaceful results, these dynamics should be imprinted with peaceful values, attitudes and modes of action, as defined by the concept of cultures of peace. This holds for every node and interaction, independently of where or when the intervention takes place.

This peace web reflects differentiated intervention strategies which incorporate distinct instruments. These strategies are correlated and applied with different levels of intensity

according to the peace/violence characteristics of each context (continuum of peaces and violences). This means that promoting, keeping and building peace are not sequential but correlated areas of intervention. These areas are not contained; they support each other in an articulated though flexible way towards the common goal of peace. Promoting peace implies a strategy of confidence building, which aims at creating the conditions for a non-violent choice of means when in face of conflict. This strategy includes instruments such as the creation of lines of communication, power sharing scenarios, a conducive environment to discuss issues of grievances, resentment and/or justice. These instruments should always be present even if in a formal peace context. As argued earlier, formal peace contexts still include violent means reflecting the continuum of peaces and violences, which cannot be ignored.

Keeping peace, as an area of intervention, focuses on responding to the elements sustaining physical and psychological widespread violence as well as the lack of basic human conditions, including economic, institutional and identitary ones. This implies the involvement of soldiers, security forces (police) and civilians with distinct self-supporting mandates. In order to embed their actions in cultures of peace, soldiers are responsible for the overall physical security of missions' personnel, for the training and organization of the local military forces and for, if needed, keeping the belligerent factions apart. Security forces are responsible for training and organizing their local counterparts and to keep public security, until those can take over. Civilians need to engage with local authorities and civil society in order to lay the foundations for building peace, often initiating the physical reconstruction of infrastructure and the psychological reconstruction of the social tissue.

Building peace aims at consolidating and promoting peace. This implies among others, the establishment of the rule of law, a functioning judicial system, proportional power-sharing and representative structures, and the promotion and protection of human rights. It further implies economic reconstruction, measures to assist in reconciling society, integration of ex-combatants, all of these sustained by confidence building measures. These areas of intervention contribute and are upheld by cultures of peace, which advocate peaceful values, attitudes, modes of behavior and ways of life. By framing these areas of intervention in this peace web, the result is a dynamic and integrated approach to peace, which is correlated instead of sequential and phased, allowing for a comprehensive approach that renders the research-action agenda an attainable goal.

This conceptual proposal demands a structural revision at the operational level. The existing instruments formally have the potential to address peace and violence concerns. However, these same instruments are premised in concepts and rendered operational in such a way that limits their success. As a result, this is not a proposal for the creation of new instruments, rather it argues for a differentiated articulation and implementation of the existing ones. This proposal calls for an operational shift. First, regarding timing, interventions should not be delineated as sequential depending on their focus, but rather correlated as put forward in the peace web. Second, regarding personnel, interventions should include military, police and civilian personnel, in a joint-coordinated and correlated manner. This means that strategies, implementation plans and decision-making processes have to be tripartite in order to be comprehensive enough to address the complexity of the realities on the field. This way of rendering the existing instruments operational corresponds to the multiple linkages identified in the peace web. Third, regarding the underlying framework, these interventions should be explicitly and specifically committed to sets of values, modes of behavior and ways of life that reject violence and promote peace. Only when research and action depart and act by this same ontology can cultures of peace become sustainable.

Conclusion

Peace studies have advocated from their inception a paradigm shift. They have put forward a new ontology to address violence and peace, which has seeped into the political discourse and instruments. This move has made it into the field of UN peace interventions. However, the results have not lived up to the expectations. On the one hand, the broadening of the peace studies' agenda along with the disconnection between the operational results and the research proposals rendered the peace studies field fragile. On the other hand, these same dynamics have allowed for a legitimization of the operational instruments in a perverse manner. Incorporating the peace studies terminology and research results legitimized the use of traditional instruments under these new language and understandings. This resulted in frustrating and unsuccessful outcomes regarding the peace studies' research-action implementation.

The conditions are ripe for the paradigm shift so long advocated by peace studies, if there is an effort to concentrate in keeping 'action' coherent with ontology. Building upon Peter Hall's policy paradigm shift model (1993), the paradigm shift into cultures of peace is

being thwarted by the fact that a second order change has not taken place. According to Hall, a paradigm shift entails first, second and third order changes. Paradigms are structured by overall goals, policy instruments and the settings where these instruments are applied. First order change occurs when the settings change, but the overall goals and instruments remain the same. This change takes place on the basis of past experiences and projections for the future. Second order change involves a modification in both settings and instruments of policy whereas the overall goals remain the same. The third order change entails an alteration of settings, policy instruments and overall goals, implying a paradigm shift.

Peace studies have put forward an explicit proposal for a paradigm shift, where the overall goal is peace, by peaceful means. For a long time, this proposal remained just an intellectual alternative due to the Cold War setting, where the goal was to contain violence without ignoring the eventual to use force if need be. With the end of the Cold War, the setting allowed this overall goal to become a feasible alternative. The post-Cold War setting unveiled types of violence that differ from Cold War ones. Along the lines of Kaldor and Moura, the intra-state nature of violence and the continuum of peaces and violences, including formal peace contexts, denote a change of setting, even though the policy instruments remained untouched (first order change). Gradually, the need was felt to respond to this change of setting by adjusting the policy instruments. This adjustment was mostly noticeable in the evolution of peacekeeping missions. Conceptually, these adjustments incorporated the terminology of peace studies in an attempt to reflect the overall goal of peace (second order change). And yet, the so longed for paradigm shift into cultures of peace did not take place. This was mainly due to implementation procedures, which revealed a disconnection between the terminology and the overall goal pursued, and the instruments and personnel involved in rendering these operational. This remains as such, because training, equipment, mandate and personnel still fail to be embedded in cultures of peace. Therefore, the paradigm shift envisaged will not take place unless cultures of violence are replaced by cultures of peace (third order change). This means reconnecting peace studies' research and action, as advanced in the peace web proposed here, to overcome the shortcomings in second order change. A challenge that remains for the future of peace studies.

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