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Parallel Panels I: June 3, 13:30 – 15:30
Panel 1: The City and the Citizen
Room: 3.1
“Promoting the Debate on Access to Justice and Citizenship. An Ecology of Justices in the Cities of Lisboa and Maputo”
Sara Araújo, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Access to justice is a human right and a precondition to full citizenship and democracy. The liberal conception that State has and should have the monopoly of production and administration of law and justice has been questioned by both Anthropology and Sociology of Law, but also by the difficulties the judicial courts have been facing when it comes to guaranteeing citizens' access to justice. All over the world, in global north and south countries, the weaknesses of the liberal model of justice are increasingly evident, as well as the need to resort to other forms of justice. In this context, the debate around the role of extra judicial mechanisms is relevant everywhere. Based on field work conducted between 2008 and 2010 in Lisboa and Maputo, I explore the diversity of what I designate by community justices and discuss the role these play in promoting or negating citizen's access to justice.
Underlying my research is Boaventura de Sousa Santos's Sociology of Absences and Emergencies, an epistemological proposal conceived against the invisibility of diversity. Accepting the author's challenge I try to promote an ecology of justices confronting the liberal conception of law and justice with the diversity of law and justice that exists in the world. Many times this diversity is not predictable. Therefore we must go to the field as free of prejudices as we can in order to avoid excluding some forms of justice just because they don't feet in our categories. Thus my concept of community justices is broad and flexible. It includes every institution of justice which uses conflict resolution mechanisms different from those traditionally favoured by the liberal State.
I never looked for the exotic or the traditional. My community justice concept allows me to include old and new forms of justices and the aim is to understand how people solve their problems. Focusing my attention on two previously established urban geographical areas, my first research goal was to draw for each context a community justice's map. But promoting knowledge is different from accepting and defending uncritically that the identified practices are the best or even good. It was imperative to observe the work community justices develop and the role they play. The field work required many hours of direct observation inside selected institutions and the study of the available written files. For analyzing data I used an analytical framework to evaluate practices and compare different conflict resolution frameworks.
Underlying my research is Boaventura de Sousa Santos's Sociology of Absences and Emergencies, an epistemological proposal conceived against the invisibility of diversity. Accepting the author's challenge I try to promote an ecology of justices confronting the liberal conception of law and justice with the diversity of law and justice that exists in the world. Many times this diversity is not predictable. Therefore we must go to the field as free of prejudices as we can in order to avoid excluding some forms of justice just because they don't feet in our categories. Thus my concept of community justices is broad and flexible. It includes every institution of justice which uses conflict resolution mechanisms different from those traditionally favoured by the liberal State.
I never looked for the exotic or the traditional. My community justice concept allows me to include old and new forms of justices and the aim is to understand how people solve their problems. Focusing my attention on two previously established urban geographical areas, my first research goal was to draw for each context a community justice's map. But promoting knowledge is different from accepting and defending uncritically that the identified practices are the best or even good. It was imperative to observe the work community justices develop and the role they play. The field work required many hours of direct observation inside selected institutions and the study of the available written files. For analyzing data I used an analytical framework to evaluate practices and compare different conflict resolution frameworks.
“Which Citizenship? Planning and Political Mobilization in the Metropolitan Area of Jerusalem”
Marco Allegra, University of Torino, Italy
In 1967 Israel conquered the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) during the Six Day War. After more than forty years of military occupation and the settlement of about 500,000 Israeli citizens in East Jerusalem ad the rest of the West Bank, two main alternatives emerge from the ongoing debate about the perspectives of a peaceful solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first strategy – the so-called “two state solution” (TSS) – represents the traditional Palestinian political platform since the late 1970s, that is, the secession of a Palestinian demos from the Israeli system of control through the birth of an independent Palestinian state on the WBGS. The second strategy – the “one state solution” OSS – considers the process of integration between Israel and the WBGS irreversible and aims at a radical reform of the present Israeli constitution to enfranchise the WBGS Palestinians, thereby establishing one democratic state on the whole territory of historical Palestine.
The alternative between secession and enfranchisement raises various questions about the future of the conflict: What is the citizenship model prevailing today in historical Palestine? What kind of relation we can observe between ideal constitutional models and actual developments on the ground? To what extent the two alternative models of solution can be neatly conceptualized as mutually exclusive? What is the role of those devices of social, economic, geographic and political integration between different areas of the territory or social groups?
The paper addresses these issues by adopting a geographic and thematic focus. It will focus on the metropolitan area of Jerusalem and on the debate on planning issues at the metropolitan level. The working hypothesis is that Jerusalem is in the same time a crucial engine of integration – because of its nature of “bridge” between Israel proper and the WBGS – and of fragmentation – because of the presence of multiple jurisdictional layers. In the same time, urban and metropolitan planning – and its connection with the idea of the “right to the city” and “urban citizenship” – is an important locus of struggle and contestation of political, legal and social levels of exclusion.
The paper will review the different approaches of bureaucrats and professionals, politicians and activists in order to understand how their planning strategies relate to the TSS/OSS alternative. How does the existence of a unique metropolitan fabric shared by Israelis and Palestinians fit into the alternative between secession and enfranchisement? How do institutions, NGOs, political movements and local communities translate their different strategies into forms of mobilization and grassroots activity? How do these strategies can be interpreted with reference to the different citizenship discourses related to the TSS/OSS alternative?
The alternative between secession and enfranchisement raises various questions about the future of the conflict: What is the citizenship model prevailing today in historical Palestine? What kind of relation we can observe between ideal constitutional models and actual developments on the ground? To what extent the two alternative models of solution can be neatly conceptualized as mutually exclusive? What is the role of those devices of social, economic, geographic and political integration between different areas of the territory or social groups?
The paper addresses these issues by adopting a geographic and thematic focus. It will focus on the metropolitan area of Jerusalem and on the debate on planning issues at the metropolitan level. The working hypothesis is that Jerusalem is in the same time a crucial engine of integration – because of its nature of “bridge” between Israel proper and the WBGS – and of fragmentation – because of the presence of multiple jurisdictional layers. In the same time, urban and metropolitan planning – and its connection with the idea of the “right to the city” and “urban citizenship” – is an important locus of struggle and contestation of political, legal and social levels of exclusion.
The paper will review the different approaches of bureaucrats and professionals, politicians and activists in order to understand how their planning strategies relate to the TSS/OSS alternative. How does the existence of a unique metropolitan fabric shared by Israelis and Palestinians fit into the alternative between secession and enfranchisement? How do institutions, NGOs, political movements and local communities translate their different strategies into forms of mobilization and grassroots activity? How do these strategies can be interpreted with reference to the different citizenship discourses related to the TSS/OSS alternative?
“‘Love it or leave it’: Citizenship, Minorities and Struggle for a Right to the City in Istanbul”
Gulcin Erdi Lelandais, University of Warwick, UK
The restructuring of the global political economy has itself also destabilised traditional forms of citizenship. This destabilization has opened greater political opportunity to imagine and realize new citizenships that offer alternatives to the current citizenship order.
In this context, several minority communities begin also to organise for their cultural and political rights and to claim a visible place in public space. Citizenship is undergoing a process of reterritorialization, such that many new forms of citizenship do not assume as given either an association with national-scale territory or the sovereignty of national-state citizenship (Purcell, 2003). Other, non-national political identities 9 based on geography, ethnicity, gender and sexuality are being advanced as potential bases for citizenship. In short, global-political economic restructuring has created a context in which the nation has been partly decentred as the dominant basis for the organization of citizenship. This decentring is both the opportunity for and consequence of the emergence of new forms of citizenship. They are arising through active political projects designed to destabilize the current order, and to imagine and establish new bases for political relationships.
To demonstrate the empirical bases of this issue, the case of minorities in Turkey constitute one of the most relevant examples. For a long time, the citizenship in this country was linked to an idea according to which it involves political loyalty and a total allegiance to the Nation-State. It was a sum of more obligations and less rights. So, minorities like Kurds, Alevis and Gipsies were forced to obey the founding rules of Republic (respect of Ataturk’s principles, nationalism and secularism). This situation seems to change over the last decade. Our study focalising on urban transformation politics in Istanbul against neighbourhoods and small towns in which there is a strong presence of minorities, will study the struggle of the three community (Kurds, Alevis, Gipsies) for recognition and justice against forced displacement caused by these politics.
In summary, this presentation aims to examine the relationship between public planning projects, exclusion in public policy management and minorities’ identity affirmation within this process. In this context the project will focus on planning movements in Turkey with a comparative study of three urban and environmental planning projects and citizen protestation against them. We will se how collective memory and space is now determinant aspects of new forms of citizenships. At the same time, these protestations have in common is that they oppose State technocracy (Fincher, 1987). Contrary to a classical approach, we will consider these movements as the real affirmation of citizenship, a willingness of minorities to exist in the public space with their ethnical and political identity which was hitherto denied by public authorities with neither a will for social inclusion nor recognition.
In this context, several minority communities begin also to organise for their cultural and political rights and to claim a visible place in public space. Citizenship is undergoing a process of reterritorialization, such that many new forms of citizenship do not assume as given either an association with national-scale territory or the sovereignty of national-state citizenship (Purcell, 2003). Other, non-national political identities 9 based on geography, ethnicity, gender and sexuality are being advanced as potential bases for citizenship. In short, global-political economic restructuring has created a context in which the nation has been partly decentred as the dominant basis for the organization of citizenship. This decentring is both the opportunity for and consequence of the emergence of new forms of citizenship. They are arising through active political projects designed to destabilize the current order, and to imagine and establish new bases for political relationships.
To demonstrate the empirical bases of this issue, the case of minorities in Turkey constitute one of the most relevant examples. For a long time, the citizenship in this country was linked to an idea according to which it involves political loyalty and a total allegiance to the Nation-State. It was a sum of more obligations and less rights. So, minorities like Kurds, Alevis and Gipsies were forced to obey the founding rules of Republic (respect of Ataturk’s principles, nationalism and secularism). This situation seems to change over the last decade. Our study focalising on urban transformation politics in Istanbul against neighbourhoods and small towns in which there is a strong presence of minorities, will study the struggle of the three community (Kurds, Alevis, Gipsies) for recognition and justice against forced displacement caused by these politics.
In summary, this presentation aims to examine the relationship between public planning projects, exclusion in public policy management and minorities’ identity affirmation within this process. In this context the project will focus on planning movements in Turkey with a comparative study of three urban and environmental planning projects and citizen protestation against them. We will se how collective memory and space is now determinant aspects of new forms of citizenships. At the same time, these protestations have in common is that they oppose State technocracy (Fincher, 1987). Contrary to a classical approach, we will consider these movements as the real affirmation of citizenship, a willingness of minorities to exist in the public space with their ethnical and political identity which was hitherto denied by public authorities with neither a will for social inclusion nor recognition.
Chair: João Mascarenhas Mateus, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Discussant: Giovanni Allegretti, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Panel 2: Ideal v. Non-ideal Thinking about Citizenship
Room: 3.2
“Comprehensive Political Ontology as a Mode of Striking a Balance between Description and Normative Assessment”
Kristian Klockars, University of Helsinki, Finland
My presentation approaches the problem of citizenship on the level of political ontology. By political ontology is here meant a comprehensive perspective bringing together how to understand the domain of the political, the site of power within it, the problem of the subject and political agency and the question of the place and value of institutional settings. Political ontology is here understood in a non-essentialist and historical fashion. The main background sources are Foucault’s idea of an ontology of the present, Rancière’s analyses of the relation between equality and the political, Arendt’s reflections on institutions and citizenship and Derrida’s conception of deconstruction as a mode of affirmative opening.
A strength of a Foucauldian ontology of the present is that it manages to focus on those features, practices and powers that mould the conditions of “what we are”. But it lacks adequate reflections on certain tensions within the political field itself. Rancière’s conceptualisation of the political as a dissensual and undetermined field of equality, contrasted with the cohesive forces of the institutional setting, adds an important dimension: the need to reflect more deeply on political ontological issues. However, Rancière ends up in a far too existentialist solution: politics and active transformative citizenship is rare and exist as reactions to unbearable situations of inequality. What is lacking is adequate reflection on the diverse values of institutional settings and Rancière’s conception is far too bleak and simplified on this level.
Today the very conditions of political agency and the place of institutions are changing rapidly. These real world changes affect our knowledge about citizenship by launching disbelief and a sense of crisis. For example, when the borders between political communities become blurred, some of our hitherto most well-known affirmative practices are put in doubt. Such real world changes entail (historical) ontological changes. The modes of being of citizenship, political community and institutions are no longer the same. A political egalitarianism should focus also on reconstructing what kind of institutions today might advance the possibilities for active citizenship, in contrast to only the ‘police-ing’ tendencies of institutions Foucault and Rancière emphasises.
In my paper I approach these changes of our condition on the level of a comprehensive political ontology. It is my belief that such abstraction is necessary and important for a better understanding of our present exactly due to the far-reaching changes affecting our conception of ourselves as citizens. The hope is that by approaching the disbeliefs and sense of crisis on an adequately abstract level, keeping up a diagnostic touch with empirical reality, new openings of our self-understanding may occur. Such a combination of political ontology with a diagnostic approach towards the empirical present is both a possible and plausible way of attempting “a proper balance between description, explanation and prescription in political theory”.
A strength of a Foucauldian ontology of the present is that it manages to focus on those features, practices and powers that mould the conditions of “what we are”. But it lacks adequate reflections on certain tensions within the political field itself. Rancière’s conceptualisation of the political as a dissensual and undetermined field of equality, contrasted with the cohesive forces of the institutional setting, adds an important dimension: the need to reflect more deeply on political ontological issues. However, Rancière ends up in a far too existentialist solution: politics and active transformative citizenship is rare and exist as reactions to unbearable situations of inequality. What is lacking is adequate reflection on the diverse values of institutional settings and Rancière’s conception is far too bleak and simplified on this level.
Today the very conditions of political agency and the place of institutions are changing rapidly. These real world changes affect our knowledge about citizenship by launching disbelief and a sense of crisis. For example, when the borders between political communities become blurred, some of our hitherto most well-known affirmative practices are put in doubt. Such real world changes entail (historical) ontological changes. The modes of being of citizenship, political community and institutions are no longer the same. A political egalitarianism should focus also on reconstructing what kind of institutions today might advance the possibilities for active citizenship, in contrast to only the ‘police-ing’ tendencies of institutions Foucault and Rancière emphasises.
In my paper I approach these changes of our condition on the level of a comprehensive political ontology. It is my belief that such abstraction is necessary and important for a better understanding of our present exactly due to the far-reaching changes affecting our conception of ourselves as citizens. The hope is that by approaching the disbeliefs and sense of crisis on an adequately abstract level, keeping up a diagnostic touch with empirical reality, new openings of our self-understanding may occur. Such a combination of political ontology with a diagnostic approach towards the empirical present is both a possible and plausible way of attempting “a proper balance between description, explanation and prescription in political theory”.
“Towards Multicultural Citizenship: In Defense of Normative Theory”
Rémi Léger, Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada
Like most political theorists, most theorists of multiculturalism have not been very explicit about their methodological presuppositions. Typically, they either mention that, like Joseph Carens, their approach is “contextual” or instead opt to rehearse Melissa Williams’ prescient distinction between “juridical” and “political” approaches to multicultural dilemmas. These labels, however, much like Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper famously argued about identity, have come to mean “too much, too little, or nothing at all.”
Against this backdrop, this paper sets out to do two things. First, it sketches the central characteristics and discusses the philosophical motivations of what I take to be the two main methodological approaches in the scholarship on multiculturalism: deliberation and contextualism. Briefly, deliberative multiculturalists hold that the task of the theorist is to devise proper deliberative mechanisms and lay out relevant normative and theoretical issues, while contextual multiculturalists argue that theorists should put forward normative recommendations based on a reading of multicultural dilemmas that includes accounting for normative principles, political values, historical traditions, cultural norms, and social facts.
Second, in contrast to the prevailing predisposition towards deliberation in the scholarship on multiculturalism, this paper defends the merits of contextualism. In particular, I discuss why multiculturalists should hold on to making normative recommendations, that is why we should not shy away from prescribing institutional arrangements and forms of recognition. More precisely, and as your call for paper frames it, my paper engages directly with the balance between description, explanation and prescription.
Against this backdrop, this paper sets out to do two things. First, it sketches the central characteristics and discusses the philosophical motivations of what I take to be the two main methodological approaches in the scholarship on multiculturalism: deliberation and contextualism. Briefly, deliberative multiculturalists hold that the task of the theorist is to devise proper deliberative mechanisms and lay out relevant normative and theoretical issues, while contextual multiculturalists argue that theorists should put forward normative recommendations based on a reading of multicultural dilemmas that includes accounting for normative principles, political values, historical traditions, cultural norms, and social facts.
Second, in contrast to the prevailing predisposition towards deliberation in the scholarship on multiculturalism, this paper defends the merits of contextualism. In particular, I discuss why multiculturalists should hold on to making normative recommendations, that is why we should not shy away from prescribing institutional arrangements and forms of recognition. More precisely, and as your call for paper frames it, my paper engages directly with the balance between description, explanation and prescription.
“Thinking about ‘Status’ and ‘Identity’ Together: Pierre Bourdieu’s Underestimated Contribution to the Discourse on Recognition”
Steffen Neumann, University of Victoria, Canada
Over the last few decades, different social groups and movements have confronted the cultural narratives of membership and nationhood of modern societies that tried to dismiss their past histories of exclusion and marginalization. They have seriously challenged liberalism’s false universalism in its downplaying of particularized experiences and identities in the practice of citizenship, including social markers such as ethnicity, “race,” religious beliefs, gender, sexual orientation, and so forth. The salience in these kinds of cultural claims has spawned much research in the politics of recognition and identity politics. Thus, Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth rightly asserted that recognition has become the “veritable keyword of our time.” This paper addresses this shift towards recognition by critically examining Charles Taylor’s “identity model of recognition” in contrast to Nancy Fraser’s “status model of recognition.” In doing so, it emphasizes how this false dichotomy between ‘identity’ and ‘status’ has been misleading the debate about recognition. This paper will demonstrate in particular how Taylor’s identity-based understanding of recognition has led him to the misguided conclusion that problems of cultural recognition do not correlate with (according to him, allegedly absent) problems of social status and socio-economic inequality. Conversely, Fraser’s alternative status model has restricted her to fully neglect matters of identity and subjectivity. This has serious consequences for without any concept of subjectivity, Fraser tends to be unable to address pre-political and hidden social injuries or suffering and their various impacts within the process of subjection. These impacts can function negatively as constraints and barriers for exercising democratic rights and civic freedom equally. Therefore, this paper argues that a more comprehensive understanding of recognition must entail both identity and status, integrating Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of the habitus within a new way of thinking the two together. This paper endeavours to outline this more comprehensive approach.
“From Self-Realization to Freedom? On the Meaning of Struggles for Recognition”
Renante Pilapil, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium
Today's political landscape is no longer dominated by movements inspired by orthodox Marxism that claim for an equitable share of economic resources and wealth. It is significantly interspersed by social movements on race, gender, sexuality, nationality, language, ethnicity, and religion, all driven by a common claim--recognition. While the pursuit and fulfillment of the good life requires primary goods such as rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, or wealth and income, persons also need "goods" governing their social relationships that are significant sources of well-being. Foremost of these is recognition. Due recognition is regarded as a "vital human need" or an indispensable condition for individual self-realization. Violation or deprivation of such need can motivate persons to engage in struggles for recognition. This understanding of recognition proposed by Axel Honneth has been criticized for its lack of attention to what actually happens in the struggles for recognition. The emphasis on the underlying and unchanging anthropological-normative core--the ideal of self-realization--unduly skirts the dynamics of social conflict and potentially endorses a final resolution to struggles for recognition. Contrary to Honneth, James Tully recasts the meaning of recognition by tying it up in agonistic practices of freedom. By celebrating freedom in democratic disagreements, identity politics is no longer about finding the best resolution to struggles for recognition but rather ensuring that the political games of recognition are freely played.
This paper presents and examines two approaches of recognition--one is based on the normative ideal of self-realization and the other on the democratic practices of freedom. It attempts to accomplish two things: 1) a comparison and contrast of the different arguments of both views; and 2) an exposition of their respective problematic implications. Essentially, the paper makes three claims. First, while Honneth's approach argues for the ontological, ethical, and moral grammar of struggles for recognition, Tully's approach shies away from it and focuses mainly on the rough ground of struggles themselves anchored in his theory of democracy. Second, while Honneth gives primacy to recognition as affirmation, Tully is preoccupied with the notion of contestation. And third, despite the problems of Honneth's self-realization approach to recognition, Tully's practices of freedom approach is not a superior alternative. While Tully provides a fresh and different approach to recognition, it generates new difficulties which resolution lies beyond its own resources. At best, it can only serve as a corrective measure to Honneth's approach.
This paper presents and examines two approaches of recognition--one is based on the normative ideal of self-realization and the other on the democratic practices of freedom. It attempts to accomplish two things: 1) a comparison and contrast of the different arguments of both views; and 2) an exposition of their respective problematic implications. Essentially, the paper makes three claims. First, while Honneth's approach argues for the ontological, ethical, and moral grammar of struggles for recognition, Tully's approach shies away from it and focuses mainly on the rough ground of struggles themselves anchored in his theory of democracy. Second, while Honneth gives primacy to recognition as affirmation, Tully is preoccupied with the notion of contestation. And third, despite the problems of Honneth's self-realization approach to recognition, Tully's practices of freedom approach is not a superior alternative. While Tully provides a fresh and different approach to recognition, it generates new difficulties which resolution lies beyond its own resources. At best, it can only serve as a corrective measure to Honneth's approach.
Chair: Alexandra Abranches, Universidade do Minho, Braga, Portugal
Discussant: Ángel Rivero, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain
Panel 3: Colonial and Postcolonial Resistance
Room: 3.3
“The Politicization of Black Identities and ‘Agonistic Democracy’: A Comparative Analysis of France and Colombia”
Brigitte Beauzamy, University of Warwick, UK
Angélica Montes, Université Paris 8, France
The categorization of populations as black is an emerging policy tool in democracies concerned with multiculturalism and social cohesion. Under the paradigm of the fight against discriminations, policies have been designed in order to mitigate inequalities pervasive in race relations, thereby raising the question of how the Blacks, who have been constructed as a subordinate category in social representations and practices, may be specifically targeted by public action. France and Colombia here display very contrastive landscapes: while Colombia has adopted a multicultural constitution in the 1990s and publicly acknowledges ethnic minorities, France still very much operates within a Republican color-blind framework and uses territorial or socio-economic angles to target ethnic minorities. However, both countries offer a surprisingly similar situation vis-à-vis the positioning of the Blacks at the center of political discourses on cultural diversity and its issues, even though the difficulty to provide a univocal definition of Blackness relates to specific historical patterns of colonization and migration in each country. Both France and Colombia also tend to frame policies targeting the Blacks in terms of citizenship, often claiming to facilitate the inclusion of otherwise excluded groups in the demos.
We argue that examining the definition of citizenship explicitly or implicitly contained in these public policies and discourses is essential to understanding the current politicization of Black identities in both countries. Actually, the paradigm of inclusion refers to a notion of citizenship in which it is seen as an element of social cohesion, not as the exercise of political rights in a pluralist and contested public sphere. We will demonstrate that policies aimed at mitigating discriminations against Black people and their socio-cultural integration end up co-opting so-called representatives of Black minorities into the policy process while marginalizing political actors critical of government policies. This in turn radicalizes the positions held by marginalized Black political movements or public intellectuals: they are silenced either by a dominant paradigm refusing to acknowledge the specificity of Black experiences in the French case or by other hegemonic political actors in the field of race relations, such as indigenous movements, in the Colombian case. Using Mouffe’s concept of “agonistic democracy”, we will show that the construction of Blackness as a political category is intrinsically contentious and therefore leads to a heightening of interracial social tensions. However, such dissent, the mark of a truly democratic process, is repressed in both countries to avoid an ethnicization of political discontent – but it ironically re-appears in the form of opportunities seized by a variety of political actors.
We argue that examining the definition of citizenship explicitly or implicitly contained in these public policies and discourses is essential to understanding the current politicization of Black identities in both countries. Actually, the paradigm of inclusion refers to a notion of citizenship in which it is seen as an element of social cohesion, not as the exercise of political rights in a pluralist and contested public sphere. We will demonstrate that policies aimed at mitigating discriminations against Black people and their socio-cultural integration end up co-opting so-called representatives of Black minorities into the policy process while marginalizing political actors critical of government policies. This in turn radicalizes the positions held by marginalized Black political movements or public intellectuals: they are silenced either by a dominant paradigm refusing to acknowledge the specificity of Black experiences in the French case or by other hegemonic political actors in the field of race relations, such as indigenous movements, in the Colombian case. Using Mouffe’s concept of “agonistic democracy”, we will show that the construction of Blackness as a political category is intrinsically contentious and therefore leads to a heightening of interracial social tensions. However, such dissent, the mark of a truly democratic process, is repressed in both countries to avoid an ethnicization of political discontent – but it ironically re-appears in the form of opportunities seized by a variety of political actors.
“Interculturality in Living Legal Pluralism: A Comparative Approach to Bolivia, Mozambique and Vanuatu”
Michael Klode, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, La Paz, Bolivia
Within the first theme of the conference, struggles for recognition and justice, this paper analyses three cases of interaction between formal and informal justice systems. Using a comparative approach, it argues that the normative incorporation of formal mechanisms that introduces independent (informal and non-state) legal systems for the indigenous and rural population within the formal legal apparatus of a State vary according to the social articulation of that normative challenge. Thus, this paradox – the formalization of the relations between informal and formal legal systems – lies in the center of the political debate regarding the acknowledgement of collective rights of the subjects of informal legal systems. For example in Bolivia, one of the analyzed case studies, the Morales´ government identifies itself as counter-hegemonic and is, therefore, a champion of equalizing both the formal state system and the many existing informal non-state systems through the newly elaborated Constitution. Nevertheless, the social process of filling this constitutional mandate with coordination and cooperation mechanisms or dialogue between justice operators both from formal and informal legal systems, etc, is only beginning.
The aim of this paper is to contextualize the different experiences in Bolivia, Mozambique and Vanuatu confronting each case study with the same following questions: how does the constitutional framework deal with the informal/customary/non-state legal systems and why? Are there any mechanisms that enable coordination and cooperation between state and non-state systems? What are the intercultural elements provided by the legal systems and how do they address human rights or the rule of law?
The paper does not aim to answer all of these questions, but to highlight the relevant tasks ahead, the inherent paradoxes of the postcolonial struggle of eliminating the state centered shadow in which many indigenous groups are still hidden, and to provide through the comparative approach, inputs and alternatives to face the challenge of translating social facts into a legal order or help the legal order address the relevant social facts.
One of the keys might be the concept of an intercultural approach within legal orders, but this paper suggests that there is not yet a distinctive content and proposes, therefore, as a conclusion, elements that might impulse intercultural norms as the center of interaction between formal and informal legal systems within a pluralistic scenario.
The aim of this paper is to contextualize the different experiences in Bolivia, Mozambique and Vanuatu confronting each case study with the same following questions: how does the constitutional framework deal with the informal/customary/non-state legal systems and why? Are there any mechanisms that enable coordination and cooperation between state and non-state systems? What are the intercultural elements provided by the legal systems and how do they address human rights or the rule of law?
The paper does not aim to answer all of these questions, but to highlight the relevant tasks ahead, the inherent paradoxes of the postcolonial struggle of eliminating the state centered shadow in which many indigenous groups are still hidden, and to provide through the comparative approach, inputs and alternatives to face the challenge of translating social facts into a legal order or help the legal order address the relevant social facts.
One of the keys might be the concept of an intercultural approach within legal orders, but this paper suggests that there is not yet a distinctive content and proposes, therefore, as a conclusion, elements that might impulse intercultural norms as the center of interaction between formal and informal legal systems within a pluralistic scenario.
“Circumscribed Spheres of Belonging and Action: Framing Indigenous Citizenship in Terms of ‘Non-Domination’”
Derek Kornelsen, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
In the last decade state-centred theorizing of indigenous rights has increasingly entailed a reconsideration of the traditional republican emphasis on freedom through self-rule within the context of liberal constitutionalism resulting in a dual emphasis on constitutionalism and democracy. This has also entailed a theoretical shift away from traditional liberal understandings of freedom as non-interference and towards republican conceptions of freedom as non-domination. This paper examines the potential that a theory of freedom as non-domination holds for conceiving legitimate forms of indigenous citizenship while accommodating the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination. I begin in Part I by examining Philip Pettit's claim that freedom understood as non-domination ought to be recognised as the supreme ideal guiding the structure of state institutions and state policy. While Pettit's theory offers a promising framework for dealing with some of the kinds of state domination that indigenous peoples face, I argue that he fails to adequately attend to the ways in which the practices of collective self-determination are more subtly constrained by colonial states. That is, situations in which indigenous peoples may be offered some semblance of freedom but are constrained to do so within relatively fixed legal/political orders that were constructed over them without their involvement. Thus, Part II turns to James Tully's work on democratic constitutionalism, non-domination, and the freedom of indigenous peoples in Canada vis-à-vis colonial domination. His main contribution is to conceive of democracy and constitutionalism as coequal, rendering the overarching terms of constitutional association – not merely the norms and rules delineated within – as subject to democratic legitimation. When applied to the issues surrounding indigenous self-determination Tully's framework suggests that indigenous peoples ought to be able to negotiate the terms of their inclusion into the Canadian constitutional framework on a nation-to-nation basis – that is, as nations equal in status to that of the Canadian state. However, in Part III I argue that although Tully's work offers invaluable insights into problems of colonial domination in part because he rightly identifies the context of colonial domination as a unique case requiring unique solutions, his democratic constitutionalism inadvertently reproduces some of the forms of domination that he is trying to overcome by assuming 'Aboriginality' (that is, Canadian citizenship) thus circumscribing spheres of action and belonging with respect to indigenous peoples. As I try to explain, his background commitment to an overarching Canadian polity lends an anachronistic legitimacy to the Canadian state as a comprehensive enabling site for indigenous self-determination, constraining indigenous peoples to employ their agency in ways that engender a sense of belonging to a superimposed polity. I conclude, therefore, by suggesting that a more robust theory of indigenous citizenship based on freedom as non-domination must look beyond the background conditions of a putatively sovereign state as the legitimate and comprehensive forum for the expression and realisation of the right to self-determination.
“African Struggles for Freedom after Decolonisation: State vs. Citizen in the Postcolony”
Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa
The celebrated decolonisation process produced juridical freedom, that is, freedom for the African state from colonial rule. This juridical freedom is often conflated with freedom for the citizens from oppression and exploitation. While the two forms of freedom are inextricably interlinked, there is need for critical examination of the politics and trajectories of the struggle for the freedom ‘from below’ involving ordinary citizens and excluded elites, which have continued since the time of the end of colonial rule. This paper is focused on the pathways adopted by the ordinary people in their endeavours to escape domination and abuse by the postcolonial state. The article builds on a combination of William J. Foltz (2002)’s four-dimensional thesis on ordinary citizens’ struggles for freedom as taking the form of ‘freedom for the African state;’ ‘freedom from the African state;’ ‘freedom within the African state;’ and ‘freedom through the African state system,’ and Achille Mbembe (1992; 2001)’s radical interpretation of constructions and performances of power within the postcolony. Foltz’s intervention provides an ideal entry point to critical interrogation of ordinary citizens’ responses to postcolonial state oppression and the pathways they took in search of freedom that has not received much scholarly attention. The article posits that soon after release from direct colonial rule, the postcolonial state became a leviathan and an albatross on ordinary citizens’ quest for freedom provoking new multiple struggles. Citizen struggles for freedom took various forms involving disengagement from the state; agitating for internal democratisation of the state; supporting opposition parties; trying to take control of the state; outright emigration; mocking the state; trying to influence state policy from within, agitating for secession, and other subtle and softer forms of resistance and engagement such as conviviality and use of music, jokes, comic strips and satire to reveal the vulgarity, debauchery and buffoonery of those in control of state power.
“Adivasis in and against the State: Exploring the Dynamics of Subaltern Politics and State Power in Contemporary India”
Alf Nilsen, University of Bergen, Norway
The question of the state has come to occupy a central place in recent debates on subaltern politics in contemporary India. Against those critical voices which have claimed that the emancipation of subaltern groups can only proceed by challenging and moving beyond the modern Indian state, a range of scholars and commentators have asserted that it is precisely by seeking to harness the state that social movements can hope to advance their oppositional projects. Intervening in this debate, this paper explores the ways in and extent to which the subaltern politics of Adivasi movements have managed to democratize local state-society relationships and advance rights-based legislation that has the potential to protect tribal livelihoods. The paper analyses the trajectory of two local Adivasi movements in the Bhil and Bhilala heartland of western Madhya Pradesh, as well as the Campaign for Survival and Dignity and the resultant Forest Rights Act, and discusses the conceptual lessons that can be drawn from these experiences in terms of the dynamics of subaltern politics and state power in contemporary India. Drawing on recent advances in Marxian state theory, the paper argues that a relational conception of state power and subaltern politics is needed to move beyond the theoretical impasses of both anti-statism and state-centrism and towards a politically enabling engagement with contemporary adivasi mobilization in India.
Chair: Silvia Rodríguez Maeso, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Discussant: Paula Meneses, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Panel 4: Constructing the Citizenry
Room: Sala Keynes
“Preference for People ‘like us’. Ethno-Cultural Preferentialism in Citizenship Policies”
Costica Dumbrava, European University Institute, Florence, Italy
Through the regulation of citizenship states seek to make a clear differentiation between citizens and foreigners. The mere recognition of certain individuals as members logically implies the exclusion of all others. But often citizenship norms also differentiate between different categories of citizens, as well as foreigners, to whom they ascribe different burdens and privileges. In these cases, the division is not merely between citizens and non-citizens but essentially between citizens and less-citizens, and between foreigners and less foreigners.
Despite wide commitment to citizenship equality and non-discrimination, we can still find instances where citizens enjoy different privileges and face different burdens in what regards their citizenship status. In particular circumstances, certain “original” or “natural” citizens are deemed to be worthier than others to hold up their citizenship status (e.g. emigration, acquisition of another citizenship). In a similar logic, certain citizenship laws differentiate between categories of foreigners, holding some as 'dearer', worthier, or readier for membership status than the rest.
One way to start is to identify a general category under which these differentiations could fit. My suggestion is to view them as deriving from the general vision according to which membership in “our” political community should be reserved, as far as possible, to “people like us”. Differentiation on the basis of such sameness will depend heavily on the way in which “we” is constructed. Following this logic, an ethno-centric community will welcome people that share with the members same ethno-cultural features, a socialist community will require new members to demonstrate commitment to socialism, a republican community will be open to people who are or are willing to work towards the realization of a particular common good. From this perspective, ethno-cultural preferentialism is one sub-specie of the preference for people “like us”, where “us” is defined in ethno-cultural terms. The proposed paper will first seek to identify instances of ethno-cultural preferentialism in regulations of citizenship. For this purpose, I will scrutinize citizenship rules of EU countries (27). Secondly, the paper will discuss three general justifications that underpin ethno-cultural preferentialism: democratic self-rule (“we are the people and it is us to decide”); nationalism (“we are a nation and we wave the right to prefer our fellows”); and justice (“we have a duty to bring these people in”). When discussing the issues of preferentialism for membership, two major theoretical questions come to the fore: what kind of “us” and how much of it can legitimately be put at the foundation of our political community; and how much of this “constitutional” core can be imported to the boundaries of the community (as criteria). My suggestion is that we can rid of a good deal of controversy by keeping, as much as possible, the two questions separate. In this way, concerns with the qualities of membership will not overwhelm the process of boundary making. Such approach will make ethno-cultural preferentialism less plausible even in the eyes of (some) genuine nationalists. Through the regulation of citizenship states seek to make a clear differentiation between citizens and foreigners. The mere recognition of certain individuals as members logically implies the exclusion of all others. But often citizenship norms also differentiate between different categories of citizens, as well as foreigners, to whom they ascribe different burdens and privileges. In these cases, the division is not merely between citizens and non-citizens but essentially between citizens and less-citizens, and between foreigners and less foreigners.
Despite wide commitment to citizenship equality and non-discrimination, we can still find instances where citizens enjoy different privileges and face different burdens in what regards their citizenship status. In particular circumstances, certain “original” or “natural” citizens are deemed to be worthier than others to hold up their citizenship status (e.g. emigration, acquisition of another citizenship). In a similar logic, certain citizenship laws differentiate between categories of foreigners, holding some as 'dearer', worthier, or readier for membership status than the rest.
One way to start is to identify a general category under which these differentiations could fit. My suggestion is to view them as deriving from the general vision according to which membership in “our” political community should be reserved, as far as possible, to “people like us”. Differentiation on the basis of such sameness will depend heavily on the way in which “we” is constructed. Following this logic, an ethno-centric community will welcome people that share with the members same ethno-cultural features, a socialist community will require new members to demonstrate commitment to socialism, a republican community will be open to people who are or are willing to work towards the realization of a particular common good. From this perspective, ethno-cultural preferentialism is one sub-specie of the preference for people “like us”, where “us” is defined in ethno-cultural terms. The proposed paper will first seek to identify instances of ethno-cultural preferentialism in regulations of citizenship. For this purpose, I will scrutinize citizenship rules of EU countries (27). Secondly, the paper will discuss three general justifications that underpin ethno-cultural preferentialism: democratic self-rule (“we are the people and it is us to decide”); nationalism (“we are a nation and we wave the right to prefer our fellows”); and justice (“we have a duty to bring these people in”). When discussing the issues of preferentialism for membership, two major theoretical questions come to the fore: what kind of “us” and how much of it can legitimately be put at the foundation of our political community; and how much of this “constitutional” core can be imported to the boundaries of the community (as criteria). My suggestion is that we can rid of a good deal of controversy by keeping, as much as possible, the two questions separate. In this way, concerns with the qualities of membership will not overwhelm the process of boundary making. Such approach will make ethno-cultural preferentialism less plausible even in the eyes of (some) genuine nationalists.
Despite wide commitment to citizenship equality and non-discrimination, we can still find instances where citizens enjoy different privileges and face different burdens in what regards their citizenship status. In particular circumstances, certain “original” or “natural” citizens are deemed to be worthier than others to hold up their citizenship status (e.g. emigration, acquisition of another citizenship). In a similar logic, certain citizenship laws differentiate between categories of foreigners, holding some as 'dearer', worthier, or readier for membership status than the rest.
One way to start is to identify a general category under which these differentiations could fit. My suggestion is to view them as deriving from the general vision according to which membership in “our” political community should be reserved, as far as possible, to “people like us”. Differentiation on the basis of such sameness will depend heavily on the way in which “we” is constructed. Following this logic, an ethno-centric community will welcome people that share with the members same ethno-cultural features, a socialist community will require new members to demonstrate commitment to socialism, a republican community will be open to people who are or are willing to work towards the realization of a particular common good. From this perspective, ethno-cultural preferentialism is one sub-specie of the preference for people “like us”, where “us” is defined in ethno-cultural terms. The proposed paper will first seek to identify instances of ethno-cultural preferentialism in regulations of citizenship. For this purpose, I will scrutinize citizenship rules of EU countries (27). Secondly, the paper will discuss three general justifications that underpin ethno-cultural preferentialism: democratic self-rule (“we are the people and it is us to decide”); nationalism (“we are a nation and we wave the right to prefer our fellows”); and justice (“we have a duty to bring these people in”). When discussing the issues of preferentialism for membership, two major theoretical questions come to the fore: what kind of “us” and how much of it can legitimately be put at the foundation of our political community; and how much of this “constitutional” core can be imported to the boundaries of the community (as criteria). My suggestion is that we can rid of a good deal of controversy by keeping, as much as possible, the two questions separate. In this way, concerns with the qualities of membership will not overwhelm the process of boundary making. Such approach will make ethno-cultural preferentialism less plausible even in the eyes of (some) genuine nationalists. Through the regulation of citizenship states seek to make a clear differentiation between citizens and foreigners. The mere recognition of certain individuals as members logically implies the exclusion of all others. But often citizenship norms also differentiate between different categories of citizens, as well as foreigners, to whom they ascribe different burdens and privileges. In these cases, the division is not merely between citizens and non-citizens but essentially between citizens and less-citizens, and between foreigners and less foreigners.
Despite wide commitment to citizenship equality and non-discrimination, we can still find instances where citizens enjoy different privileges and face different burdens in what regards their citizenship status. In particular circumstances, certain “original” or “natural” citizens are deemed to be worthier than others to hold up their citizenship status (e.g. emigration, acquisition of another citizenship). In a similar logic, certain citizenship laws differentiate between categories of foreigners, holding some as 'dearer', worthier, or readier for membership status than the rest.
One way to start is to identify a general category under which these differentiations could fit. My suggestion is to view them as deriving from the general vision according to which membership in “our” political community should be reserved, as far as possible, to “people like us”. Differentiation on the basis of such sameness will depend heavily on the way in which “we” is constructed. Following this logic, an ethno-centric community will welcome people that share with the members same ethno-cultural features, a socialist community will require new members to demonstrate commitment to socialism, a republican community will be open to people who are or are willing to work towards the realization of a particular common good. From this perspective, ethno-cultural preferentialism is one sub-specie of the preference for people “like us”, where “us” is defined in ethno-cultural terms. The proposed paper will first seek to identify instances of ethno-cultural preferentialism in regulations of citizenship. For this purpose, I will scrutinize citizenship rules of EU countries (27). Secondly, the paper will discuss three general justifications that underpin ethno-cultural preferentialism: democratic self-rule (“we are the people and it is us to decide”); nationalism (“we are a nation and we wave the right to prefer our fellows”); and justice (“we have a duty to bring these people in”). When discussing the issues of preferentialism for membership, two major theoretical questions come to the fore: what kind of “us” and how much of it can legitimately be put at the foundation of our political community; and how much of this “constitutional” core can be imported to the boundaries of the community (as criteria). My suggestion is that we can rid of a good deal of controversy by keeping, as much as possible, the two questions separate. In this way, concerns with the qualities of membership will not overwhelm the process of boundary making. Such approach will make ethno-cultural preferentialism less plausible even in the eyes of (some) genuine nationalists.
“Identity Crisis, Contested Citizenship and the Challenges of Democratic Governance in Nigeria since 1999”
Siyan Oyeweso, Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria
Since the rebirth of democratic governance in Nigeria in 1999, conflicts arising from questions bothering on identity, indigeneity, minority recognition claims and citizenship have led to so much bloodletting, destruction of property, social dislocation as well as forced and voluntary movements across Nigerian internal and external borders. Within the last ten years of elected civilian government, it has been estimated that over 20, 000 people have lost their lives and hundreds of thousands displaced in over 200 outbreaks of violence traceable to identity, indigeneity and citizenship disputes. Indeed, in many parts of contemporary Nigeria, residents are worried more about identity and citizenship-based violence than other priority crimes. This paper defines identity and the basis of identity construction in Nigeria, and draws specific linkage between identity politics and the spate internecine violence across the Nigerian territorial landscape. Apart from examining Nigeria’s key identity groups and their geographical distributions, the paper further discusses the implications of identity based violence on development and national integration. The study argues that using indigeneity as a basis for accessing resources creates the greatest challenge to national integration in Nigeria. Specifically, the paper identifies key flashpoints in Nigeria and the extent to which identity and citizenship continue to be redefined to suit contemporary needs. Essentially, the paper explores the historical dynamics of the citizenship crisis in Nigeria with a view to proffering possible solutions to the problems posed by mismanagement of Nigerian cultural and ethnic diversities in such a way that these endless cycle of citizen-on-citizen violence would abate to make way for greater national integration and harmonious coexistence.
“The Logics of Identification: Fingerprinting and Nationality in Northeast Asia”
Sara Park, Kyoto University, Japan
The purpose of this paper is to examine what kind of idea provides citizenship to nationals and foreigners in Northeast Asia. In order to secure citizenship, states need to establish clear measures who belongs to the state, and how to identify nationals. In the process to realize these two aims, some people will be excluded from full-citizenship, which is called as “de facto exclusion” (Castles and Davidson 2000, p11) by nation-states, or the innate limit of contemporary citizenship.
Through historical-sociological research on fingerprinting system in South Korea and Japan, this paper tries to find out how and why the two countries introduced the identification measures to distinct nationals and foreigners. Known as most homogeneous countries, these two governments are also notorious for its identification system, namely, fingerprint registration to nationals (South Korea) and to foreigners (Japan). Recent historical surveys have discovered that the key lies in the state building process in early post-war period.
Following the defeat of Japan in 1945, an enormous number of people sought to cross or return across state boundaries throughout Northeast Asia. In process and duration, their experiences were highly varied. Even if people reached their destinations, they were often compelled to move again due to war and unstable social situations under the new conditions of the Cold War. In many regions where used to be parts of Japanese Empire had to refine their border and migration systems, dealing with mass traffic on one hand and wars and conflicts on the other. The fingerprinting registration was introduced to South Korea and Japan almost at the same time, in order to control this traffic and to capture “illegal migrants” who were thought to be “communists”.
First, citing oral and written sources from and about “illegal entrants”, I argue that state building under Cold War turned certain people into national enemy in South Korea, who had to and tried to leave the country. Then I turn to their situation in receiving country, Japan, where these people were apprehended as “illegal entrants”, although they held Japanese nationality. Finally, I figure out which political situation allowed fingerprint registration, and how it was introduced.
Through historical-sociological research on fingerprinting system in South Korea and Japan, this paper tries to find out how and why the two countries introduced the identification measures to distinct nationals and foreigners. Known as most homogeneous countries, these two governments are also notorious for its identification system, namely, fingerprint registration to nationals (South Korea) and to foreigners (Japan). Recent historical surveys have discovered that the key lies in the state building process in early post-war period.
Following the defeat of Japan in 1945, an enormous number of people sought to cross or return across state boundaries throughout Northeast Asia. In process and duration, their experiences were highly varied. Even if people reached their destinations, they were often compelled to move again due to war and unstable social situations under the new conditions of the Cold War. In many regions where used to be parts of Japanese Empire had to refine their border and migration systems, dealing with mass traffic on one hand and wars and conflicts on the other. The fingerprinting registration was introduced to South Korea and Japan almost at the same time, in order to control this traffic and to capture “illegal migrants” who were thought to be “communists”.
First, citing oral and written sources from and about “illegal entrants”, I argue that state building under Cold War turned certain people into national enemy in South Korea, who had to and tried to leave the country. Then I turn to their situation in receiving country, Japan, where these people were apprehended as “illegal entrants”, although they held Japanese nationality. Finally, I figure out which political situation allowed fingerprint registration, and how it was introduced.
“‘We Are Family Too!’ – Same-Sex Intimate Citizenship in Portugal”
Ana Cristina Santos, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
According to the Eurobarometer (2003), 93% of Portuguese citizens say ‘the family’ is the most important aspect of their lives. But defining what a family is or what it is not is a difficult task. The Portuguese Civil Code, under Family Law, states that there are four juridical sources of family relationships – marriage, kinship, affinity and adoption (Article 1576). Each of these sources of family relationships is influenced by the premise of heterosexuality (Butler, 2002). However, legal definitions of ‘the family’ are object of dispute, and they have been targeted by the LGBT movement in recent years. In the Portuguese context, as this paper will highlight, this has been a central field of contestation on the part of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) activism, with impact on “law’s families” (Diduck, 2003) or how LGBT relational-claims (i.e., those related to the recognition of relationships and parenthood) contribute to widening the legal understanding of ‘the family’.
In this paper, I examine the relationship between same-sex relational claims and socio-legal obstacles and advances, highlighting the centrality of two major value-discourses (Williams and Roseneil, 2004) in Portugal: ‘the family’ and ‘the child’. I then discuss the heteronormative value-discourse of ‘the family’ as particularly important in Portuguese legal texts. I suggest that LGBT rights face a situation of ‘normative ambiguity’ (Krieger, 2003) – on the one hand, the Portuguese Constitution provides protection from (individual) discrimination; on the other hand, specific laws mirror the heteronormative value-discourses of the lawmaker, preserving the law as a site of (relational) discrimination. This opposition is counterbalanced by a recent shift, after Portugal became the 8th country worldwide to allow same-sex civil marriage. The last section of the paper explores signs of socio-legal change and examines the underlying reasons for them, putting particular emphasis on activists’ proactive engagement with political parties in recent years.
In this paper, I examine the relationship between same-sex relational claims and socio-legal obstacles and advances, highlighting the centrality of two major value-discourses (Williams and Roseneil, 2004) in Portugal: ‘the family’ and ‘the child’. I then discuss the heteronormative value-discourse of ‘the family’ as particularly important in Portuguese legal texts. I suggest that LGBT rights face a situation of ‘normative ambiguity’ (Krieger, 2003) – on the one hand, the Portuguese Constitution provides protection from (individual) discrimination; on the other hand, specific laws mirror the heteronormative value-discourses of the lawmaker, preserving the law as a site of (relational) discrimination. This opposition is counterbalanced by a recent shift, after Portugal became the 8th country worldwide to allow same-sex civil marriage. The last section of the paper explores signs of socio-legal change and examines the underlying reasons for them, putting particular emphasis on activists’ proactive engagement with political parties in recent years.
Chair: Maria José Canelo, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Discussant: Makau Mutua, SUNY, Buffalo, USA
Panel 5: Migration, Stigmatization and Resistance
Room: A.3.1
“Undesirable Citizens: Exclusions and Gradations in the Canadian Body Politic”
Jeff Myers, University of Toronto, Canada
Despite the contested, contextualized, and multiple dimensions of “citizenship”, in the context of Canadian government policy, it has largely been a symbolic gatekeeping tool wherein some people are admitted to full legal and political membership in the state while others are excluded. Moreover, despite the philosophical foundations of citizenship as a democratic equalizer, the system of Canadian citizenship enforcement, regulation, and education has tended to create gradations among prospective citizens, and between prospective citizens and already-Canadians. Both of these trends – exclusion and gradation – continue to be integral parts of Canadian citizenship 60 years after its inception. In concert with immigration policy, this setup continues to define who is and who is not “Canadian”, and who is a “good” versus who is a “bad” Canadian, definitions which have in part contributed to the hegemony of those Canadians who are white, male, able-bodied, heterosexual, and not poor.
This presentation explores how this arrangement is increasingly out of touch with the realities of the 21st century, where issues such as global migration, multiculturalism, and cultural hybridity call into question the naturalness of the nation-state and singular state narratives. In light of the tensions that have emerged, citizenship is a more and more problematic – and problematized – concept. While recognizing that states have a justifiable interest in setting citizenship inclusion criteria, the research critically examines how, in the Canadian system, the criteria also helps to maintain hegemonic constructions, which have long masqueraded as “truths”. These constructions are at odds with the rhetoric of multiculturalism and tolerance that permeates the modern Canadian state. The presentation will critically explore this issue from three angles: conceptual difficulties with the notion of citizenship itself; an historical overview of Canadian citizenship and immigration policy over the past 60 years vis-à-vis the exclusions and gradations engendered; and preliminary analysis of interviews with people who belong to groups that have been historically or contemporarily excluded or (de)graded.
This presentation explores how this arrangement is increasingly out of touch with the realities of the 21st century, where issues such as global migration, multiculturalism, and cultural hybridity call into question the naturalness of the nation-state and singular state narratives. In light of the tensions that have emerged, citizenship is a more and more problematic – and problematized – concept. While recognizing that states have a justifiable interest in setting citizenship inclusion criteria, the research critically examines how, in the Canadian system, the criteria also helps to maintain hegemonic constructions, which have long masqueraded as “truths”. These constructions are at odds with the rhetoric of multiculturalism and tolerance that permeates the modern Canadian state. The presentation will critically explore this issue from three angles: conceptual difficulties with the notion of citizenship itself; an historical overview of Canadian citizenship and immigration policy over the past 60 years vis-à-vis the exclusions and gradations engendered; and preliminary analysis of interviews with people who belong to groups that have been historically or contemporarily excluded or (de)graded.
“Sikh Citizenship in Postcolonial Britain”
Katy Sian, University of Leeds, UK
This paper sets out to explore Sikh citizenship in relation to the UK. The Sikh diaspora has a complex and somewhat intimate relationship with Britain, serving in the British army and being regarded as the ‘favoured’ sons of the Empire. Following the collapse of British colonialism and India’s independence many Sikhs migrated and settled in the UK. What we want to discuss in this paper is to what extent are Sikhs regarded citizens in Britain, they are currently protected under the race-relations act, and are generally seen as an integrated community. However, in the current climate in the wake of the ‘war on terror’, Sikhs are increasingly finding their identity under the spotlight as they are mistaken for Muslims, the antithesis of the West.
How have such events impacted Sikh citizenship and notions of belonging? Where do Sikhs in the UK position themselves and what role has the Muslim ‘enemy’ played in identifications with the nation and national majority? What are the implications of a handful of Sikhs now entering and representing far right, xenophobic groups targeting Muslims? To explore these themes I will draw upon the 1970s Sikh protests in Britain against the banning of the turban. This issue mobilised disenfranchised Sikhs facing discrimination, and thus put into question some of the assumptions about their relationship to the British Empire and their citizenship of post-imperial Britain.
Forty years on it is arguable that among Britain’s ethnically marked citizens Sikhs are considered to be largely assimilated and as such the turban is no longer seen as a marker of radical difference. In this paper we will explore the struggle over the meaning of the turban as a signifier for Sikhness and the implications it has for belonging in postcolonial Britain with the so called ‘looming’ Muslim threat.
How have such events impacted Sikh citizenship and notions of belonging? Where do Sikhs in the UK position themselves and what role has the Muslim ‘enemy’ played in identifications with the nation and national majority? What are the implications of a handful of Sikhs now entering and representing far right, xenophobic groups targeting Muslims? To explore these themes I will draw upon the 1970s Sikh protests in Britain against the banning of the turban. This issue mobilised disenfranchised Sikhs facing discrimination, and thus put into question some of the assumptions about their relationship to the British Empire and their citizenship of post-imperial Britain.
Forty years on it is arguable that among Britain’s ethnically marked citizens Sikhs are considered to be largely assimilated and as such the turban is no longer seen as a marker of radical difference. In this paper we will explore the struggle over the meaning of the turban as a signifier for Sikhness and the implications it has for belonging in postcolonial Britain with the so called ‘looming’ Muslim threat.
“The Law of Illegal Peoples: Undocumented Immigration and a Theory of Domestic Justice without Nationality or Citizenship as its Starting Point”
Grant Silva, University of Oregon, USA
In 1971, Roger Nett called the freedom of human movement across the globe “the civil right we are not ready for.” Over three decades later, in the spring of 2006, large immigrant rights protests took place in cities across the United States. Using Spanish language radio, cell-phones, the Internet, and word of mouth, thousands of high school and college students, service workers, professionals and ordinary people (many but not all Hispanic) organized, walked out of school or work, and marched into the streets of cities like downtown Los Angeles. Besides signaling another round of civil protests, these events made visible the debates surrounding national identity, national citizenship and undocumented immigrant rights in an unprecedented way. For many Hispanics, these events signaled their unique political existence, the birth of a new “citizen,” so to speak. It is this political existence—and the theoretical and practical problems that it posses to traditional theories of national identity, liberal policies of exclusion and global theories of justice—that this project explores.
This project assumes an epistemological standpoint external to the nation-state, i.e. the perspective of undocumented immigrants. This conceptual re-orientation proves invaluable to thinking about justice in novel ways. Theories of justice that do not take into account the international elements of 21st century societies need reconsideration: although John Rawls’ work remains central to political philosophy in the United States, by constricting his theory of justice to a closed, self-sustaining polity that assumes all persons behind the veil of ignorance to be citizens, the trajectory of liberal political thought after his work evades the question of citizenship and social justice for undocumented people; similarly, while conversations about “multicultural citizenship” are abundant in North American political contexts, these discussions focus on the national representation of minority peoples and unfortunately ignore the legalities of citizenship and the reality of undocumented immigration; other North American and European political philosophers express interest in the idea of citizenship insofar as it relates to cosmopolitanism and global/international justice. These pursuits provide significant headway into discussions of international relations and justice without borders. Nevertheless, they detract from the legal dimensions of citizenship for undocumented people by focusing on global citizenship. In a world with a global-demos or a political world union no one can be “illegal.”
This project, however, explores the question of justice for undocumented immigrants in nation-states as they actually are: the sites of sovereign power claims backed by militaristic borders and in need of cheap, expendable labor. The question of national assumptions and arrested notions of justice thus serves as the next set of hurdles for liberal political theory. I turn to the work of Ètienne Balibar, Phillip Cole and Enrique Dussel as sources for thinking about justice from the outside of nationality, i.e. a theory of justice for people who maintain the type of marginalized social positioning mentioned above. Not only is a domestic theory of justice without national constraints possible, but this idea reflects the actual ways in which the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution provides rights to persons and not citizens.
This project assumes an epistemological standpoint external to the nation-state, i.e. the perspective of undocumented immigrants. This conceptual re-orientation proves invaluable to thinking about justice in novel ways. Theories of justice that do not take into account the international elements of 21st century societies need reconsideration: although John Rawls’ work remains central to political philosophy in the United States, by constricting his theory of justice to a closed, self-sustaining polity that assumes all persons behind the veil of ignorance to be citizens, the trajectory of liberal political thought after his work evades the question of citizenship and social justice for undocumented people; similarly, while conversations about “multicultural citizenship” are abundant in North American political contexts, these discussions focus on the national representation of minority peoples and unfortunately ignore the legalities of citizenship and the reality of undocumented immigration; other North American and European political philosophers express interest in the idea of citizenship insofar as it relates to cosmopolitanism and global/international justice. These pursuits provide significant headway into discussions of international relations and justice without borders. Nevertheless, they detract from the legal dimensions of citizenship for undocumented people by focusing on global citizenship. In a world with a global-demos or a political world union no one can be “illegal.”
This project, however, explores the question of justice for undocumented immigrants in nation-states as they actually are: the sites of sovereign power claims backed by militaristic borders and in need of cheap, expendable labor. The question of national assumptions and arrested notions of justice thus serves as the next set of hurdles for liberal political theory. I turn to the work of Ètienne Balibar, Phillip Cole and Enrique Dussel as sources for thinking about justice from the outside of nationality, i.e. a theory of justice for people who maintain the type of marginalized social positioning mentioned above. Not only is a domestic theory of justice without national constraints possible, but this idea reflects the actual ways in which the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution provides rights to persons and not citizens.
Chair: Mathias Thaler, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Discussant: Rainer Bauböck, European University Institute, Florence, Italy
Panel 6: Citizenship beyond Boundaries
Room: 3.4
“Unexpected Citizens: Sex Work, Mobility, Europe”
Rutvica Andrijasevic, Centre for Labour Market Studies, University of Leicester
Much emphasis is placed today in Europe on citizens’ participation and engagement and on strengthening the communication between citizens and the EU institutions. While European institutions are increasingly concerned with the lack of citizen participation and attempt to foster European citizenship they are paradoxically unable to see acts of citizen mobilization. Exemplary in this regard would be the actions of 17th October 2005, when a Declaration on the Rights of Sex Workers was presented in the European Parliament. The conference, the consultation process that preceded it and the presentation of the Declaration are paradigmatic forms of active citizenship. However, the organisation, mobilisation and rights claims by sex workers around Europe and beyond are not recognised as political participation. How are we to understand this inattention by European institutions and representatives to a form of citizen action and democratic participation? Why are the presentation, endorsement and signing of the
Declaration of the Rights of Sex Workers in Europe in the EP not more widely recognised as significant political actions?
I suggest that the dismissal of the Declaration and of the sex workers’ mobilisation is to be found in the idea of who can be a legitimate actor in the EU and what counts as a legitimate political action. This inattention derives from citizenship having received a purely normative juridical treatment (at the legislative or regulative level), or a deductive treatment which proceeds form a pre-existing concept of citizenship and of the citizen at the European level. The sex workers' actions do not fully fit the legislative and regulative institutionalization of citizenship. They self-organise as a collective subject rather than having recourse to pre-given civil society mediators. To draw out the political significance of this mobilization for European citizenship, a different conception of citizenship is required. In this paper (co-authored with Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans and Vicki Squire), I draw on the concepts of ‘acts of citizenship’ (Isin 2008) and ‘sociality of mobility’ (Aradau, Huysmans, Squire 2011) to show the limits of the EU’s understanding of citizenship and free movement, but also its potential of being opened up and reformulated in new sites by subjects who act as citizens. Accordingly, I will discuss the ways in which The sex workers who mobilise around the Declaration and the manifesto disrupt given understandings of what counts as a citizen and political action in the EU.
Declaration of the Rights of Sex Workers in Europe in the EP not more widely recognised as significant political actions?
I suggest that the dismissal of the Declaration and of the sex workers’ mobilisation is to be found in the idea of who can be a legitimate actor in the EU and what counts as a legitimate political action. This inattention derives from citizenship having received a purely normative juridical treatment (at the legislative or regulative level), or a deductive treatment which proceeds form a pre-existing concept of citizenship and of the citizen at the European level. The sex workers' actions do not fully fit the legislative and regulative institutionalization of citizenship. They self-organise as a collective subject rather than having recourse to pre-given civil society mediators. To draw out the political significance of this mobilization for European citizenship, a different conception of citizenship is required. In this paper (co-authored with Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans and Vicki Squire), I draw on the concepts of ‘acts of citizenship’ (Isin 2008) and ‘sociality of mobility’ (Aradau, Huysmans, Squire 2011) to show the limits of the EU’s understanding of citizenship and free movement, but also its potential of being opened up and reformulated in new sites by subjects who act as citizens. Accordingly, I will discuss the ways in which The sex workers who mobilise around the Declaration and the manifesto disrupt given understandings of what counts as a citizen and political action in the EU.
“Choices under Constraint: Redefinitions of Protection and Empowerment Options for Migrants and Marginalized Groups”
Marina Kaneti, New School for Social Research, New York, USA
Protection and empowerment of migrants and marginalized groups are at the core of international conventions and protocols. To this end, both protection and empowerment are built on (at least) three interrelated, yet highly problematic, foundations. First, both protection and empowerment are directly aligned with the objectives of the international human rights regime and respond to universal notion of individual rights (the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, UDHR, in particular). This, however, has been deemed problematic, a Western-world imposition, by many states and peoples who were not even in existence in 1948 when the UDHR was ratified. Second, because of the nature of international conventions, both protection and empowerment necessitate an agent, such as a sovereign nation-state or an international body, to execute on specified objectives leading to protection and empowerment. Concurrently, citizenship and welfare entitlements become one with the notions of empowerment and protection. However, nation-states, and liberal democracies in particular, have a prior commitment to their own (voting) population than to migrants or the marginalized. Third, both protection and empowerment necessitate the adoption of a state-imposed categorization and identification that could conflict with a person’s individual understanding of self, and limit the spectrum of exercise of individual agency. As Baubock points out, the liberal conception of equating the state and the individual facilitated through the human rights regime fails to establish an equal footing for states and individuals – ‘individuals are merely bearers of rights but not authors of law.’ Human rights, protection and empowerment are thus devised independently and outside the persons they seek to impact and effectively strip the latter from the possibility to enact their own understanding of autonomy and self-reliance.
How relevant is this complex contingency design for those in need of alternatives to protection and empowerment? Further, if today the space for negotiation is restricted by the territorial and legal boundaries of nation-states, are peoples’ possibilities to enact freedom, rights, and autonomy inherently limited to forms of socio-economic inclusion and modes of representation granted by the state? Concurrently, what do such limitations mean to people who are already disadvantaged by structural constraints – be those migrants, underprivileged, or marginalized persons? Are there alternative modes for exercise of agency? How do people who do not have rights act so as to ‘have the rights that they have not’?
This paper examines a number of empirical cases highlighting the tension between internationally stipulated protection and empowerment, on one hand, and individual attempts at autonomy, agency and self-determination, on the other. In particular, the paper explores tensions arising from several sets of dichotomies: First, tensions arising from protection and empowerment based on ‘status’ (legality) rather than on ‘being’ (pure humanity). Second, empowerment and re-integration as contingent upon observance of an imposed set of rights and obligations rather than on individual agency and right for self-determination. Third, building on Balibar’s concept of anti-violence, the paper examines structural arrangements that make the ‘civil state’ more violent than the ‘state of nature.’
How relevant is this complex contingency design for those in need of alternatives to protection and empowerment? Further, if today the space for negotiation is restricted by the territorial and legal boundaries of nation-states, are peoples’ possibilities to enact freedom, rights, and autonomy inherently limited to forms of socio-economic inclusion and modes of representation granted by the state? Concurrently, what do such limitations mean to people who are already disadvantaged by structural constraints – be those migrants, underprivileged, or marginalized persons? Are there alternative modes for exercise of agency? How do people who do not have rights act so as to ‘have the rights that they have not’?
This paper examines a number of empirical cases highlighting the tension between internationally stipulated protection and empowerment, on one hand, and individual attempts at autonomy, agency and self-determination, on the other. In particular, the paper explores tensions arising from several sets of dichotomies: First, tensions arising from protection and empowerment based on ‘status’ (legality) rather than on ‘being’ (pure humanity). Second, empowerment and re-integration as contingent upon observance of an imposed set of rights and obligations rather than on individual agency and right for self-determination. Third, building on Balibar’s concept of anti-violence, the paper examines structural arrangements that make the ‘civil state’ more violent than the ‘state of nature.’
“Towards a Cosmopolitan and Inclusive European Citizenship Regime? Negotiating Immigrants’ Inclusion and Exclusion in the New Europe”
Oliver Schmidtke, University of Victoria, Canada
One of the key normative expectations concerning an emerging European identity and transnational citizenship regime is that they are cosmopolitan in nature and to a large degree exempt from the exclusionary underpinnings of traditional national identities. A European citizenship regime is widely expected to provide an environment in which traditional modes of social closure and discrimination against the allegedly inferior ‘other’ become less and less acceptable as a social and political practice. This paper discusses this normative supposition analyzing how codes of belonging and identity are reproduced in the European public sphere and how they inform citizenship practices and policies vis-à-vis immigrants. The key hypothesis developed in this presentation will point to a deep ambivalence that characterizes an emerging European citizenship status: On the one hand, European identity markers are likely to undermine traditional forms of exclusion and, also in terms of their (EU) policy implications, advocate a commitment to equality and non-discrimination. The nascent European citizenship regime has institutionalized important steps towards forms of recognition and legal entitlements beyond the logic of the Westphalian world of exclusive nation-states. On the other hand, the normalcy of a transnational community of migrants in Europe has also produced the notion of the extra-communitari or étrangers extra-communautaires, the non-EU, non-Western migrant, whose status is defined largely by a newly emerging pejorative identity. This logic of exclusion informs policies toward unwanted (illegal) migrants from non-Western backgrounds as becomes prominently manifest in the fortification of the EU’s external borders. In this latter respect, the inclusive logic of a trans- or postnational European identity is poised to produce new forms of social exclusion. This hypothesis will be discussed based on the results of a three-year international research project that focuses on pattern of social and economic integration of migrants in three European countries and Canada.
Chair: Paulo Barcelos, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal
Discussant: Cecília MacDowell Santos, University of San Francisco, USA/Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Panel 7: Environmental Justice
Room: G. da Silva
“Rights of Resistance: Struggling for Ecological Democracy in the 21st Century”
Marco Armiero, Universitat Autonoma, Barcelona, Spain
Giacomo D'Alisa, Universitat Autonoma, Barcelona, Spain
In facing global ecological problems, such as climate change, most politicians seem to forget about citizenships, democracy, and justice ; in current political discourse, ‘saving the world’ sounds like a mission transcending the politics of democracy and citizenship – as was clearly stated by US vice president Al Gore in his An Inconvenient Truth.
But is this the case? Is it true that the ecological crisis transcends democracy, thereby lying outside of the political sphere? In this paper, we argue that this is not the case; rather, the emergence of ecological rights and struggles has changed the very definitions and borders of both the political and the environmental. . In particular, we believe that the rise of a new environmentalism, connecting civil rights with social and environmental justice, has been challenging the traditional production and practices of democracy, science, and mobilization. We will explore the emergence of both the Environmental Justice Movement (EJM) in North America and of the Environmentalism of the Poor (EOP) in the global South. Fighting for environmental justice, activists north and south have elaborated a new grammar of civil rights and new narratives of oppression and empowerment. They have challenged the very assumption that environmental concerns are luxuries for wealthy people, or, using Ronald Inglehart’s definition, expressions of dematerialization in western societies. They also confront the faith in technological solutions and the very process of construction of scientific knowledge, calling for the rise of a ‘post-normal science’ paradigm).
The paper is formed of two parts. In the first, basing on an overview of recent literature in the field, we will propose an interpretation of EJM and EOP as examples of struggles over the meanings of citizenship rights, participation, and democracy, stressing the blending of politics and ecology in both narratives and practices. The second part will be focused on one particular case study, the conflict over garbage disposal in the metropolitan area of Naples (Italy), which clearly reveals the political nature of the current ‘ecological crisis’.
But is this the case? Is it true that the ecological crisis transcends democracy, thereby lying outside of the political sphere? In this paper, we argue that this is not the case; rather, the emergence of ecological rights and struggles has changed the very definitions and borders of both the political and the environmental. . In particular, we believe that the rise of a new environmentalism, connecting civil rights with social and environmental justice, has been challenging the traditional production and practices of democracy, science, and mobilization. We will explore the emergence of both the Environmental Justice Movement (EJM) in North America and of the Environmentalism of the Poor (EOP) in the global South. Fighting for environmental justice, activists north and south have elaborated a new grammar of civil rights and new narratives of oppression and empowerment. They have challenged the very assumption that environmental concerns are luxuries for wealthy people, or, using Ronald Inglehart’s definition, expressions of dematerialization in western societies. They also confront the faith in technological solutions and the very process of construction of scientific knowledge, calling for the rise of a ‘post-normal science’ paradigm).
The paper is formed of two parts. In the first, basing on an overview of recent literature in the field, we will propose an interpretation of EJM and EOP as examples of struggles over the meanings of citizenship rights, participation, and democracy, stressing the blending of politics and ecology in both narratives and practices. The second part will be focused on one particular case study, the conflict over garbage disposal in the metropolitan area of Naples (Italy), which clearly reveals the political nature of the current ‘ecological crisis’.
“Overcoming Apocalypse: Democratic Citizenship as a Dimension of Climate Change Adaptation”
Andrew Biro, Acadia University, Wolfville, Canada
The consensus view of climate scientists is that anthropogenic climate “forcing” is sufficiently advanced that even if political obstacles were overcome and human beings immediately and dramatically decreased greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, significant global warming would nevertheless occur (IPCC 2007). As a result, attention in climate change politics is increasingly being focused on climate change adaptation as well as climate change mitigation. At the same time, research on climate change communication has increasingly problematized the use of “doom-laden,” “apocalyptic” or “catastrophic” narrative frames (Ereaut & Singer, 2006; Hulme 2008; Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2007; Swyngedouw, 2010), largely on the grounds that such narratives prove to be politically disabling in a variety of ways.
Bringing together these seemingly disparate problematics, highlights the ways in which the practices and capacities of democratic citizenship might constitute an important (and underappreciated) dimension of climate change adaptation. If the broadening and deepening of human autonomy remains a desirable end even under changed climatic conditions, then contemporary responses to climate change must be assessed by (among other things) the extent to which they will facilitate and enhance robust conceptions of democratic citizen engagement.
Bringing together these seemingly disparate problematics, highlights the ways in which the practices and capacities of democratic citizenship might constitute an important (and underappreciated) dimension of climate change adaptation. If the broadening and deepening of human autonomy remains a desirable end even under changed climatic conditions, then contemporary responses to climate change must be assessed by (among other things) the extent to which they will facilitate and enhance robust conceptions of democratic citizen engagement.
“Shipbreaking at Alang–Sosiya (India): An Ecological Distribution Conflict”
Federico Demaria, Universitat Autonoma, Barcelona, Spain
More than 80% of international trade in goods by volume is carried by sea. The shipping industry constitutes a key element in the infrastructure of the world's social metabolism. Ocean-going ships are owned and used for their trade by developed countries but are often demolished, together with their toxic materials, in developing countries. Ship breaking is the process of dismantling an obsolete vessel's structure for scrapping or disposal. The Alang–Sosiya yard (India), one of the world largest shipbreaking yards, is studied here with particular attention to toxic waste management. Ship owners and ship breakers obtain large profits dumping the environmental costs on workers, local farmers and fishers. Shipbreaking in the developing world is not just an externality but a successful case of cost shifting, or else, profit accumulation by contamination.
This unequal distribution of benefits and burdens, due to an international and national uneven distribution of power, has led to an ecological distribution conflict. The controversy at the Indian Supreme Court in 2006 over the dismantling of the ocean liner ‘Blue Lady,’ shows how the different languages of valuation expressed by different social groups clashed. The paper will address the analysis of the Blue lady court case as an insight into the framing conflict, meaning the struggle over reality construction. Different actors participated in the ‘politics of signification’ (Hall, 1982). There were environmentalists, villagers, shipbreakers and the Indian authorities. Actors involved are signifying agents engaged in the production of alternative and contentious meanings (Benford and Snow, 2000). They undertook two core framing tasks: diagnostic and prognostic. The first concerns the definition of what the problem is and who is responsible; the second regards the proposed solutions. In particular, the paper analyses the different attitudes expressed by these actors to the different methods of waste management, and the different valuation languages they used to frame the issue. During the court hearings, the resistance of workers, farmers and fishers to the dispossession of their health, livelihood and clean environment turned out to be a struggle for justice and recognition. Not all citizens have the same right to signify; frameworks and contexts, such as the judicial one, are not neutral. In fact the Supreme Court decided chose the language of the powerful, interpreting ‘Development’ as the dominant (read hegemonic) ideology with the most substantive power to signify. As a result, while shipbreaking continues, farmers and fishers, who are loosing their livelihood environment, remain invisible.
This unequal distribution of benefits and burdens, due to an international and national uneven distribution of power, has led to an ecological distribution conflict. The controversy at the Indian Supreme Court in 2006 over the dismantling of the ocean liner ‘Blue Lady,’ shows how the different languages of valuation expressed by different social groups clashed. The paper will address the analysis of the Blue lady court case as an insight into the framing conflict, meaning the struggle over reality construction. Different actors participated in the ‘politics of signification’ (Hall, 1982). There were environmentalists, villagers, shipbreakers and the Indian authorities. Actors involved are signifying agents engaged in the production of alternative and contentious meanings (Benford and Snow, 2000). They undertook two core framing tasks: diagnostic and prognostic. The first concerns the definition of what the problem is and who is responsible; the second regards the proposed solutions. In particular, the paper analyses the different attitudes expressed by these actors to the different methods of waste management, and the different valuation languages they used to frame the issue. During the court hearings, the resistance of workers, farmers and fishers to the dispossession of their health, livelihood and clean environment turned out to be a struggle for justice and recognition. Not all citizens have the same right to signify; frameworks and contexts, such as the judicial one, are not neutral. In fact the Supreme Court decided chose the language of the powerful, interpreting ‘Development’ as the dominant (read hegemonic) ideology with the most substantive power to signify. As a result, while shipbreaking continues, farmers and fishers, who are loosing their livelihood environment, remain invisible.
“Environmental Justice in Brazil: The Conflict of Camargos District in Belo Horizonte – Minas Gerais”
Lays Helena Paes e Silva, Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal
The paper will analyze the conflict which developed around the issue of medical waste incineration in a low income neighborhood in the northwest area of Belo Horizonte, the Camargos district. Starting as a technical/scientific controversy, the conflict actively involved a local citizens’ movement struggling for broader issues of recognition and justice. In the process political and social tensions also manifested in various ways, requiring the emergence of new collective actors within the controversy itself.
In 2003 SERQUIP, a hospital and industrial incineration company, was settled in Camargos. The facility would begin to work with an operating license granted by the City Councilor for the Environment. The local population was given no information about the company or its activities, nor any visible signs enabled people to identify the new installment as an hazardous facility. Two years after the incinerator had started to function, causing various environmental and public health problems, local citizens mobilized against it: the emerging conflict ended up challenging not only the location of that particular installment, or the environmental and social viability of the incineration process, but mostly the legitimacy of the entire decision making process regarding incineration and other environmental policies. The conflict opposed different understandings of environmental regulations and policies, and demanded public powers to ponder what is at stake when hazardous facilities are planned, negotiated and implemented in the local space.
In general, controversies concerning waste incineration result from the confrontation of the views and interests of different social actors – social movements, business groups, scientists and experts and political representatives – organized as groups. Each group is constituted around a specific set of statements about the benefits and drawbacks of the incineration process. What I intend to highlight in this paper is the fact that such conflicts are not only of technical nature, but crucially involve the exercise of citizenship rights, challenging the very functioning of modern democracy. Mapping the socio-political geography of the Camargos controversy, the paper will show how, in unequal societies, the racially discriminated groups and low income populations – in short, vulnerable and marginalized groups – bear most of the environmental damage caused by development. The emergence of ‘environmental justice’ issues spur the mobilization of new collective actors, which organize in order to respond to these threats – both to life and environmental quality – and uneven vulnerability, struggling for the recognition of environmental equality as a civil right.
In 2003 SERQUIP, a hospital and industrial incineration company, was settled in Camargos. The facility would begin to work with an operating license granted by the City Councilor for the Environment. The local population was given no information about the company or its activities, nor any visible signs enabled people to identify the new installment as an hazardous facility. Two years after the incinerator had started to function, causing various environmental and public health problems, local citizens mobilized against it: the emerging conflict ended up challenging not only the location of that particular installment, or the environmental and social viability of the incineration process, but mostly the legitimacy of the entire decision making process regarding incineration and other environmental policies. The conflict opposed different understandings of environmental regulations and policies, and demanded public powers to ponder what is at stake when hazardous facilities are planned, negotiated and implemented in the local space.
In general, controversies concerning waste incineration result from the confrontation of the views and interests of different social actors – social movements, business groups, scientists and experts and political representatives – organized as groups. Each group is constituted around a specific set of statements about the benefits and drawbacks of the incineration process. What I intend to highlight in this paper is the fact that such conflicts are not only of technical nature, but crucially involve the exercise of citizenship rights, challenging the very functioning of modern democracy. Mapping the socio-political geography of the Camargos controversy, the paper will show how, in unequal societies, the racially discriminated groups and low income populations – in short, vulnerable and marginalized groups – bear most of the environmental damage caused by development. The emergence of ‘environmental justice’ issues spur the mobilization of new collective actors, which organize in order to respond to these threats – both to life and environmental quality – and uneven vulnerability, struggling for the recognition of environmental equality as a civil right.
Chair: Laura Centemeri, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Discussant: Stefania Barca, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Parallel Panels II: June 4, 13:30 – 15:30
Panel 8: Identity Struggles and the Redefinition of Citizenship
Room: 3.4
“Ethnos Versus Demos: Citizenship in Post-War Bosnia”
Dragana Bodruzic, University of Toronto, Canada
I propose to consider how certain sectors of civil society in Bosnia have attempted to promote a civic Bosnian identity and individual rights in the wake of the Bosnian conflict. I also consider their efforts to contest the emphasis on group ethnic rights enshrined in Bosnia’s consociational constitutional structure, and reasons for their failure.
The Bosnian constitution, an annex to the Dayton Agreement which ended the Bosnian conflict in 1995, states that the rights and freedoms set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols, shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, these are prioritized over all other law.
The Dayton Constitution, however, is at root discriminatory. The consociational structure of the country not only divides the state into two entities, the Federation and the Serb Republic, it also divides power between the three main ethnic groups: Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs. These ‘Constituent peoples’ are distinguished from Bosnia’s ‘Other’ communities. A member of the ‘Other’ group (for instance, Jewish or Roma Bosnians) cannot run for the country’s Presidency, nor can, for example, a Serb living in the Federation or a Bosniac living in the Serb Republic. Collective rights thus take precedence over individual rights.
According to Habermas (1996), each person should receive three types of recognition, “equal respect in their integrity as irreplaceable individuals, as members of ethnic or cultural groups, and as citizens, that is as members of the political community” (cited in Mujkić 2007:113). Finding the right balance between these rights is a challenge for any society. The way these have been balanced in Bosnia, with ethnicity being so firmly planted above individual rights, is particularly worrisome. This issue has never been addressed, since all attempts to amend the Constitution have failed. According to Mujkić, the “ruling, ethnically-based political parties have shown no willingness to do so because it would have undermined the very basis of their power, ethnic collective rights” (2007:113). Consequently, “a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina is recognized only as a member of an ethnic group, and only through this recognition is he or she recognized as a member of the political community” (ibid.:113).
I propose to explore the manner in which members of Bosnia’s fledgling civil society have sought to contest the dominance of collective over individual rights. In particular, I consider the discourse of human rights used by these actors, as well as the manner in which they seek to promote a civic Bosnian identity and notion of citizenship. Finally, I provide some preliminary conclusions regarding reasons for their failure to make a dent in the dominant political rights discourses in the country.
The Bosnian constitution, an annex to the Dayton Agreement which ended the Bosnian conflict in 1995, states that the rights and freedoms set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols, shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, these are prioritized over all other law.
The Dayton Constitution, however, is at root discriminatory. The consociational structure of the country not only divides the state into two entities, the Federation and the Serb Republic, it also divides power between the three main ethnic groups: Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs. These ‘Constituent peoples’ are distinguished from Bosnia’s ‘Other’ communities. A member of the ‘Other’ group (for instance, Jewish or Roma Bosnians) cannot run for the country’s Presidency, nor can, for example, a Serb living in the Federation or a Bosniac living in the Serb Republic. Collective rights thus take precedence over individual rights.
According to Habermas (1996), each person should receive three types of recognition, “equal respect in their integrity as irreplaceable individuals, as members of ethnic or cultural groups, and as citizens, that is as members of the political community” (cited in Mujkić 2007:113). Finding the right balance between these rights is a challenge for any society. The way these have been balanced in Bosnia, with ethnicity being so firmly planted above individual rights, is particularly worrisome. This issue has never been addressed, since all attempts to amend the Constitution have failed. According to Mujkić, the “ruling, ethnically-based political parties have shown no willingness to do so because it would have undermined the very basis of their power, ethnic collective rights” (2007:113). Consequently, “a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina is recognized only as a member of an ethnic group, and only through this recognition is he or she recognized as a member of the political community” (ibid.:113).
I propose to explore the manner in which members of Bosnia’s fledgling civil society have sought to contest the dominance of collective over individual rights. In particular, I consider the discourse of human rights used by these actors, as well as the manner in which they seek to promote a civic Bosnian identity and notion of citizenship. Finally, I provide some preliminary conclusions regarding reasons for their failure to make a dent in the dominant political rights discourses in the country.
“Dignity in the Time of Impunity: On the Claiming of Rights through Racial Discrimination Litigation in Contemporary Brazil”
Seth Racusen, Anna Maria College, Paxton, MA, USA
This paper examines subaltern legal contestation of subordination and daily indignities in Brazil and thereby addresses two of the conference themes: (1) the struggle for recognition and justice and (3) bridging the gap between theory and empirical research about subaltern contestation. In contemporary Brazil, the overwhelming majority of racial discrimination claims filed by Afro Brazilians under the new constitution and its implementing law of 1989 have been classified as injúria, an injury to the honor of the plaintiff. During the past decade, Brazilian anti-discrimination litigation has vastly increased at a moment that the attention of most NGOs and international donors had shifted to other areas. This paper examines the sources, significance and transformative potential of this litigation expansion. Given the low expectation of prevailing in race discrimination cases and the historical taboo against alleging racial discrimination, why would anyone wish to bring a case? Further how viable is individual litigation to contest racial discrimination?
This paper explores the development of a new black subjectivity through racial discrimination litigation and the transformative potential of that litigation in Brazil in the context of the bottom-up citizenship advanced by James Holston and Boaventura de Sousa Santos. Although class-based litigation holds more significance for social change than individual litigation, I claim that in the Brazilian context, individual litigation can constitute a new Black subjectivity. In discussing the diverse practices that could constitute cosmopolitan legality, de Sousa Santos suggested a role for individual litigation that reduces rather than reproduces inequality and that advances ‘thick’ claims in the sense of human flourishing. I claim that this litigation primarily represents the latter: the seeking of dignity in constrained times, and draw upon twenty qualitative interviews with plaintiffs and their lawyers. Plaintiffs sought to invoke the law strategically as a moral and tactical discourse within the discriminatory incidents and beyond to stop an aggressor and to command respect. All aspects of these incidents demonstrated what Holston termed a “disjunctive civil democracy”, in which the access to justice is limited for the subaltern and in which public and private actors presume immunity from the law. The paper explores the multiple forms of Black subjectivity, given the weak rule of law and entrenched authoritarian tendencies.
Although class-based litigation accompanied by collective action holds more significance for social change than individual litigation, I hypothesize that the movement upward toward transnational mobilization increases the significance of individual litigation. The movement upward toward transnational activism contains a paradox: that transnationalism increases the possibilities to contest global and domestic inequities and yet also challenges social movement organizations (SMOs) by stretching thin, underfinanced organizations from their base constituency to the international level where they compete with other SMOs for the attention and support of international donors. I hypothesize that the tension between the interests of a movement and its constituency increases in circumstances of scarce domestic resources and available international resources. In this context, I claim that individual litigation represents the critical articulation of a constituency’s interests.
This paper explores the development of a new black subjectivity through racial discrimination litigation and the transformative potential of that litigation in Brazil in the context of the bottom-up citizenship advanced by James Holston and Boaventura de Sousa Santos. Although class-based litigation holds more significance for social change than individual litigation, I claim that in the Brazilian context, individual litigation can constitute a new Black subjectivity. In discussing the diverse practices that could constitute cosmopolitan legality, de Sousa Santos suggested a role for individual litigation that reduces rather than reproduces inequality and that advances ‘thick’ claims in the sense of human flourishing. I claim that this litigation primarily represents the latter: the seeking of dignity in constrained times, and draw upon twenty qualitative interviews with plaintiffs and their lawyers. Plaintiffs sought to invoke the law strategically as a moral and tactical discourse within the discriminatory incidents and beyond to stop an aggressor and to command respect. All aspects of these incidents demonstrated what Holston termed a “disjunctive civil democracy”, in which the access to justice is limited for the subaltern and in which public and private actors presume immunity from the law. The paper explores the multiple forms of Black subjectivity, given the weak rule of law and entrenched authoritarian tendencies.
Although class-based litigation accompanied by collective action holds more significance for social change than individual litigation, I hypothesize that the movement upward toward transnational mobilization increases the significance of individual litigation. The movement upward toward transnational activism contains a paradox: that transnationalism increases the possibilities to contest global and domestic inequities and yet also challenges social movement organizations (SMOs) by stretching thin, underfinanced organizations from their base constituency to the international level where they compete with other SMOs for the attention and support of international donors. I hypothesize that the tension between the interests of a movement and its constituency increases in circumstances of scarce domestic resources and available international resources. In this context, I claim that individual litigation represents the critical articulation of a constituency’s interests.
“Tracing Identities: Profane Citizenship, Contribution and Power in Democratic Societies”
Jacques Roux, CNRS, Paris, France
In the frame of the European Profacity program (Profacity.eu), we work at the margins of citizenship to recognize how the situations of the "have-not" inform on changing formats of general citizenship in European democracies contexts. We propose to underpin the viewpoint. The hypothesis is that “normal” citizenship in the democracies of the North is ontologically ill. Drawing on strength and science, States remove profane experience, which is precisely what robs their “raison d'être”. “Official” citizenship is losing its meaning, and authoritarian mechanisms of control and expertise are reenforced. All this is hidden by an appearance of democracy, participation, or empowerment. To document this situation, we propose to follow three tracks:
Profane citizenship on the ground poses practical problems and the beginnings of engagement. Therefore the layman is a central vector to reconsider social ontologies. As laboratorie of incitizening, any situation can be relevant of the citizenry. Borders have become porous between Society and City. What is political is not visible. Paying attention with the discrete forms of domination, we need to go through an objectification, a public accountability: to make intelligible what is not visible.
To face the principle of participation, become servient to the techniques of neo-liberal governmentality, we propose the principle of contribution. Participation assumes a common and sharable model of society divided into units homogeneous as a joint stock company (stakeholders). In the principle of contribution, the Common is not given a priori: it is actualized in a historical and unique way. It is based on to give and not on to take and its foundation uses modes of presence, not of existence.
These contributions are available to documentation activity. This is common among members committed themselves in the situations involved, but also, by contagion or opening, to any observer or witness. The researcher doesn’t monopolize the accountability nor even get hegemony over the research process. He takes his part, but other actors also contribute to the investigation. There is a co-dependance between each other. The divisions, contrasts, conflicts, pass through documents and advertising scenes.
Thus, community is tackling with a divided image of itself, as an orphan from a horizon of unity. This loss of moral ideals terrace inherited forms of citizenship and provides a radical place for profane world. The latter becomes a holder of political meaning, beyond the claim forms or mobilizations for recognition. A review of forms of contagion, public or non public, is useful to understand the citizening process of social situations: how these situations are identified as an experience/experiment that falls within the City (the Public problem for J. Dewey). A that cruxial point, the community is revealed as an experience itself, in the event of an inaccessible reconciliation.
We propose this route in the profane dimensions of citizenship by considering one particular social area: the contemporary management of tracing identities. The sophisticated tools and techniques for storing personal individual data (legal, social, body...) and their monitoring by staff of public officials in trans-national situations (identity checks in public places, specially oriented against irregular immigration) are a cruxial point to observe the moving and sensible forms of reframing citizenship.
Profane citizenship on the ground poses practical problems and the beginnings of engagement. Therefore the layman is a central vector to reconsider social ontologies. As laboratorie of incitizening, any situation can be relevant of the citizenry. Borders have become porous between Society and City. What is political is not visible. Paying attention with the discrete forms of domination, we need to go through an objectification, a public accountability: to make intelligible what is not visible.
To face the principle of participation, become servient to the techniques of neo-liberal governmentality, we propose the principle of contribution. Participation assumes a common and sharable model of society divided into units homogeneous as a joint stock company (stakeholders). In the principle of contribution, the Common is not given a priori: it is actualized in a historical and unique way. It is based on to give and not on to take and its foundation uses modes of presence, not of existence.
These contributions are available to documentation activity. This is common among members committed themselves in the situations involved, but also, by contagion or opening, to any observer or witness. The researcher doesn’t monopolize the accountability nor even get hegemony over the research process. He takes his part, but other actors also contribute to the investigation. There is a co-dependance between each other. The divisions, contrasts, conflicts, pass through documents and advertising scenes.
Thus, community is tackling with a divided image of itself, as an orphan from a horizon of unity. This loss of moral ideals terrace inherited forms of citizenship and provides a radical place for profane world. The latter becomes a holder of political meaning, beyond the claim forms or mobilizations for recognition. A review of forms of contagion, public or non public, is useful to understand the citizening process of social situations: how these situations are identified as an experience/experiment that falls within the City (the Public problem for J. Dewey). A that cruxial point, the community is revealed as an experience itself, in the event of an inaccessible reconciliation.
We propose this route in the profane dimensions of citizenship by considering one particular social area: the contemporary management of tracing identities. The sophisticated tools and techniques for storing personal individual data (legal, social, body...) and their monitoring by staff of public officials in trans-national situations (identity checks in public places, specially oriented against irregular immigration) are a cruxial point to observe the moving and sensible forms of reframing citizenship.
“The Struggle for Recognition of Pre-Existing Aboriginal Legal Cultures: Radical Pluralism or ‘One Law for All’ after All?”
Maxime St. Hilaire, Université de Sherbrooke, Canada
Aboriginal peoples have been struggling for the recognition of their “pre-existing” legal orders, which they claim proceed from their distinctive cultures. In Canada, such struggles were given new impetus by the 1982 constitutional reform, which “recognizes and affirms” both aboriginal and treaty rights. The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that aboriginal rights somehow stem from pre-existing legal orders. These, however, appear as material, rather than formal, sources of law, for the Court speaks of their “absorption” or “incorporation” into the common law. Among jurists and legal theorists, this issue has been principally framed as one of “legal pluralism.” But, though necessary, the concept of legal pluralism is far from sufficient to clarify what is at stake. Legal pluralism was meant to be a descriptive, not a normative, theoretical legal concept. It merely explains how various legal systems can sustain internormativity relationships. It does not say much about why things should be so. Therefore, it does not say anything illuminating about the normative content of aboriginal peoples’ claim to recognition of their own legal cultures.
Seeking to elucidate why the recognition of their “traditional” legal orders by the State’s is so important to aboriginal peoples, political theorists rapidly turned to the “Politics of Recognition.” This is not without problems. First of all, Taylor’s extension of Hegel and Mead’s principle of recognition to struggles for recognition of minority cultures truly only deals with claims “stronger” than rights claims, whereas in Canada, for instance, it already is a matter of positive law that recognition of aboriginal legal cultures is, at least through aboriginal rights, claimed as a right. Second, one cannot but notice that Taylor’s work on recognition looks more like a research program. The same year 1992 Taylor’s Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition” was published, so was Axel Honneth’s Kampf um Anerkennung. The latter was a revised version of Honneth’s Habilitationsschrift, the defense panel of which Taylor had been on in 1989. Compared with Taylor’s, Honneth’s work on recognition is much more thorough. As a matter of fact, it neither does nor can truly apply to struggles such as the ones Taylor focuses on. Some might see there a lacuna in Honneth’s theory. However, Taylor excepted, one hardly finds any trace of the idea of directly recognizing “cultures” within those parts of the philosophical “canon” that deal with recognition. In Fichte’s Grundlage des Naturrechts, recognition is strictly about the legal conditions of intersubjectivity. In Hegel, the recognition principle is extended from (private) law to “State”, but it is still concerned with the recognition of individuals. And, within the legal canon,
recognition is, again, oriented towards the individual and conceived of in legal terms. At last, if
the recognition of some legal order is claimed as a right, does it not follow, in all logic, that, at least at a certain level, some common legal principle is then appealed to? This would, partially at least, prove Waldron right.
Seeking to elucidate why the recognition of their “traditional” legal orders by the State’s is so important to aboriginal peoples, political theorists rapidly turned to the “Politics of Recognition.” This is not without problems. First of all, Taylor’s extension of Hegel and Mead’s principle of recognition to struggles for recognition of minority cultures truly only deals with claims “stronger” than rights claims, whereas in Canada, for instance, it already is a matter of positive law that recognition of aboriginal legal cultures is, at least through aboriginal rights, claimed as a right. Second, one cannot but notice that Taylor’s work on recognition looks more like a research program. The same year 1992 Taylor’s Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition” was published, so was Axel Honneth’s Kampf um Anerkennung. The latter was a revised version of Honneth’s Habilitationsschrift, the defense panel of which Taylor had been on in 1989. Compared with Taylor’s, Honneth’s work on recognition is much more thorough. As a matter of fact, it neither does nor can truly apply to struggles such as the ones Taylor focuses on. Some might see there a lacuna in Honneth’s theory. However, Taylor excepted, one hardly finds any trace of the idea of directly recognizing “cultures” within those parts of the philosophical “canon” that deal with recognition. In Fichte’s Grundlage des Naturrechts, recognition is strictly about the legal conditions of intersubjectivity. In Hegel, the recognition principle is extended from (private) law to “State”, but it is still concerned with the recognition of individuals. And, within the legal canon,
recognition is, again, oriented towards the individual and conceived of in legal terms. At last, if
the recognition of some legal order is claimed as a right, does it not follow, in all logic, that, at least at a certain level, some common legal principle is then appealed to? This would, partially at least, prove Waldron right.
“What Is Wrong With Coming From Mainland China?”
Yu Chin Tseng, University of Essex, UK
Among migration, immigrant and other related issues, marriage immigrants is a peculiar category since it mingles contentions uneven development in global scale, wealth gap in local scale and gender. Yet, the nation which has lost its gravity along with the globalization and the penetrability of national boundaries (Soysal, 1994; Ohman, 1995) cannot be abandoned thoroughly.
There have been burgeoning marriage immigrants from Mainland China to Taiwan who are called “Mainland spouses” since 1992, the time mutual communication between two political entities has launched. Mainland spouses have faced inequality in obtaining citizenship, rights of working, and political rights. More specifically, they are subjected to a special regulation: Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland China Area which is based on hostility and communist-phobia. Also, it is the legislative fountain of Mainland spouses’ unequal status.
In this paper, I will first demonstrate the impossibility of talking about citizenship without putting it into a framework formed by political entities, which are Mainland China and Taiwan in this case, and then investigate the possibility of creating a political space in terms of their resistance: regulation amendments started from 2002.
Provided that over 98% of Mainland spouses are female, supports from and alliances with feminist groups regarding gender biased perplexity of obtaining citizenship are expected. Also, provided that majority of Mainland spouses, legally or illegally, are engaged in lower primary labor works, stronger alliance with labor groups regarding should be desirable. However, this cannot be seen in Taiwan.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that there has been other element acts critically on the road of Mainland spouses to obtain citizenship. In this case, nation, in the context of relation between Mainland China and Taiwan, plays a crucial role.
From above, it can be seen clearly that not only the crux of their unequal status is correlated to nation but also resistances and fights for their rights cannot escape from nation. Therefore, rights claiming simply based on citizenship or universal human rights are not enough in this case. Then, what can be effective in claiming their rights and pursuit of equal situation?
As mentioned above, perplexity and in equality of Mainland spouse is tangled with relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan, I will look at regulation amendment movement from 2002 to see how the change of political atmosphere create or enclose political possibilities and to comprehend what kind of political space they have created against the dominant discourse based on otherizing and demonizing Mainland China.
There have been burgeoning marriage immigrants from Mainland China to Taiwan who are called “Mainland spouses” since 1992, the time mutual communication between two political entities has launched. Mainland spouses have faced inequality in obtaining citizenship, rights of working, and political rights. More specifically, they are subjected to a special regulation: Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland China Area which is based on hostility and communist-phobia. Also, it is the legislative fountain of Mainland spouses’ unequal status.
In this paper, I will first demonstrate the impossibility of talking about citizenship without putting it into a framework formed by political entities, which are Mainland China and Taiwan in this case, and then investigate the possibility of creating a political space in terms of their resistance: regulation amendments started from 2002.
Provided that over 98% of Mainland spouses are female, supports from and alliances with feminist groups regarding gender biased perplexity of obtaining citizenship are expected. Also, provided that majority of Mainland spouses, legally or illegally, are engaged in lower primary labor works, stronger alliance with labor groups regarding should be desirable. However, this cannot be seen in Taiwan.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that there has been other element acts critically on the road of Mainland spouses to obtain citizenship. In this case, nation, in the context of relation between Mainland China and Taiwan, plays a crucial role.
From above, it can be seen clearly that not only the crux of their unequal status is correlated to nation but also resistances and fights for their rights cannot escape from nation. Therefore, rights claiming simply based on citizenship or universal human rights are not enough in this case. Then, what can be effective in claiming their rights and pursuit of equal situation?
As mentioned above, perplexity and in equality of Mainland spouse is tangled with relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan, I will look at regulation amendment movement from 2002 to see how the change of political atmosphere create or enclose political possibilities and to comprehend what kind of political space they have created against the dominant discourse based on otherizing and demonizing Mainland China.
Chair: Catarina Frade, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Discussant: Conceição Gomes, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Panel 9: Democratic Virtues and Citizenship Practices
Room: 3.1
“Citizens Who Think and Act: Some Reflections on the Rhetorical Tradition of Isocrates, Cicero, Quintilian and the Humanists”
Giuseppe Ballacci, Universidade do Minho, Braga, Portugal
According to Hannah Arendt western philosophy has generally suffered from an incapacity to deal properly with the contingent character of politics. The roots of this failure, in her opinion, lie in the theoretical error of trying to assuage contingency by conceiving politics according to the model of poietic activity, i.e. production. This model is attractive for the philosopher because, in the same way theoretical contemplation is something that happens only in a state of complete motionless, it assures that the purity of the ideal form to be produced is kept safe from the process of production itself. However, taking Plato’s political philosophy as an emblematic case, she argues that this model creates inevitably a chasm between thinking and acting, theory and practice, which “depriving thought of reality and action of sense, makes both meaningless”. On a more concrete level, this means the creation of an undemocratic conception of politics where an uninformed and uncritical multitude is commanded by an intellectual elite detached from common sense.
Arendt, in fact, took inspiration from ancient Greek politics, rather than from their philosophy. But if we look attentively at that kind of politics, we would see that it consisted first of all of rhetoric. Rhetoric understood both as the practice of public eloquence and as a kind of education to civic life. With authors such as Isocrates, and then above all in Rome with Cicero and Quintilian, rhetoric became the core of a new ideal that tried to combine what philosophers considered two conflicting goals: the cultivation of the fullness of the person through study and the pursuit of the common good through politics. According to these authors the promotion of reason pursued by philosophers was a futile enterprise if not generalized and transformed into political action through eloquence. In this sense, rhetoric, much more than mere persuasion, became for them the fundamental art of speaking wisely for the common good; a supreme virtue that joined together the speculative with the practical virtues. It is this conception of rhetoric, indeed, that laid the foundations of Renaissance Humanism: the ideal of forming virtuous citizens and complete human beings through the cultivation of humanity in all spheres of life.
In this paper I will argue that this rhetorical-humanistic tradition represents prudential thinking at its best; an under-explored and fascinating perspective for political theory, particularly for what concerns the relationship between theory and practice and its consequences on the idea of citizenship. Focusing on Quintilian, the supreme synthesis of classical rhetoric, and Vico, the last exponent of Humanism and its philosophical culmination, I will show why this tradition is helpful to overcome the undemocratic division denounced by Arendt, still implicit in much contemporary political science. Starting from that principle of completeness, those authors developed an original conception of citizenship centred on judgment – the capacity to think in action – where the gaps between mass and elite, thinking and acting, are reduced as common citizens result to be more thoughtful and philosophers or intellectuals more concrete.
Arendt, in fact, took inspiration from ancient Greek politics, rather than from their philosophy. But if we look attentively at that kind of politics, we would see that it consisted first of all of rhetoric. Rhetoric understood both as the practice of public eloquence and as a kind of education to civic life. With authors such as Isocrates, and then above all in Rome with Cicero and Quintilian, rhetoric became the core of a new ideal that tried to combine what philosophers considered two conflicting goals: the cultivation of the fullness of the person through study and the pursuit of the common good through politics. According to these authors the promotion of reason pursued by philosophers was a futile enterprise if not generalized and transformed into political action through eloquence. In this sense, rhetoric, much more than mere persuasion, became for them the fundamental art of speaking wisely for the common good; a supreme virtue that joined together the speculative with the practical virtues. It is this conception of rhetoric, indeed, that laid the foundations of Renaissance Humanism: the ideal of forming virtuous citizens and complete human beings through the cultivation of humanity in all spheres of life.
In this paper I will argue that this rhetorical-humanistic tradition represents prudential thinking at its best; an under-explored and fascinating perspective for political theory, particularly for what concerns the relationship between theory and practice and its consequences on the idea of citizenship. Focusing on Quintilian, the supreme synthesis of classical rhetoric, and Vico, the last exponent of Humanism and its philosophical culmination, I will show why this tradition is helpful to overcome the undemocratic division denounced by Arendt, still implicit in much contemporary political science. Starting from that principle of completeness, those authors developed an original conception of citizenship centred on judgment – the capacity to think in action – where the gaps between mass and elite, thinking and acting, are reduced as common citizens result to be more thoughtful and philosophers or intellectuals more concrete.
“A Lonely Courage”
Alex Livingston, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, USA
In an 1897 speech delivered to commemorate the life of Civil War officer Robert Gould Shaw, William James praised the virtue of courage in a democratic society. The courage James praised, however, was not the bellicose courage of the solider at war but rather what he calls the “a more lonely courage” Shaw displayed when he agreed to serve as the white Captain of the Massachusetts 54th Regiment, the Union’s so-called black regiment. Why does James consider Shaw’s break with the racial and class expectations a form of political courage distinct from soldierly courage? And why does he call it ‘lonely’? In this essay I argue that James’s political writings offer both a critique of the destructive and disciplinary dimensions of courage and a defence of centrality of courage as a practice of citizenship. I draw a contrast between the depictions of courage in Theodore Roosevelt’s The Rough Riders and James’s conception of loneliness to argue that James offers a radically reconfigured view of democratic courage that is at once sceptical of the claims of the community and nation to which Roosevelt’s rhetoric of courage often serves, but at the same time responsive to the claims of equality that often cut across the limited and exclusive boundaries of political membership. I conclude with some reflections about how this contrast between lonely and bellicose courage might inform a more sceptical but vigilant form of civic freedom.
“The Western Satyagrahi: Thoreau and Gandhi on Engaged Radical/Nonviolent/
Transformative Citizenship”
Pablo Ouziel, University of Victoria, Canada
This paper explores the thought and practice of Henry David Thoreau in an attempt to reconceptualise revolutionary practices of citizenship in contemporary Western societies. The premise of the paper is that within Thoreaudian spiritual/ethical practices of the self, there exists the opportunity to revolutionize the theory of revolution, in a way which overcomes our constrained political freedoms while doing justice to the increasing complexity of democratic politics. It is the argument of the paper, that Thoreau’s contribution to radical political thought, helps shed light on some necessary conditions for effectively exercising citizenship within a Western contemporary context, and thus, offers new dimensions of political freedom which can challenge ingrained legal, political, economic, military and social norms.
Although as Western political theorists we are indebted to Mahatma Gandhi for having crystallized a theory and practice of nonviolence (satyagraha), it would seem beneficial for us to acknowledge the parallels of Gandhi’s work with Thoreau’s Western alternative. It could be argued, that attempting to build strong nonviolent foundations within contemporary Western societies by drawing too heavily upon Gandhi’s work, can act as a ‘reverse orientalist’ move, which rather than enticing, detracts Western citizens from nonviolent practices – due to the cultural abyss separating contemporary Western lifestyles from those of India’s colonial past. For this reason, considering the fact that Gandhi himself expressed his indebtedness to Thoreau, and understanding that a close reading of Thoreau’s key works shows his firm commitment to what Gandhi described as Satyagraha, western political theorists could contribute tremendously to Western nonviolent struggles by resurfacing the Western nonviolent tradition – to which undoubtedly Thoreau is one of the most important contributors.
Anthony Parel argues that the secular end of Satyagraha can only be reached if spiritual means have a role. He also states, that the confluence of the secular and spiritual in Gandhi’s work separates it from Thoreau’s non spiritual alternative. Yet, Howard Zinn, in his introduction to The Higher Law: Thoreau on Civil Disobedience and Reform, locates Thoreau in the tradition of popular, cooperativist activism. And Thomas Merton, in Choosing to Love the World, shows how although surrounded by a climate of decaying individualism in Western societies, Thoreau’s non-individualistic solitary practices, granted him the maturity necessary to keep alive the spiritual and intelligent consciousness necessary for true unity among men.
Building upon Zinn’s and Merton’s work, this paper will argue for the non-individualist Thoreau, and highlight his contemplative activism and the integrity and fullness of his secular and spiritual development. Through the analysis presented, it will become apparent that in his work as a satyagrahi, Thoreau renounced the blessing of every convenient illusion that absolved him from responsibility to his inner truth and social reality, and through revolutionary means, withdrew his cooperation with US imperial expansion. An exemplary, radical/nonviolent/transformative move, from which many lessons can be drawn by Western citizens seeking to effectively exercise citizenship in the early days of the 21st century.
Although as Western political theorists we are indebted to Mahatma Gandhi for having crystallized a theory and practice of nonviolence (satyagraha), it would seem beneficial for us to acknowledge the parallels of Gandhi’s work with Thoreau’s Western alternative. It could be argued, that attempting to build strong nonviolent foundations within contemporary Western societies by drawing too heavily upon Gandhi’s work, can act as a ‘reverse orientalist’ move, which rather than enticing, detracts Western citizens from nonviolent practices – due to the cultural abyss separating contemporary Western lifestyles from those of India’s colonial past. For this reason, considering the fact that Gandhi himself expressed his indebtedness to Thoreau, and understanding that a close reading of Thoreau’s key works shows his firm commitment to what Gandhi described as Satyagraha, western political theorists could contribute tremendously to Western nonviolent struggles by resurfacing the Western nonviolent tradition – to which undoubtedly Thoreau is one of the most important contributors.
Anthony Parel argues that the secular end of Satyagraha can only be reached if spiritual means have a role. He also states, that the confluence of the secular and spiritual in Gandhi’s work separates it from Thoreau’s non spiritual alternative. Yet, Howard Zinn, in his introduction to The Higher Law: Thoreau on Civil Disobedience and Reform, locates Thoreau in the tradition of popular, cooperativist activism. And Thomas Merton, in Choosing to Love the World, shows how although surrounded by a climate of decaying individualism in Western societies, Thoreau’s non-individualistic solitary practices, granted him the maturity necessary to keep alive the spiritual and intelligent consciousness necessary for true unity among men.
Building upon Zinn’s and Merton’s work, this paper will argue for the non-individualist Thoreau, and highlight his contemplative activism and the integrity and fullness of his secular and spiritual development. Through the analysis presented, it will become apparent that in his work as a satyagrahi, Thoreau renounced the blessing of every convenient illusion that absolved him from responsibility to his inner truth and social reality, and through revolutionary means, withdrew his cooperation with US imperial expansion. An exemplary, radical/nonviolent/transformative move, from which many lessons can be drawn by Western citizens seeking to effectively exercise citizenship in the early days of the 21st century.
“The Stakes of Citizenship: Inbetween Dialogue, Participation and Mobilisation”
Paulina Tambakaki, University of Westminster, London, UK
Citizenship discourse has been fraught with tensions and dilemmas leaving political theorists puzzled as to the task ahead. While citizenship presupposes, for example, solidarity and a common bond which holds the demos together, growing apprehension towards the nation raises serious questions about the ways in which civic solidarity could be engendered, if at all, within contemporary plural societies. With suggestions ranging from citizenship as friendship (Kahane, 1999) to constitutional patriotism (Habermas: 1996, 2001) and liberal interpretations of ethnic principles (Miller: 1995), the question at stake is how citizenship could reinscribe democratic unity in constitutively plural settings. However, growing disenchantment with state institutions coupled with cross-border civil society activism reinforces scepticism about the continuing relevance of nationally- and territorially-bound citizenship (a scepticism evident in the rapidly increasing literature on civil society activism and the decreasing literature on citizenship). Although ever growing calls for democratising layers of governance – from the global to the local – open a wealth of possibilities for recasting citizenship, the focus on revising the concept in universal, all-inclusive and often human rights terms, exposes further its vulnerability (see Held 1995, 2004; Bohman 2007; Parekh 2004). Although it would appear from this brief exposition that citizenship as a concept is gradually losing its appeal, what we concurrently witness in the wake of restrictive citizenship practices is paradoxically the return of citizenship. Can we reconceive citizenship in a way which addresses these developments, while still retaining the notion of the demos, necessary for practising democratic politics?
To address this question the paper engages with the writings of Tully and Habermas who argue for a dialogical approach to citizenship practices. Taking their cues from different philosophical traditions, Tully and Habermas certainly differ in the way they conceive of dialogue and democratic deliberation. However, they do share in the emphasis they both place on deliberation, understanding citizenship as a participatory means; a way of having a say about the rules of the democratic game. This understanding of citizenship, argues the paper, leads both Tully and Habermas to bypass the challenges currently confronting citizenship discourse since they fail to explain what would exactly motivate this type of political participation. To address the challenges posed to citizenship discourse, and thus revise citizenship as a term, rather than political agency, the paper explores the idea of mobilisation as an alternative to dialogical participation.
To address this question the paper engages with the writings of Tully and Habermas who argue for a dialogical approach to citizenship practices. Taking their cues from different philosophical traditions, Tully and Habermas certainly differ in the way they conceive of dialogue and democratic deliberation. However, they do share in the emphasis they both place on deliberation, understanding citizenship as a participatory means; a way of having a say about the rules of the democratic game. This understanding of citizenship, argues the paper, leads both Tully and Habermas to bypass the challenges currently confronting citizenship discourse since they fail to explain what would exactly motivate this type of political participation. To address the challenges posed to citizenship discourse, and thus revise citizenship as a term, rather than political agency, the paper explores the idea of mobilisation as an alternative to dialogical participation.
Chair: Mihaela Mihai, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Discussant: Duncan Ivison, University of Sidney, Australia
Panel 10: New Forms of Political Participation
Room: 3.3
“Acting as Citizens by Burning Cars in the Banlieues: Challenging the Nexus of Security and Citizenship”
Helen Arfvidsson, Open University, Milton Keynes, UK
This paper fits into the first theme of the conference and is prompted by two different yet connected developments in Europe. The first entails practices of stricter immigration policies; migration increasingly framed as a security issue; along with transformed meanings of national citizenship and the rise of xenophobic tendencies. The second concerns the upsurge of ‘rioting’ youth burning cars in urban peripheries, most notably in France 2005 and more recently in Sweden throughout 2009. Drawing on these two developments, the paper examines from a Swedish perspective how these are connected in a nexus of security and citizenship which proliferates fears, insecurities and uncertainties.
The analysis is divided into two parts. The first explores how the acts of burning cars in the banlieues are framed in local and national media. It aims to reveal and analyze how these acts are positioned within dominant security framings of the banlieue which in turn help constrain the political voice and agency of the youth in question as they are frequently depicted as either dangerous perpetrators or objectified victims. The second part examines how these acts represent something else than merely violent acts of destruction. They are looked upon as the political becoming of the youth, as struggles for justice, and as expressions of resistance to the current configuration of the nexus. The analysis takes its departure in how the burning of cars can be understood as acts of citizenship challenging the boundaries of the political. Acts of citizenship is here understood as those acts that transform forms and modes of being political; realizing ruptures in the given by emphasizing the critical capacity of citizenship (Isin 2008). The paper contributes to the literature on acts of citizenship by introducing the notion of speaking through violence.
The analysis is divided into two parts. The first explores how the acts of burning cars in the banlieues are framed in local and national media. It aims to reveal and analyze how these acts are positioned within dominant security framings of the banlieue which in turn help constrain the political voice and agency of the youth in question as they are frequently depicted as either dangerous perpetrators or objectified victims. The second part examines how these acts represent something else than merely violent acts of destruction. They are looked upon as the political becoming of the youth, as struggles for justice, and as expressions of resistance to the current configuration of the nexus. The analysis takes its departure in how the burning of cars can be understood as acts of citizenship challenging the boundaries of the political. Acts of citizenship is here understood as those acts that transform forms and modes of being political; realizing ruptures in the given by emphasizing the critical capacity of citizenship (Isin 2008). The paper contributes to the literature on acts of citizenship by introducing the notion of speaking through violence.
“New Media Galaxy: A New Way for Citizen Political Participation? The Need of a Communication Ethical Approach”
Ramón Feenstra, Universitat Jaume I de Castellón, Castellón de la Plana, Spain
Since classical Greek times, it has not been thought possible to separate the political freedom of citizens from the dimension of participation in public affairs. Citizens of a democracy are assumed to have the opportunity to take part in decision-making processes, which is why representation is established as a central mechanism for constituting political power. However, over the last few years, an alarming decline has been observed in the number of members of mass political parties, along with a reduction in the number of votes on election days and even, as in the case of Spain, a situation where political representatives have become the third largest concern of ordinary citizens. To this must be added a widespread feeling of lack of public interest in anything connected with ‘politics’, which are thought to be useless and not seen as an area of action connected with citizens but rather a specific area manipulated by certain elites. Political freedom does not appear to exist, and the idea is spreading that choice and options exist only within the limited possibilities offered by the market.
Observing these trends, which are undoubtedly occurring in one form or another, leads some thinkers to conclude that we are facing a post-democratic era; an era taking giant strides away from ideal situations in the past when representative democracy was better rooted, more consolidated and had solid pillars sustaining the democratic construction against any possible earthquake that might arrive. These authors who note the most negative features of modern democracies and who put their fingers on the wounds inflicted by many problems that must be carefully considered find, however, that their view is challenged by other theoreticians like Keane or Rosanvallon, who consider that what is really changing is the way of understanding democracy and the forms and possibilities of public participation. For these two authors, who work separately and who offer us two new concepts for understanding modern democracy – monitory democracy and counterdemocracy respectively – we are facing new challenges and opportunities for participation. In these the development of new forms of communication has played an essential role. These authors are exploring the new opportunities now offered to us, allowing us, above all, to understand the significance of contemporary events as important as the Wikileaks’ revelation of secret documents relating to political power in the United States.
This paper tries to take a critical approach to the study of these proposals and to analyse them based on the possibilities offered for the expansion of political freedom for citizens. However, it also attempts to ask questions about the normative conditions affecting the new media galaxy which are required in order to achieve the effective consolidation of the models proposed by the two authors. Ultimately, it is a question of thinking of a normative media model as another pillar, although by no means the only one, necessary so that some of the possibilities nowadays presented to us to promote political freedom can be expanded.
Observing these trends, which are undoubtedly occurring in one form or another, leads some thinkers to conclude that we are facing a post-democratic era; an era taking giant strides away from ideal situations in the past when representative democracy was better rooted, more consolidated and had solid pillars sustaining the democratic construction against any possible earthquake that might arrive. These authors who note the most negative features of modern democracies and who put their fingers on the wounds inflicted by many problems that must be carefully considered find, however, that their view is challenged by other theoreticians like Keane or Rosanvallon, who consider that what is really changing is the way of understanding democracy and the forms and possibilities of public participation. For these two authors, who work separately and who offer us two new concepts for understanding modern democracy – monitory democracy and counterdemocracy respectively – we are facing new challenges and opportunities for participation. In these the development of new forms of communication has played an essential role. These authors are exploring the new opportunities now offered to us, allowing us, above all, to understand the significance of contemporary events as important as the Wikileaks’ revelation of secret documents relating to political power in the United States.
This paper tries to take a critical approach to the study of these proposals and to analyse them based on the possibilities offered for the expansion of political freedom for citizens. However, it also attempts to ask questions about the normative conditions affecting the new media galaxy which are required in order to achieve the effective consolidation of the models proposed by the two authors. Ultimately, it is a question of thinking of a normative media model as another pillar, although by no means the only one, necessary so that some of the possibilities nowadays presented to us to promote political freedom can be expanded.
“Debating Citizenship and Interrogating Identity in Native American Hip-Hop”
Miye Nadya Tom, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
The federal recognition of Native American identity (tribal enrollment or membership) is one of many ongoing struggles for the self-determination and community survival in the USA. Questions of cultural identity, cultural knowledge and community engagement have long confronted static anthropological classifications and blood quantum (contrived by colonialism) to be recognized as belonging to a given tribe or nation, especially as Native American communities in the USA have diversified and become ethnically mixed. Furthermore, such a system created to better manage Native American populations under the premises that Indigenous peoples of North America would eventually dilute or dissipate into history.
The growth of Latino populations in the USA also brings another dimension to these debates. For instance, Chicano political ideology appropriated and promotes an indigenous identity as part of a struggle for citizenship. While there are many similar struggles and political discourses shared between these groups, there are also struggles and debates between them. Many cultural and political boundaries have blurred as it has become fashionable to celebrate indigenous roots in the face of a colonial Anglo America and to claim full citizen rights and recognition. This has sometimes resounded with accusations of cultural appropriation and the usurping of the identity and struggles of Native American peoples.
I explore how such debates have emerged and are confronted by those who inherit these struggles: youth and young adults. Many have come to use contemporary or popular culture means to express themselves and reflect on their condition. I have chosen to use hip-hop and rap music because this subversive cultural movement, which emerged from the African-American context and has been quite prevalent among young Native Americans in cities and on reservations alike. It has been so popular that “Native [American] Hip-Hop” emerged as its own industry throughout North America, offering a contemporary means to express, contest and reinvent cultural identity whereas rap music has reflected upon issues in contemporary Native American communities – and to be heard throughout Native American communities and society at large. Hip-Hop has helped approach intergenerational debates on maintaining traditions and maintaining certain cultural boundaries, sometimes creating a means of non-formal education to maintain traditions. For instance, the faceless and headless movement, SAVAGE Family, has used rap to confront “genocidal environments,” which are a result of historical trauma and continue to afflict Native American communities. Nevertheless, it has also been rift with debates on authenticity and stereotypes. Furthermore, Chicanos and have also come to play prominent roles in promoting “Native Hip-Hop” and/or “Indigenous Hip-Hop” with shared anti-colonial discourses.
Has “Native American Hip-Hip” offered a new means for dialogue and debates on citizenship and identity among young Native Americans and between its Native American and Chicano protagonists? Or is it yet another a source of intercultural conflict that reinforces stereotypes and suppresses the voice of Indigenous peoples in the USA? Finally, do these Americocentric debates divert young people from engaging in global discussions on identity, citizenship and Indigenous peoples’ struggle for self-determination (which are not isolated to the USA)?
The growth of Latino populations in the USA also brings another dimension to these debates. For instance, Chicano political ideology appropriated and promotes an indigenous identity as part of a struggle for citizenship. While there are many similar struggles and political discourses shared between these groups, there are also struggles and debates between them. Many cultural and political boundaries have blurred as it has become fashionable to celebrate indigenous roots in the face of a colonial Anglo America and to claim full citizen rights and recognition. This has sometimes resounded with accusations of cultural appropriation and the usurping of the identity and struggles of Native American peoples.
I explore how such debates have emerged and are confronted by those who inherit these struggles: youth and young adults. Many have come to use contemporary or popular culture means to express themselves and reflect on their condition. I have chosen to use hip-hop and rap music because this subversive cultural movement, which emerged from the African-American context and has been quite prevalent among young Native Americans in cities and on reservations alike. It has been so popular that “Native [American] Hip-Hop” emerged as its own industry throughout North America, offering a contemporary means to express, contest and reinvent cultural identity whereas rap music has reflected upon issues in contemporary Native American communities – and to be heard throughout Native American communities and society at large. Hip-Hop has helped approach intergenerational debates on maintaining traditions and maintaining certain cultural boundaries, sometimes creating a means of non-formal education to maintain traditions. For instance, the faceless and headless movement, SAVAGE Family, has used rap to confront “genocidal environments,” which are a result of historical trauma and continue to afflict Native American communities. Nevertheless, it has also been rift with debates on authenticity and stereotypes. Furthermore, Chicanos and have also come to play prominent roles in promoting “Native Hip-Hop” and/or “Indigenous Hip-Hop” with shared anti-colonial discourses.
Has “Native American Hip-Hip” offered a new means for dialogue and debates on citizenship and identity among young Native Americans and between its Native American and Chicano protagonists? Or is it yet another a source of intercultural conflict that reinforces stereotypes and suppresses the voice of Indigenous peoples in the USA? Finally, do these Americocentric debates divert young people from engaging in global discussions on identity, citizenship and Indigenous peoples’ struggle for self-determination (which are not isolated to the USA)?
“Struggle for Recognition and the Power of Images: ‘Participant Video’ as an Instrument of a Shared Anthropology”
Peter Anton Zoettl, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal
Drawing on recent experiments in the realm of “participatory video”, the paper discusses the central role of images in the struggle for recognition of identity among re-emergent indigenous groups in northeastern Brazil. Many northeastern indigenous groups which – in the public mind – had long ceased to exist, during the last years and decades have found their way back into the Brazilian (and international) news. While some of them have finally managed to find their ethnic status at least legally acknowledged, most are still tormented by what they experience as a lack of true recognition of their Indianness by their fellow Brazilian citizens. Northeastern Indians, people say, are ‘Indians in disguise’, who make up their identity only for the benefit of land and public assistance. A verdict which is based mainly on visual evidence: to be recognized as Indian, Indians have to look like Indians. Partly in response to this public demand, and as a means of reaffirming their culture, the performance of Indianness has become part of the Indian’s lives and Indian culture. The participatory production of a small video documentary, in which the inhabitants of an Indian Reserve in the state of Bahia depict their view of the tourists, and the tourists’ view of the Indians, reveals the multilayered way in which ‘Images’ and the recognition of Indianness are interconnected, and how they can hinder the true emancipation of marginalized ethnic groups.
Chair: Olga Solovova , Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Discussant: Claudino Ferreira, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Panel 11: Theorizing Citizenship: The Boundaries of the Demos
Room: Sala Keynes
“The Democratic Indeterminacy or How Can Citizenship Help Us Solve Democratically Migration Issues?
Martin Deleixhe, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
The tension between democracy as a political regime and democracy as a critical ideal reveals itself along several topical issues, including notably the growing rejection of immigrants. On one hand, democracy as an institution is made more fragile through the apparition of foreign subjectivities that carry with them a problematic otherness. On the other hand, democracy as an idealistic perspective commands us to respect the egalitarian and inclusive dynamics that shape the utopian dimension inherent in the concept’s core. Immigration opens up a breach between the two possible understandings of democracy that doesn’t seem easy to bridge.
Immigration cracks democracy right where it appears to be conceptually the weakest: in its dependence on a homogeneous national subjectivity that safeguards the fiction of the popular sovereignty. The prominent question turns out to be whether democracy should preserve that national subjectivity from an increasing pluralism that, according to some, would threaten its institutional foundations (Schnapper, 1994, Manent, 2006, Debray, 2010) or if it should rather celebrate the revelation brought by the incomers that there is an ineluctable share of indeterminacy in the democratic ideal or, in other words, that democracy is founded on an absence of foundation in the name of an elusive demos (Lefort, 1986, Rancière, 1998) ?
During this communication, I would like to explore this second dimension and more specifically to scrutinize three conceptual axes in which the democracy’s indeterminacy is instrumental in prohibiting the political space’s definitive closure. First, democracy exposes its radical incompleteness through its juridical foundations. The content of the universal rights that constitute its architecture’s pillars is always in excess to their formulation (Lefort, 1981). Therefore, they demand a permanent contextualization through a democratic deliberation (Benhabib, 2004) whose outcome remains unpredictable. Second, this debate is located inside a political collectivity, a circumscribed community, whose boundaries can’t escape a certain degree of confusion. The foreigner –supposed to embody the limits of the community – is, after his immigration, simultaneously inside and outside the national identity (le Blanc, 2010). And, last but not least, political participation being constitutive of the public space (Arendt, 1961) and not a statutory attribution, it contains the seed of a possible reconstruction of citizenship that would resist all forms of national subjection (Balibar, 2001, Beltran, 2009). We believe that a good understanding of this triple indeterminacy, conceptualized from the perspective of democracy as an ideal, allows us to sketch the minimal requirement in terms of hospitality for democracy as a regime.
Immigration cracks democracy right where it appears to be conceptually the weakest: in its dependence on a homogeneous national subjectivity that safeguards the fiction of the popular sovereignty. The prominent question turns out to be whether democracy should preserve that national subjectivity from an increasing pluralism that, according to some, would threaten its institutional foundations (Schnapper, 1994, Manent, 2006, Debray, 2010) or if it should rather celebrate the revelation brought by the incomers that there is an ineluctable share of indeterminacy in the democratic ideal or, in other words, that democracy is founded on an absence of foundation in the name of an elusive demos (Lefort, 1986, Rancière, 1998) ?
During this communication, I would like to explore this second dimension and more specifically to scrutinize three conceptual axes in which the democracy’s indeterminacy is instrumental in prohibiting the political space’s definitive closure. First, democracy exposes its radical incompleteness through its juridical foundations. The content of the universal rights that constitute its architecture’s pillars is always in excess to their formulation (Lefort, 1981). Therefore, they demand a permanent contextualization through a democratic deliberation (Benhabib, 2004) whose outcome remains unpredictable. Second, this debate is located inside a political collectivity, a circumscribed community, whose boundaries can’t escape a certain degree of confusion. The foreigner –supposed to embody the limits of the community – is, after his immigration, simultaneously inside and outside the national identity (le Blanc, 2010). And, last but not least, political participation being constitutive of the public space (Arendt, 1961) and not a statutory attribution, it contains the seed of a possible reconstruction of citizenship that would resist all forms of national subjection (Balibar, 2001, Beltran, 2009). We believe that a good understanding of this triple indeterminacy, conceptualized from the perspective of democracy as an ideal, allows us to sketch the minimal requirement in terms of hospitality for democracy as a regime.
“Contesting the Territoriality of Citizenship: Duality in National Minority Action”
Tove Malloy, European Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg, Germany
Europe’s traditional national minorities often act as citizens towards two poles, the home state and the kin-state. One day they negotiate rights, responsibilities and budgets with the authorities where they live, be it national, regional or local. Another day they negotiate subsidies with the authorities of their kin-state, and often at several levels. And indeed being in Europe, they may on a third day negotiate programmatic issues with supranational actors such as the European Union. Thus, traditional national minorities perform acts of citizenship not only at different layers but also at several points within each layer. This phenomenon clearly contests the perceived notion of citizenship and acts of citizenship as attached to one territorial state. At minimum, there is a duality in this type of citizenship acts. The traditional national minorities often have public and private lives on both sides of a sovereign border, be it families, networks, or professional and political allegiances. Generally they master the languages of both states. Their identity is likely hybrid based on dual loyalty, complex solidarity, and most likely multicultural and multilingual approaches to education.
Drawing on a case study from the Danish-German border region, this paper will seek to design the first skeleton of the architecture of a multi-dimensional citizenship model that describes the situation of traditional national minority citizenship in modern Europe. This will involve providing a concept of citizenship that provides the foundation upon which to design the new model. Next it will seek to show whether the selected concept is viable on the basis of acts of citizenship exercised by the national minorities in the case study. Specific objectives will be to ascertain within certain spheres of life whether minority acts of citizenships support the choice of concept. Possible spheres of life of attention may be the socio-political, the cultural and the economic. If successful, the paper will not only suggest that the perceived notion of citizenship as attached to a specific territory is inadequate but will also take the idea of acts of citizenship (Isin) further. It might argue that while acts of citizenship are clearly to be seen as articulated in a discourse of democratic struggles (Honneth), they may also demonstrate that acts of citizenship are a matter of becoming (Connolly) – perhaps becoming critical (Connolly/Malloy).
Drawing on a case study from the Danish-German border region, this paper will seek to design the first skeleton of the architecture of a multi-dimensional citizenship model that describes the situation of traditional national minority citizenship in modern Europe. This will involve providing a concept of citizenship that provides the foundation upon which to design the new model. Next it will seek to show whether the selected concept is viable on the basis of acts of citizenship exercised by the national minorities in the case study. Specific objectives will be to ascertain within certain spheres of life whether minority acts of citizenships support the choice of concept. Possible spheres of life of attention may be the socio-political, the cultural and the economic. If successful, the paper will not only suggest that the perceived notion of citizenship as attached to a specific territory is inadequate but will also take the idea of acts of citizenship (Isin) further. It might argue that while acts of citizenship are clearly to be seen as articulated in a discourse of democratic struggles (Honneth), they may also demonstrate that acts of citizenship are a matter of becoming (Connolly) – perhaps becoming critical (Connolly/Malloy).
“Reflexive Constituency Formation: The Democratic Constitution of the Demos”
Laura Montanaro, University of Chicago, USA
Current theories of non-electoral forms of representation either avoid the question of how to form democratically legitimate constituencies outside electoral processes, or beg the question by focusing on the representation of discourses rather than peoples. By drawing on the standard of “affected interests,” this paper offers an alternative. Self-appointed representatives – those actors who make claims of representation outside of electoral processes – are able to link non-electoral constituencies to the basic democratic principle that those affected by collective decisions should have capacities to influence those decisions. Self-appointed representation neither restricts itself to existing geographical constituencies nor forfeits the question of how to understand the constituency in democratic terms. Not only does self-appointed representation supplement democratic theory and practice by providing representation for affected constituencies within and across borders, but it also recasts some core premises of democratic theory and practice precisely because it functions as a mechanism of constituency formation, helping to constitute constituencies and sometimes democratic, i.e. affected, ones – a problem often considered irresolvable within democratic theory.
These constituencies are not “constituted” in the sense that they did not exist prior to the self-appointed representative. Rather, once the claim is made, the affected may begin to coalesce, or coalesce further as a “people” or demos along some dimensions of common interest, for example, problems, feelings, and experiences of injustice. In this way, the representative claim may transform a latent constituency into a self-conscious and effective one. Through the process of authorizing or de-authorizing self-appointed claims of representation, individuals decide whether they want to be part of this and/or that people. That is, when individuals authorize or de-authorize self-appointed claims of representation, they constitute themselves as a demos in relation to the representative claim, thus choosing the boundaries of their own demos. Self-determination in democracy requires a reflexive form of self-constitution in which, as Bohman puts it, “the terms and boundaries of democracy are made by citizens themselves and not others” (2007, 2). Non-electoral constituencies cannot always give themselves law through an elected legislature, but with the help of self-appointed representatives, they can define the boundaries of their own demos or demoi.
There can be no demos without representation, and the constitution of an appropriate demos – an affected demos – is a condition for democracy. As Laclau puts it, “The represented depends on the representative for the constitution of his or her own identity” (2007). Self-appointed representatives provide a significant means through which people become self-determining through constituting themselves as a demos in relation to an issue that affects them. This understanding of constituency formation contributes to a plurality of “citizenships,” and is increasingly important to expanding democracy in a world in which issues are not contained by electoral constituencies, or contexts in which formal democratic institutions work poorly or do not exist.
These constituencies are not “constituted” in the sense that they did not exist prior to the self-appointed representative. Rather, once the claim is made, the affected may begin to coalesce, or coalesce further as a “people” or demos along some dimensions of common interest, for example, problems, feelings, and experiences of injustice. In this way, the representative claim may transform a latent constituency into a self-conscious and effective one. Through the process of authorizing or de-authorizing self-appointed claims of representation, individuals decide whether they want to be part of this and/or that people. That is, when individuals authorize or de-authorize self-appointed claims of representation, they constitute themselves as a demos in relation to the representative claim, thus choosing the boundaries of their own demos. Self-determination in democracy requires a reflexive form of self-constitution in which, as Bohman puts it, “the terms and boundaries of democracy are made by citizens themselves and not others” (2007, 2). Non-electoral constituencies cannot always give themselves law through an elected legislature, but with the help of self-appointed representatives, they can define the boundaries of their own demos or demoi.
There can be no demos without representation, and the constitution of an appropriate demos – an affected demos – is a condition for democracy. As Laclau puts it, “The represented depends on the representative for the constitution of his or her own identity” (2007). Self-appointed representatives provide a significant means through which people become self-determining through constituting themselves as a demos in relation to an issue that affects them. This understanding of constituency formation contributes to a plurality of “citizenships,” and is increasingly important to expanding democracy in a world in which issues are not contained by electoral constituencies, or contexts in which formal democratic institutions work poorly or do not exist.
“Citizenship as Political Integration: How to Escape from the Dead End of Political Freedom Understood as the Main Goal of Democracy”
Ángel Rivero, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain
Western European democratic societies are in a state of shock. The capacity of managing cultural pluralism is blocked and xenophobia is again in the political agenda. Till recently, on the contrary, the hegemonic stance of the European public opinion was xenophilia: Differences should be celebrated because they contribute to improve our lives. They enrich us , they amuse us and, above all, they make us conscious of hidden domination. Mainly, of what was called cultural domination. Thus, through the recognition of differences, we were able to improve the tolerance of our political arrangements. The underlying assumption was that States are culturally neutral devices able to manage a plurality of identities in society. But this is now under scrutiny. Many voices are saying, from political parties, the media, and the academia, that there are cultural limits to democracy and that democracy presupposes a we, a common identity, that is not neutral in cultural terms. In this paper I will concentrate on the difficulties of democracies in managing cultural pluralism and I will tackle this issue from the perspective of normative political theory. I will present some historical instances in order to illuminate both the connection between politics and culture in the western modern state and its long tradition of failed public policies aimed at expulsion, assimilation or integration. From these experiences I will draw some normative conclusions that I find useful in order to face the challenge posed to citizenship by the contemporary problems of cultural pluralism. In a nutshell, I will show that cultural pluralism is not a problem for democracy if citizenship is understood as a device aimed at integration and not as the expression of a common will.
Chair: Teresa Toldy, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Discussant: Simone Chambers, University of Toronto, Canada
Panel 12: Rethinking Urban Citizenship
Room: 3.2
“Expanding Citizenship? A Critical Evaluation of City Human Rights Discourses and Practices”
Michele Grigolo, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
In times of increasing economic injustice and cultural differentiation within state borders, human rights challenge citizenship both in theory and practice by promoting inclusion where citizenship often excludes. At the same time, the inclusion promoted by human rights through its universalism has been challenged by the diversity of values and experiences of people across countries and borders. The classical philosophical and sociological critique of human rights addresses their abstract, capitalist and imperialist character. This paper explores all these tensions by repositioning them at the city level and by looking at practices of human rights circulated at the city level as policies or campaigns, by public and/or private agents such as local governments, NGOs and social movements. The paper focuses particularly on the European and US experiences of definition and implementation of city UN conventions, city human rights charters, and the principle of non-discrimination and equality measures. It considers also the diffusion of human rights practices beyond the Western world, highlighting the obvious differences as human rights move away from the Western political and legal tradition that produced them back in the 1940s within the United Nations. Different bottom-up and top-down experiences are presented. Drawing on these concrete cases, the paper highlights the potential of city human rights discourses and practices in expanding citizenship but also the de facto limits of these discourses and practices. In Western cities, local human rights practices are expressed but also constrained within the larger legal framework dictated by, on the one hand, supra-local levels of governments and legislation and, on the other, local markets and politics. Participation emerges here as a key process to generate new ways of thinking and implementing human rights, although it clearly meets with substantial obstacles tied to the specific attitudes and cultures of the agents involved. Under these circumstances, the paper suggests ways in which cities can contribute to expand citizenship through human rights while trying to redefine human rights 'from below', dynamically linking them to the concrete life experiences of the territories and cultures of the people who use them.
“Back to the City: Urban Citizenship and Global Migration”
Myer Siemiatycki, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada
Contemporary global migration is re-asserting the city as a central site of citizenship claims and struggles. This paper examines the theoretical, policy and mass mobilization currents which underlie resurgent urban citizenship in immigrant cities across the global north.
A variety of dynamics are strengthening the ties of citizenship and the city. The vast majority of migrants re-settle in cities. Often confronted by national states of the north advancing securitized, neo-liberal measures, migrants and their allies are increasingly turning to the local state – to cities – as platforms and advocates of immigrant rights. Does this herald the revival of the city state, or is it the ghettoization into the least powerful governmental jurisdiction of citizenship claims for marginalized populations? Do migrant claims of ‘rights to the city’ advance social inclusion or are they a diversion from more fundamental assertions of national and transnational rights?
Theoretical considerations of re-scaling statecraft, identity and belonging underlie the paper. Empirical analysis of citizenship movements across the global north, with particular emphasis on the experience of Toronto test the extent to which an empowering urban citizenship is emerging.
The content of urban citizenship claims is richly diverse. It encompasses claims on urban landscapes, municipal services, civic political rights and representation, enhanced municipal government powers, and equitable civic integration. This is building a new discourse and practice of urban citizenship in many cities.
The Cities of Migration network links cities of the global north which exemplify the transformation of urban places and citizenship norms in an age of migration. For its part, Toronto stands out as a city literally on the tipping point – with 49.9% of its population foreign-born. This paper explores the capacity of urban citizenship claims to significantly enrich both democracy and the well-being of marginalized populations. Is ‘Back to the City’ the future of citizenship?
A variety of dynamics are strengthening the ties of citizenship and the city. The vast majority of migrants re-settle in cities. Often confronted by national states of the north advancing securitized, neo-liberal measures, migrants and their allies are increasingly turning to the local state – to cities – as platforms and advocates of immigrant rights. Does this herald the revival of the city state, or is it the ghettoization into the least powerful governmental jurisdiction of citizenship claims for marginalized populations? Do migrant claims of ‘rights to the city’ advance social inclusion or are they a diversion from more fundamental assertions of national and transnational rights?
Theoretical considerations of re-scaling statecraft, identity and belonging underlie the paper. Empirical analysis of citizenship movements across the global north, with particular emphasis on the experience of Toronto test the extent to which an empowering urban citizenship is emerging.
The content of urban citizenship claims is richly diverse. It encompasses claims on urban landscapes, municipal services, civic political rights and representation, enhanced municipal government powers, and equitable civic integration. This is building a new discourse and practice of urban citizenship in many cities.
The Cities of Migration network links cities of the global north which exemplify the transformation of urban places and citizenship norms in an age of migration. For its part, Toronto stands out as a city literally on the tipping point – with 49.9% of its population foreign-born. This paper explores the capacity of urban citizenship claims to significantly enrich both democracy and the well-being of marginalized populations. Is ‘Back to the City’ the future of citizenship?
“The Limits of Urban Citizenship”
Patrick Turmel, Université Laval, Québec, Canada
The contemporary city, with its multiple jurisdictions and porous borders, is a puzzle for political philosophers. It is not only difficult to trace its contours, one can also find large variations in the rights and responsibilities of its inhabitants. Indeed, users of the urban public realm are not equals when it comes to the resources they can benefit from, nor when it comes to the responsibilities they face. In fact, for most political philosophers interested in the issue, the major problems in cities derive from various asymmetries of that sort. One is that between the city or metropolitan region – what I call the urban public realm – and its numerous political jurisdictions. The contours of these jurisdictions dividing cities do not fit at all the daily reality of urban living. As a result, some individuals will benefit from services or resources without having to assume their full cost. In other words, they will consume some public goods as free-riders. Inversely, some residents will be strongly affected by decisions on which they have no say or control. Note also that residents living in disadvantaged jurisdictions will receive poorer services than those living in more affluent ones. Asymmetries between de jure citizens and mere de facto residents also create an important gap in urban areas. These are all serious issues from the perspective of justice. Among the few political philosophers or theorists to have given serious thought on the question, a popular solution is that of an urban government, whose jurisdiction is designed to fit perfectly the contour of the city, including its suburbs. Another, related one, is that of urban citizenship, a status any inhabitant of the urban public realm should benefit, according to these theorists. This paper will be mainly concerned with this latter idea of urban citizenship. This is now a popular catch phrase in urban studies, but its meaning often remains quite elusive. What I want to do in this paper is to question the way this notion is used by some of its more serious proponents. Rainer Bauböck, for instance, in his paper « Reinventing Urban Citizenship », claims that urban citizenship should be a formal status, based on residence. And envisions, following the proponents of regional or urban governments, that “social and political boundaries of cities ought to be broadly congruent” and that “cities should be reunited with their peripheries in common jurisdictions” (Bauböck 2003, 139). I want to argue in this paper that the solution to the various asymmetries above-mentioned is not the institutionalization of an urban citizenship modeled on national citizenship. In particular, I want to show that the notion of urban citizenship should be separated from that of urban government, and that we have to ground the notion of urban citizenship in a proper theory of urban justice, that takes into account the institutional features of the urban public realm, including its asymmetries.
Chair: Tatiana Moura, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Discussant: Paulo Peixoto, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Panel 13: The Future of Social Citizenship?
Room: A.3.1
“Progression or Regression in Citizenship: A Retrospective Analysis of T.H. Marshall’s Account”
Amir Ali, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, India
This paper argues that there has been a progressive undermining of various strands of citizenship over the last three decades of the 1980s, 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century. It will thus look specifically at the social, political and civil strands of citizenship which will be immediately recognizable as the three strands that T.H. Marshall discussed in his famous essay ‘Citizenship and Social Class’. The paper takes then as its point of departure T.H. Marshall’s analysis of citizenship which looks at the progressive unfolding or evolution of the civil, political and social strands of citizenship over the course of the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. Using Marshall’s analysis of the steady progress, evolution and consolidation of the different strands of citizenship, the paper will argue that in the three decades that form the central focus of analysis of this paper viz. the 1980s, 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, there has been a systematic and steady erosion of precisely the strands that Marshall analysed as representing the steady and gradual development of citizenship. The paper represents an inversion of Marshall’s analysis in the sense that it argues that the undermining of the three strands of citizenship, begins with the social or welfare strand with the rise to ascendance of the New Right from the late 1970s and early 1980s and the attack on welfare. This is subsequently followed by an undermining of the political strand, culminating in the undermining of the civil strand in the first decade of the 21st century in the attacks on civil liberties in the wake of the war on terror. The paper also represents a compression of Marshall’s analysis as it argues that what was achieved in three centuries in Marshall’s analysis is undermined in a mere three decades. In a nutshell this paper represents an inversion and compression of Marshall’s analysis. Marshall writing in the middle of the 20th century was optimistic enough to argue that the Keynesian welfare state was a presence that could be counted on. This over optimistic assessment was negated by the erosion and roll back of the welfare state from the 1970s onwards. The first argument of this paper is that it was precisely the third and last strand of Marshall’s analysis, welfare, that was the first to be undermined. The second argument of this paper is that the disenfranchisement of citizens means the undermining and erosion of the political strand of citizenship. It will take the instance of the disenfranchisement of black voters in Florida in the US presidential elections of 2000 to look at such an undermining of the political strand of citizenship. The third and last argument of paper is that in the first decade of the 21st century there has also been an erosion of the civil strand of citizenship with the flagrant violations of civil liberties reported during the war on terror.
“Juridification and Social Citizenship
Even Nilssen, University of Bergen, Norway
This paper elaborates on the relationship between social citizenship and juridification. The concept of ‘juridification’ is not a simple one and has been interpreted in various ways. Generally, however, juridification processes may be understood as more detailed legal regulation, legal regulations of new areas, conflicts and problems increasingly being framed as legal claims and a development where a judicial way of thinking and acting penetrates new social fields.
Departing from a Marshallian understanding of social citizenship juridification or de-juridification processes concerns the institutional construction of social citizenship by relating collective political obligations and individual rights and duties. Hence, our main empirical spotlight is turned on social rights. Social rights are, however, also discussed in relation to other rights such as political and civil rights.
Social citizenship is on a general level constructed politically by assessment of the collective
ethical obligations of a certain political community towards its citizens. In practice, however, social citizenship is determined by the way such obligations are institutionalized. Highlighting rights as fundamental in the constitution of social citizenship, welfare law becomes a central focus point. One important intention of the paper is to elaborate on how social citizenship is constructed in the possible tension field between political, administrative and legal institutions. How does welfare law affect the relationship between welfare administration/ professions and individuals (e.g. social and civil rights) and between law and politics (e.g. social and political rights)? The institutionalization of social citizenship has to be studied on the basis of different areas of welfare law. This is exemplified by two empirical cases: the legal development in the field of work and welfare on the one hand and health services on the other.
In the field of health services it seems reasonable to say that a juridification process has taken
place in Norway – implying a reinforcement of individual patients’ rights and thus a strengthening of social citizenship (maybe at the expense of a more bureaucratic service provision). The expansion of rights within the sector encompasses claims to certain services and through the legislation patients are granted procedural rights and an increased opportunity to decide on questions concerning medical examination and treatment.
In the field of social policy individual legal rights to social benefits have increasingly been comprehended as to render people passive, leading to a stronger coupling between individual rights and duties expressed through the establishment of quasi-contractual legal arrangements. It may be argued that contractualism implies de-juridification in the way that it emphasizes tailor-made services and increased local discretion in the preparation of the content of welfare policies (weak legal control). This may also entail a development towards de-politicization of social provision although quasi-contracts can be understood as a new mode of controlling behavior which are closely attached to political objectives (e.g. to create an economic active citizen).
Departing from a Marshallian understanding of social citizenship juridification or de-juridification processes concerns the institutional construction of social citizenship by relating collective political obligations and individual rights and duties. Hence, our main empirical spotlight is turned on social rights. Social rights are, however, also discussed in relation to other rights such as political and civil rights.
Social citizenship is on a general level constructed politically by assessment of the collective
ethical obligations of a certain political community towards its citizens. In practice, however, social citizenship is determined by the way such obligations are institutionalized. Highlighting rights as fundamental in the constitution of social citizenship, welfare law becomes a central focus point. One important intention of the paper is to elaborate on how social citizenship is constructed in the possible tension field between political, administrative and legal institutions. How does welfare law affect the relationship between welfare administration/ professions and individuals (e.g. social and civil rights) and between law and politics (e.g. social and political rights)? The institutionalization of social citizenship has to be studied on the basis of different areas of welfare law. This is exemplified by two empirical cases: the legal development in the field of work and welfare on the one hand and health services on the other.
In the field of health services it seems reasonable to say that a juridification process has taken
place in Norway – implying a reinforcement of individual patients’ rights and thus a strengthening of social citizenship (maybe at the expense of a more bureaucratic service provision). The expansion of rights within the sector encompasses claims to certain services and through the legislation patients are granted procedural rights and an increased opportunity to decide on questions concerning medical examination and treatment.
In the field of social policy individual legal rights to social benefits have increasingly been comprehended as to render people passive, leading to a stronger coupling between individual rights and duties expressed through the establishment of quasi-contractual legal arrangements. It may be argued that contractualism implies de-juridification in the way that it emphasizes tailor-made services and increased local discretion in the preparation of the content of welfare policies (weak legal control). This may also entail a development towards de-politicization of social provision although quasi-contracts can be understood as a new mode of controlling behavior which are closely attached to political objectives (e.g. to create an economic active citizen).
“Geopolitics in Frontier Areas – Elements for a Reevaluation of Social Rights and Citizenship in Mercosur Borders”
Vera Maria Ribeiro Nogueira, Universidade Católica de Pelotas, Brazil
This paper discusses social rights and citizenship in the context of the current regionalization and economic globalization processes. These processes have different reaches in different countries, and frontier areas, most particularly, deserve attention. Because frontiers are spaces where distinctions in the attention to basic human needs come together with limitations in rights as defined by each Nation State, they have become areas of political fight for citizenship expansion, thereby evidencing the phenomenon of denationalization. Using as empirical background the frontier regions between Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina, this paper shows how frontier geopolitics demands a review of the guarantee of social rights in the face of the innovative actions and pacts that are bringing to light the incipient phenomenon of denationalization. It shows that the social relations developed by inter-frontier co-living have different configurations according to the historical and cultural conditions of each particular zone, which affects the mechanisms and dynamics of social protection, and examines the institutionalities that emerge as a consequence of multilateral agreements and the social policies of each country involved in the study, which are determinant for a review of citizenship. From these fights emerge bilateral pacts, neighbor agreements, free frontier zones and innovative initiatives in the political fight for citizenship expansion beyond territorial borders. To deal with this theme, it was necessary to learn about the sociopolitical and economic phenomena of the last decades of the 20th century, generally called globalization processes. This paper describes the asymmetries between economic and social globalization, and highlights territorial inequalities in Healthcare – both long-existing and new which affect social rights and have direct impacts on frontier areas. It presents the contradiction that exists between the emphasis currently given to human rights treaties, of which the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is an example, and the restrictive tendencies posed on citizenship due to the new means of capital accumulation. The paper also discusses the positions of authors that claim the institution of a new form of citizenship – economic citizenship, the result of denationalization and deterritorialization – and others that point to the need and possibility of expanding the concept of citizenship by connecting it with the Lawful Democratic States, breaking away from the concept of nationality. The paper then exposes how the developed countries are intensifying immigration control and strengthening the barriers to social protection, accentuating social exclusion and inequalities. Finally, the paper presents the possible, unconventional strategies suggested in literature to subsidise the political fights of professional and political actors concerned with social citizenship expansion.
“An American NowHereLand? Healthcare for Undocumented Migrants in Transatlantic Perspective”
Isabel Perera, Université de Genève, Switzerland
The growing irrelevance of legal parameters, as well the increasing pressure of environmental “push factors”, has led to an increase in irregular migration worldwide. Many studies have considered border politics as the primary battlefield between the non-citizen and the hegemon. This paper, however, considers how non-citizens interact with other legal spheres, primarily those which affect his welfare. The interaction between undocumented migrants and health policy in the United States is a complicated one. Traditionally, Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs) deliver low-cost health care to the uninsured. However, undocumented migrants have historically avoided the FQHCs. Fearful of revealing their identities, undocumented migrants are calling for alternative options from the American public health system. In order to better understand this alternative system, this study is situated in transatlantic perspective.
Healthcare in NowHereLand: Improving Services for Undocumented Migrants in the European Union” surveyed providers across EU member states regarding their undocumented patients. In this paper, we attempt to replicate the European study in two North American locations: Baltimore, Maryland and Southern New Jersey. The settings’ contrasting environments, urban and rural, serve as a platform for understanding the various constitutions of migrant care in the United States. In addition, secondary sources were consulted to understand the historical and political characteristics of each site.
As a result, two themes became salient. The first considers citizenship as an identity rooted in the written record. Locality and place play an important role in citizenship, as systemic inclusion often depends strongly on the “paper trail.” The second theme considers how public health is a useful tool for understanding the nuanced relationship between the non-citizen and the hegemon. Here, disenfranchisement makes way for a subaltern public health “system.” An American dependence on non-citizen labor justifies indigent health care.
Despite mounting challenges to the American public health system, undocumented migrants are finding alternative solutions to accessing care. This paper considers how hegemonic institutions might respond to these challenges, as well as to the alternative system. It questions the sphere of “immigration law,” and calls for scholars to consider how other legal spheres might illuminate studies of citizenship and non-citizenship.
Healthcare in NowHereLand: Improving Services for Undocumented Migrants in the European Union” surveyed providers across EU member states regarding their undocumented patients. In this paper, we attempt to replicate the European study in two North American locations: Baltimore, Maryland and Southern New Jersey. The settings’ contrasting environments, urban and rural, serve as a platform for understanding the various constitutions of migrant care in the United States. In addition, secondary sources were consulted to understand the historical and political characteristics of each site.
As a result, two themes became salient. The first considers citizenship as an identity rooted in the written record. Locality and place play an important role in citizenship, as systemic inclusion often depends strongly on the “paper trail.” The second theme considers how public health is a useful tool for understanding the nuanced relationship between the non-citizen and the hegemon. Here, disenfranchisement makes way for a subaltern public health “system.” An American dependence on non-citizen labor justifies indigent health care.
Despite mounting challenges to the American public health system, undocumented migrants are finding alternative solutions to accessing care. This paper considers how hegemonic institutions might respond to these challenges, as well as to the alternative system. It questions the sphere of “immigration law,” and calls for scholars to consider how other legal spheres might illuminate studies of citizenship and non-citizenship.
Chair: José Maria Castro Caldas, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Discussant: Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Parallel Panels III: June 4, 16:00 – 18:00
Panel 14: Subnational Fora of Citizen Deliberation
Room: 3.2
“The Longevity of the New Democratic Participatory Instruments: Discussing the Stability of Participatory Budgeting”
Mariana Alves, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal,
Giovanni Allegretti, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Over the past few years the participatory budgeting (PB) has been considered by much of the theory as one of the higher expression democratic innovation instruments in many political systems. Within the framework of all participatory instruments, participatory budgets stands for its capability to generate vote spaces other than the traditional ballots, also, to foment the deliberation process and enlarge people’s capability to discuss political topics, that, even though are close to their lives, not usually can be reachable in everyday life.
Therefore many PB experiences have increased not only the accountability and the participation in a determinate moment but influence the overall participation, not only in alternative democratic instruments but also in traditional democracy as some studies have shown. As a consequence of the positive effects of participatory budgeting, since early 90’s, is possible to observe a propagation of PB all over the world, since many countries started to translate Latin American models and adapt them to other democratic realities.
Nevertheless, the political interest, and participation motivated by these new political freedoms has not been sufficient to ensure their stability in some cases. Many experiences, over the past decade, develop itself in a non-linear scale, tending to fade along the way. Participatory budgets are often implemented after important political negotiations and delicate decision making process, and some, after a period of accomplishments either change dramatically or disappear.
In this paper we draw attention to the phenomenon of disappearance and profound change of some participatory budgeting experiences, focusing mainly in the Portuguese case. The discussion develops thus two mainframes: The first allow us to analyze the main elements that may contribute to the instability of some experiences that have existed and then disappeared for a long or short period. We discuss for instance the hypothesis that representative elections turnovers, political will, citizenship frustration with previous PB performances, seem to be elements to consider when explaining these dynamics.
In a second analysis mainframe we discuss the relevance of alternative democratic instruments stability. Some questions orient this topic, such as, “should participatory budgeting be legally stable?”: “does stability creates stagnation and inability to adapt to new situations or generates confidence and trust in the democracy?” Thus, we explore the stability and longevity of new democratic participatory instruments as a fundamental element both to ensure its positive effects on the institutional political system, and to create liability, that allow these effects spread over citizenry in a larger period of time.
Therefore many PB experiences have increased not only the accountability and the participation in a determinate moment but influence the overall participation, not only in alternative democratic instruments but also in traditional democracy as some studies have shown. As a consequence of the positive effects of participatory budgeting, since early 90’s, is possible to observe a propagation of PB all over the world, since many countries started to translate Latin American models and adapt them to other democratic realities.
Nevertheless, the political interest, and participation motivated by these new political freedoms has not been sufficient to ensure their stability in some cases. Many experiences, over the past decade, develop itself in a non-linear scale, tending to fade along the way. Participatory budgets are often implemented after important political negotiations and delicate decision making process, and some, after a period of accomplishments either change dramatically or disappear.
In this paper we draw attention to the phenomenon of disappearance and profound change of some participatory budgeting experiences, focusing mainly in the Portuguese case. The discussion develops thus two mainframes: The first allow us to analyze the main elements that may contribute to the instability of some experiences that have existed and then disappeared for a long or short period. We discuss for instance the hypothesis that representative elections turnovers, political will, citizenship frustration with previous PB performances, seem to be elements to consider when explaining these dynamics.
In a second analysis mainframe we discuss the relevance of alternative democratic instruments stability. Some questions orient this topic, such as, “should participatory budgeting be legally stable?”: “does stability creates stagnation and inability to adapt to new situations or generates confidence and trust in the democracy?” Thus, we explore the stability and longevity of new democratic participatory instruments as a fundamental element both to ensure its positive effects on the institutional political system, and to create liability, that allow these effects spread over citizenry in a larger period of time.
“Practices of Local Social Forums: Political Significations and Potentials for a Renewed Citizenship”
Pascale Dufour, Université de Montréal, Canada
Since the first World social forum in 2001, millions of local initiatives have emerged all over the world, sometimes directly linked with what happens at the world scale, sometimes more loosely attached to it. In either case, we know very little on these local processes where thousand of activists gathered for two or three days, thinking together, speaking and learning from each other experiences on a wild range of issues. We believe that these local events are an important source of knowledge to understand recent transformations of citizens practices.
Based on the detailed analysis of 6 cases of local social forums processes situated in Quebec and in France, the paper will explore the political significations of these activists gatherings in the two societies.
In particular, we will address three specific questions:
To what extent could we consider these practices as an expression of a renewed citizenship? What kinds of relationships are build with public authorities (local government, national state or international institutions), political parties, organized interests? Are these local social forums a form of protest or are they something else? What are the targets and explicit aims of these events?
How local social forums, as social and political practices, are embedded in their local contexts? What are they role and place in the local political life? How do activists and participants explained the emergence and development of local social forums in their localities? What are the concrete links built (or not) with other social forums happening at other scale?
How practices of local social forums challenged (or not) dominant modes of political representation/ expression of interests? Are they simply a new repertoire for collective action or do they have a creative potential in terms of democratization (participation and deliberation)?
In this paper, local social forums are considered from the point of view of their practices and not from an a priori definition of what they should be. Nevertheless, we will try to engage a more normative discussion by evaluating in which circumstances local social forums are transformative practices (or potentially transformative).
Theoretically, we propose to rely on a “geography of social movements”, that considered the importance of place and scale of collective action.
Based on the detailed analysis of 6 cases of local social forums processes situated in Quebec and in France, the paper will explore the political significations of these activists gatherings in the two societies.
In particular, we will address three specific questions:
To what extent could we consider these practices as an expression of a renewed citizenship? What kinds of relationships are build with public authorities (local government, national state or international institutions), political parties, organized interests? Are these local social forums a form of protest or are they something else? What are the targets and explicit aims of these events?
How local social forums, as social and political practices, are embedded in their local contexts? What are they role and place in the local political life? How do activists and participants explained the emergence and development of local social forums in their localities? What are the concrete links built (or not) with other social forums happening at other scale?
How practices of local social forums challenged (or not) dominant modes of political representation/ expression of interests? Are they simply a new repertoire for collective action or do they have a creative potential in terms of democratization (participation and deliberation)?
In this paper, local social forums are considered from the point of view of their practices and not from an a priori definition of what they should be. Nevertheless, we will try to engage a more normative discussion by evaluating in which circumstances local social forums are transformative practices (or potentially transformative).
Theoretically, we propose to rely on a “geography of social movements”, that considered the importance of place and scale of collective action.
“How Participatory Budget Changes the Meaning and Practices of Citizenship”
Marta Nunes da Costa, Universidade do Minho, Braga, Portugal
What does it mean to be a citizen today? In an era where boundaries are being questioned, where identities are being transformed, where social and political claims are being updated from the traditional ‘recognition’ or ‘redistribution’ discourse to a more globalized discourse supported by a theoretical appeal to human rights, it is important to clarify where the ‘citizen’ stands, morally and politically speaking.
My presentation is supported by a) a strong moral and political reading of citizenship, echoing some republican tradition where citizenship is associated with virtue; and b) the assumption that there is a strong correlation between virtuous citizens and a virtuous republic or ‘democracy’. In order to reflect upon the transformations of the concept of citizenship I will look at some the practices it involves, more precisely, I will look into the experience of participatory budget, an experience that is being made in many countries across the world and which appears to be a concrete example regarding the kind of practice that we should support in the future and that goes beyond the mere mechanical act of voting.
This presentation reflects an ongoing research about the impact participatory budget (pb) has in citizens’ lives and tries to answer a very tight and inter-dependent set of questions namely: 1. do people who participate in pb become more enlightened individuals? If enlightened understanding is one of the key virtues of democracy (Dahl 1989, 2000) what is exactly the relationship between enlightened understanding and deliberation? 2. Is there enough evidence to say that pb contributes to the empowerment of the citizens? If so, what is the relationship between control of the agenda on the one hand, and participation on the other?
In order to answer these questions I will establish a comparison between successful pb experiments in two Brazilian cities – namely, Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte – and two Portuguese cities which are implementing pb – Lisbon and Braga. It is based in these comparisons that I will test my hypothesis and try to arrive at a preliminary conclusion regarding the theoretical implications of the pb initiative. I will show how participatory budget can be a crucial tool to conceive and transform the future of democracy, by challenging the concept of citizenship and showing that citizens learn democracy by doing it. The demystification of the budget brings politics closer to the people, who see the capacity to influence political decisions redistributed and who, consequently, transform the core meaning of citizenship by redefining each individual’s level of commitment and participation in the public political sphere.
My presentation is supported by a) a strong moral and political reading of citizenship, echoing some republican tradition where citizenship is associated with virtue; and b) the assumption that there is a strong correlation between virtuous citizens and a virtuous republic or ‘democracy’. In order to reflect upon the transformations of the concept of citizenship I will look at some the practices it involves, more precisely, I will look into the experience of participatory budget, an experience that is being made in many countries across the world and which appears to be a concrete example regarding the kind of practice that we should support in the future and that goes beyond the mere mechanical act of voting.
This presentation reflects an ongoing research about the impact participatory budget (pb) has in citizens’ lives and tries to answer a very tight and inter-dependent set of questions namely: 1. do people who participate in pb become more enlightened individuals? If enlightened understanding is one of the key virtues of democracy (Dahl 1989, 2000) what is exactly the relationship between enlightened understanding and deliberation? 2. Is there enough evidence to say that pb contributes to the empowerment of the citizens? If so, what is the relationship between control of the agenda on the one hand, and participation on the other?
In order to answer these questions I will establish a comparison between successful pb experiments in two Brazilian cities – namely, Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte – and two Portuguese cities which are implementing pb – Lisbon and Braga. It is based in these comparisons that I will test my hypothesis and try to arrive at a preliminary conclusion regarding the theoretical implications of the pb initiative. I will show how participatory budget can be a crucial tool to conceive and transform the future of democracy, by challenging the concept of citizenship and showing that citizens learn democracy by doing it. The demystification of the budget brings politics closer to the people, who see the capacity to influence political decisions redistributed and who, consequently, transform the core meaning of citizenship by redefining each individual’s level of commitment and participation in the public political sphere.
“Deliberative Participation in the Health Care Sector: Potentials and Limitations”
Mauro Serapioni, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
In the last twenty years, many analyses and essays have been published with the objective of recasting democracy theory and practice in the light of the deliberative turn. A large and growing number of scholars have designated public deliberation as a cornerstone of participatory democracy. Many authors have become increasingly interested in the idea of ‘public space’ within civil society as locations for the democratisation of everyday life. Deliberation has been seen as a desirable attribute of democracy – as one of the ways through which preferences can be transformed rather than merely aggregated. Deliberative democracy should not be thought of as an alternative to representative democracy. It is rather an expansion of representative democracy. Deliberative democracy aims to establish a decision-making process based on discussion and reviews – preferably face-to-face discussion – in which participants can express various arguments freely in a democratic environment.
In recent years, this perspective is evoking a great interest in the health sector where there is a growing understanding of the need to create an appropriate 'public sphere' to encourage the dialogue between the different actors in the health system. Among the more common methods used in health, the following should be noted: Citizens' Juries, Citizens' workshop, Planning cells, Citizens' panel, Consensus conferences, Deliberative Polling and Deliberative focus groups. Common to them all is the deliberative element that includes essential aspects such as: providing information about the subject under discussion to all participants; describing and formulating the topics to be analyzed in the language of the ordinary citizen; carefully considering the views of other participants; and stimulating the discussion to reach a consensus or to bring the various positions closer. Among the benefits of deliberative processes highlighted in the literature, the following should be noted: the potential to change participants’ opinions; the ability to increase the level of tolerance and understanding between groups in accepting different points of view; a greater involvement of citizens in health policies; and a qualified mechanism to produce collective decisions and to increase the legitimacy of decisions.
Despite the extensive written literature on this subject, however, there are still few scholars who have examined the effectiveness of the deliberative methods. The results of the Citizens' Juries evaluations – the deliberative most internationally well-known method – have demonstrated several capabilities, but also some critical points. The virtues of deliberative methods are being also questioned by the representation deficit that should be a key element of participatory democracy. The involvement of small participant groups submits the deliberative processes to strong criticism. Several studies have emphasized the paradox of public participation that could contribute to increasing health inequalities, as the vulnerable social groups (immigrants, the elderly, people with mental health problems, etc.) participate less than those who are educated and more socially integrated. However, how best to achieve this involvement is still unclear, particularly in relation to ‘hard-to-reach’ citizens that are usually excluded from decision-making processes.
In recent years, this perspective is evoking a great interest in the health sector where there is a growing understanding of the need to create an appropriate 'public sphere' to encourage the dialogue between the different actors in the health system. Among the more common methods used in health, the following should be noted: Citizens' Juries, Citizens' workshop, Planning cells, Citizens' panel, Consensus conferences, Deliberative Polling and Deliberative focus groups. Common to them all is the deliberative element that includes essential aspects such as: providing information about the subject under discussion to all participants; describing and formulating the topics to be analyzed in the language of the ordinary citizen; carefully considering the views of other participants; and stimulating the discussion to reach a consensus or to bring the various positions closer. Among the benefits of deliberative processes highlighted in the literature, the following should be noted: the potential to change participants’ opinions; the ability to increase the level of tolerance and understanding between groups in accepting different points of view; a greater involvement of citizens in health policies; and a qualified mechanism to produce collective decisions and to increase the legitimacy of decisions.
Despite the extensive written literature on this subject, however, there are still few scholars who have examined the effectiveness of the deliberative methods. The results of the Citizens' Juries evaluations – the deliberative most internationally well-known method – have demonstrated several capabilities, but also some critical points. The virtues of deliberative methods are being also questioned by the representation deficit that should be a key element of participatory democracy. The involvement of small participant groups submits the deliberative processes to strong criticism. Several studies have emphasized the paradox of public participation that could contribute to increasing health inequalities, as the vulnerable social groups (immigrants, the elderly, people with mental health problems, etc.) participate less than those who are educated and more socially integrated. However, how best to achieve this involvement is still unclear, particularly in relation to ‘hard-to-reach’ citizens that are usually excluded from decision-making processes.
Chair: Pedro Hespanha, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Discussant: Nancy Duxbury, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Panel 15: Realizing Citizenship
Room: 3.1
“The Incomplete Principle – Equality in European Constitutional Law”
Mariana Canotilho, Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal
Equality has been included in almost every constitution and catalogue of rights since the late eighteenth century. It has been defined as one of the fundamental values of legal and political orders and, in some cases, as a fundamental right in itself. Therefore, it is the ground for legal (usually constitutional) obligations imposed to public authorities, theoretically forcing them to adopt public policies and concrete legislative measures to assure real equality between all citizens.
From a constitutional perspective, both equality before the law and equality trough the law are established dimensions of this legal principle and have a strong connection with fundamental rights.
The problem, in the contemporary scenario of legal pluralism and multi-level constitutionalism, namely in the European Union area, is that due to the absence of an unique catalogue of rights, equality seems to have different meanings – or different scopes – depending on the legal order in question. While some countries’ Constitutions – as is the case of Portugal – affirm equality not only in the enjoyment of civil rights (the right to vote or freedom of expression), but also in what concerns fundamental social rights (which implies equal access to health or education, for example), in the European legal order only some dimensions of equality have been given real importance.
The European Court of Justice has played an important part in the development of equality as a fundamental principle of European constitutional law, by contributing with innovative and creative jurisprudence to the establishment of firm rules of equality between men and women and of non-discrimination between EU citizens.
This is, however, in our opinion, an incomplete view of the constitutional principle. What lacks in European constitutional law today is to make the connection between equality and social justice clear. In fact, this is not only a theoretical or political claim, but also a juridical demand. If the EU is really to promote social justice and protection and to fight social exclusion and discrimination (real, legally binding objectives, stated in the Union’s Treaties), it will have to overcome the current approach to equality, based on internal market rules, and adopt a new, more complete, conception of the principle.
Some degree of substantial equality is actually a pre-condition for the exercise of citizenship. It is, in a certain way, a dimension of political freedom. If ever-growing degrees of sovereignty are being transferred into EU’s hands, the question of full equality (not only non discrimination by reason of sex, age or nationality) between European citizens will have to be addressed. It is what we will briefly try to do in this paper, by pointing out some of the missing dimensions of equality in European Union law.
From a constitutional perspective, both equality before the law and equality trough the law are established dimensions of this legal principle and have a strong connection with fundamental rights.
The problem, in the contemporary scenario of legal pluralism and multi-level constitutionalism, namely in the European Union area, is that due to the absence of an unique catalogue of rights, equality seems to have different meanings – or different scopes – depending on the legal order in question. While some countries’ Constitutions – as is the case of Portugal – affirm equality not only in the enjoyment of civil rights (the right to vote or freedom of expression), but also in what concerns fundamental social rights (which implies equal access to health or education, for example), in the European legal order only some dimensions of equality have been given real importance.
The European Court of Justice has played an important part in the development of equality as a fundamental principle of European constitutional law, by contributing with innovative and creative jurisprudence to the establishment of firm rules of equality between men and women and of non-discrimination between EU citizens.
This is, however, in our opinion, an incomplete view of the constitutional principle. What lacks in European constitutional law today is to make the connection between equality and social justice clear. In fact, this is not only a theoretical or political claim, but also a juridical demand. If the EU is really to promote social justice and protection and to fight social exclusion and discrimination (real, legally binding objectives, stated in the Union’s Treaties), it will have to overcome the current approach to equality, based on internal market rules, and adopt a new, more complete, conception of the principle.
Some degree of substantial equality is actually a pre-condition for the exercise of citizenship. It is, in a certain way, a dimension of political freedom. If ever-growing degrees of sovereignty are being transferred into EU’s hands, the question of full equality (not only non discrimination by reason of sex, age or nationality) between European citizens will have to be addressed. It is what we will briefly try to do in this paper, by pointing out some of the missing dimensions of equality in European Union law.
“Homelessness and Second-Class Citizenship in Canadian Cities”
Catherine Ellyson, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
In The Origins of Totalitarianism (2004), Hannah Arendt makes clear how important formal citizenship is in building and securing human rights. As many citizenship scholars however point out, and as Arendt recognizes herself, there is much more to citizenship than status and rights entitlement (Bosniak, 2006; Isin, 2002, 2006). Margaret Somers, observing how formal citizens were left behind during the Katrina Hurricane, concludes that “without de facto citizenship, possessing formal nation-state citizenship alone is an inadequate foundation for being recognized as a fully right-bearing person” (Somers, 2008, 26). Full citizenship, thus, entails not only entitlement to rights, but also the actual exercise of those rights, not only participation in formal political institutions, but also the possibility to get there through participation in the civil society. In my presentation, I explore the concept of de facto citizenship by assessing the case of Canadian homeless persons who, although formal citizens, seem to be deprived of de facto citizenship. What this means is that although the homeless may possess formal citizenship, entitlement to rights without the exercise of them, and without participation and belonging to the spaces they occupy, is not enough and may prove to be nothing but an empty shell. Is homelessness at all related to a lack – or insufficiency – of citizenship? Does a focus on the de facto elements of citizenship imply overlooking at the importance of formal citizenship? Do some actors – for example advocacy groups and city governments – become more central in fashioning and securing citizenship once we acknowledge the importance of the de facto elements of citizenship? I address those questions by assessing official documents released by various actors – municipal, provincial and federal governments, service providers, advocacy groups – dealing with homelessness in the cities of Vancouver and Montreal in Canada. To what extent is homelessness considered – and dealt with – as a lack of de facto citizenship? How could the homeless persons’ de facto citizenship be enhanced? Besides looking at the different representations of the homeless conveyed by different types of actors, in the context of different provinces and different cities in Canada, I wish to assess seriously the concept and reality of de facto citizenship. What does it mean? How is it generated or destroyed? Where, in what spaces, does it take place? How does it relate to formal citizenship as attributed and secured by States? I think those questions can begin to be addressed through the case of those most evidently and radically deprived of de facto citizenship.
“When Being Included is Not Enough for Inclusion”
Akos Kopper, ELTE University, Budapest, Hungary
Marton Gero, ELTE University, Budapest, Hungary
As the title of our abstract suggests we try to elucidate a paradox in our paper. Namely, according to comparative surveys – such as the European Values Study – there is a significant deviation between different political communities concerning the way citizens utilize their political rights. In most Western democracies taking part in politics, protesting, self-organizing, getting involved in civic activity is a natural practice of being a citizen. In some of Eastern European countries, however, we observe that citizens hardly exercise their political rights beyond taking part in democratic activities in the form of casting their vote at regular elections. We can observe that, although legally included, the actual political inclusion of citizens of these latter countries does not actually take place. These operate as armchair democracies with citizens watching political life but hardly take part in it. In order to elucidate this problem we emphasize that political activity is by definition a collective activity. Political rights do not merely cater to the liberty of the moderns (by guaranteeing individual liberties), but also cater to the liberty of the ancients, where the latter implies that rights cannot be exercised in an individualistic manner. Rights, such as the right for assembly, the right for free speech, or the right to go on strike are meaningless to be exercised as a private activity. It seems reasonable to assume that there are differences not only in the legal, institutional framework between Western and Eastern Europe – especially given that institutional convergence was a prerequisite of EU integration, in case of Hungary, Slovakia or Poland. Although culturalist explanations offer themselves as an alternative to institutional ones, we believe their explanatory clout should not be overplayed either. What we suggest, therefore, is to complement these with generalistic theories of civil society, which focus more on conditions necessary for collective action, but less engaged with citizenship per se. We believe these generalistic theories can help us to bridge the gap between rights that by definition tend to be individualistic and the notion of political participation, which is inherently collective in its reference. In sum, our paper aims at a critical examination of the question what makes the included to exercise their rights and their inclusion indeed to take place? What makes rights to be not merely abstract contours of political life but makes them into a ‘lived experience’.
“Civic Mobilization in Divided Societies”
Heiko Wimmen, Free University, Berlin, Germany
In societies that are deeply divided along lines of politicized ethnic or religious identity, active citizenship – participation of citizens in processes of deliberation that influence and shape public affairs – is often seriously circumscribed. Even when and where democratic processes and civil liberties are ostensibly safeguarded by legal norms, leaders of highly hierarchically structured ethno-political communities will frequently monopolize political representation and access to participation. The phenomenon is particularly pronounced in post-conflict configurations, where wartime elites can rely on fresh memories of violence and victimization to mobilize unconditional support for their claim to communal leadership.
The regimes thus established are typically characterized by low levels of governance and accountability, paired with a remarkable high capacity to absorb challenges mounted through the political institutions. In particular actors who attempt to break the logic of community-based representation and mobilize to establish political platforms centered on cross-cutting issues (class, ideology, gender, ecology) find the political process skewed against them, and often become compromised in the process of gaining access to representation. In the absence of any credible political opposition or alternative, at times political challenges are instead mounted from outside the institutions and the realm of formal politics, by citizens who turn themselves into civic political actors.
The proposed paper will discuss the constraints and opportunities encountered by such civic political actors in their attempts at political mobilization in divided societies. In particular, it will look at their encounters with the formal political sphere, and the degree to which they may succeed in the formation of counter-hegemonic, civic identities. The narrative presented is based on field research conducted in Lebanon and Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1995 and 2010, and will discuss various types of mobilizations at different stages in the post-conflict trajectories of these deeply divided societies. Through a comparative approach, it aims at expanding the understanding of citizenship in practice under adverse conditions, and outside the hegemonic paradigm of Western liberal democracy.
The regimes thus established are typically characterized by low levels of governance and accountability, paired with a remarkable high capacity to absorb challenges mounted through the political institutions. In particular actors who attempt to break the logic of community-based representation and mobilize to establish political platforms centered on cross-cutting issues (class, ideology, gender, ecology) find the political process skewed against them, and often become compromised in the process of gaining access to representation. In the absence of any credible political opposition or alternative, at times political challenges are instead mounted from outside the institutions and the realm of formal politics, by citizens who turn themselves into civic political actors.
The proposed paper will discuss the constraints and opportunities encountered by such civic political actors in their attempts at political mobilization in divided societies. In particular, it will look at their encounters with the formal political sphere, and the degree to which they may succeed in the formation of counter-hegemonic, civic identities. The narrative presented is based on field research conducted in Lebanon and Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1995 and 2010, and will discuss various types of mobilizations at different stages in the post-conflict trajectories of these deeply divided societies. Through a comparative approach, it aims at expanding the understanding of citizenship in practice under adverse conditions, and outside the hegemonic paradigm of Western liberal democracy.
Chair: Clara Keating, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Discussant: Rajeev Bhargava, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi, India
Panel 16: The Ethics of Exclusion in a Postnational Version of Citizenship
Room: 3.4
“Citizenship Crossroads of the International Cooperation for Development Global Governance Flows”
Flávia Lessa de Barros, Universidade de Brasilia, Brazil
Civil society is one of the oldest concepts of Western political and social thought. With the advancement of modernity, in the midst of several controversies, the concept of “civil society” has become a highly disputed one, like “democracy” has been, an important metanarrative of modernity of which it is one of the key-components. Yet, in spite of the relevance of the relation between the concept of civil society and democracy (which also essentially means between civil society and citizenship), as well as the current existence of “democratic regimes” almost all over the world, the process of dissemination of the concept of civil society on a global scale is not limited to the process of dissemination of democracy as a political model, although it may also be influenced by it.
I argue that different types of international cooperation agencies, by promoting the globalization of development models in many Latin American, African, Asian, and more recently, Eastern European countries, also promote the globalization of development models for civil society. This process is marked by many polysemies which creates complementarities as well as tensions and oppositions.
The relationships among international cooperation agencies and civil society in the so called “South” are useful to observe how the pretended inextricability of the relations between “democracy” and “development”, another central metanarrative of modernity, still leads to a range of current debates and struggles. In the last decades, the reactivation of civil society's participation leading role, in both practical and theoretical terms, involves trends that reinforce such pretention and trends that dismiss it, according to the meanings of “civil society” assumed by different actors in the field.
Relationships among international cooperation agencies and civil society are also useful to observe how, within the political fields generated by international cooperation, the polysemic nature of the notion of “participation” is intrinsically linked to the multiplicity of notions of “civil society” and fundamentally determines the polysemy of the notion of “citizenship”. In a wider view of the field, taking into consideration the many types of cooperation agencies, civil society organizations and networks, such diversity of meanings is simultaneously translated into potentials as well as into ambiguities and limitations over the actual unfoldings.
I highlight the importance of understanding (a) what makes certain concepts and theories about civil society stronger and hegemonic in certain contexts, (b) the roles of actors and institutions that are strategic in this process, (c) the new institutionalities, structures and dynamics promoted by them for civil society engagement. Above all, the understanding of these factors contributes to a greater understanding of other fundamental issues related to the ideas and practices of “power” and the “forms of power” that currently seek to inter-relate global, national and local scales.
The discussion is based on some results of a chapter under my responsibility in the context of the international research project “Models and their Effects on Development Paths: an Ethnographic and Comparative Approach to Knowledge Transmission and Livelihood Strategies”, supported by the European Union.
I argue that different types of international cooperation agencies, by promoting the globalization of development models in many Latin American, African, Asian, and more recently, Eastern European countries, also promote the globalization of development models for civil society. This process is marked by many polysemies which creates complementarities as well as tensions and oppositions.
The relationships among international cooperation agencies and civil society in the so called “South” are useful to observe how the pretended inextricability of the relations between “democracy” and “development”, another central metanarrative of modernity, still leads to a range of current debates and struggles. In the last decades, the reactivation of civil society's participation leading role, in both practical and theoretical terms, involves trends that reinforce such pretention and trends that dismiss it, according to the meanings of “civil society” assumed by different actors in the field.
Relationships among international cooperation agencies and civil society are also useful to observe how, within the political fields generated by international cooperation, the polysemic nature of the notion of “participation” is intrinsically linked to the multiplicity of notions of “civil society” and fundamentally determines the polysemy of the notion of “citizenship”. In a wider view of the field, taking into consideration the many types of cooperation agencies, civil society organizations and networks, such diversity of meanings is simultaneously translated into potentials as well as into ambiguities and limitations over the actual unfoldings.
I highlight the importance of understanding (a) what makes certain concepts and theories about civil society stronger and hegemonic in certain contexts, (b) the roles of actors and institutions that are strategic in this process, (c) the new institutionalities, structures and dynamics promoted by them for civil society engagement. Above all, the understanding of these factors contributes to a greater understanding of other fundamental issues related to the ideas and practices of “power” and the “forms of power” that currently seek to inter-relate global, national and local scales.
The discussion is based on some results of a chapter under my responsibility in the context of the international research project “Models and their Effects on Development Paths: an Ethnographic and Comparative Approach to Knowledge Transmission and Livelihood Strategies”, supported by the European Union.
“The Language of Migrant Selectivity in the Postnational Paradigm of Citizenship – How the New ‘Postnational Citizenships’ Are Learning to Reproduce the Modern Logic of Multiple Exclusions”
Isabel Estrada, Universidade do Minho, Braga, Portugal
Though far from new as an exclusion-inclusion criterion, knowledge, or more accurately, scientific and technological expertises, is becoming more evident as a ‘legitimate’ post-national gate for migrants to have quicker access to legality and to various citizenship rights. A way to sustain this argument is to look at how states have been legitimising knowledge as a criterion of access to legality as far as immigrants are concerned.
This legitimacy becomes obvious as we begin looking at present policies of migration. As policies of migration became more and more restrictive, they tend also to contemplate specific regimes that foster the entrance, stay and legal residence of highly-skilled professionals, in a clear strategy to gain the battle for brain circulation. One must question though whether this ‘new’ criteria of admission risks (or not) endangering the emancipatory potential of postnational citizenship. In this paper we suggest to look at the Portuguese policy of brain gain in comparison with its legal frame as far as immigration is concerned, as way to prove our argument.
Giving preference to immigrant skilled labour may correspond not only to speeding up the bureaucracy required to get legal residence, but also to reinforcing the access to social citizenship. Whether immigrant skilled labour should be benefited with a more attractive fiscal system is a common topic of discussion, with plenty of voices in favour. In parallel, an average legal alien, experiencing difficulties in keeping up with the demands of the labour market and with an effective (no legal) access to social rights, may be at a stage where he already accesses some variety of political rights... A legal alien with political rights, as well as a national, may thus feel socially less enfranchised than a legal alien scientist. This proves that there are continuous forms of revitalising the fallacy that what matters are the social not the political rights. But this does not prove however the uselessness of political rights, only the vitality of the fallacy, as we will argue.
This legitimacy becomes obvious as we begin looking at present policies of migration. As policies of migration became more and more restrictive, they tend also to contemplate specific regimes that foster the entrance, stay and legal residence of highly-skilled professionals, in a clear strategy to gain the battle for brain circulation. One must question though whether this ‘new’ criteria of admission risks (or not) endangering the emancipatory potential of postnational citizenship. In this paper we suggest to look at the Portuguese policy of brain gain in comparison with its legal frame as far as immigration is concerned, as way to prove our argument.
Giving preference to immigrant skilled labour may correspond not only to speeding up the bureaucracy required to get legal residence, but also to reinforcing the access to social citizenship. Whether immigrant skilled labour should be benefited with a more attractive fiscal system is a common topic of discussion, with plenty of voices in favour. In parallel, an average legal alien, experiencing difficulties in keeping up with the demands of the labour market and with an effective (no legal) access to social rights, may be at a stage where he already accesses some variety of political rights... A legal alien with political rights, as well as a national, may thus feel socially less enfranchised than a legal alien scientist. This proves that there are continuous forms of revitalising the fallacy that what matters are the social not the political rights. But this does not prove however the uselessness of political rights, only the vitality of the fallacy, as we will argue.
“Politics of Erasure in Local/Global Encounters: Paradoxes of Transnational AIDS Activism”
Yan Long, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
Does the surge in activism against HIV/AIDS in China and interactions with the global web of institutions and organizations indicate the emergence of a transnational social movement? This paper examines how the diffusion of the American model of AIDS activism has affected the construction of AIDS movement actors and actorhood in China. Based on a five-month ethnographic study, I demonstrate how identity politics—or essentially American-style “difference” politics—swept the grassroot struggle and how peasants living with HIV/AIDS are marginalized or even silenced as China becomes increasingly integrated into transnational AIDS advocacy networks.
Education and prevention campaigns have increased public visibility for gays and lesbians and led to public sphere discussions of “modern” sexuality and gay identity. The AIDS issue is fertile ground for the export of western definitions of sexual identities and practices, as well as gay rights agendas. However, the U.S. AIDS movement is structured by a specific claim to citizenship that is absent in China. This empirical study shows that, after early successes, most local groups led by gay individuals have not been able to fill the gap between identity and politics by simply borrowing strategies and techniques of U.S. AIDS activism. Furthermore, gay groups do not recognize the political significance of peasant activists’ struggles. As a result, gay activists fighting for individual rights do not challenge relations between the state and citizens.
In sum, this paper intends to identify ambiguous influences on transnational AIDS movements and question whether and how these tensions feed or transform cleavages within transnational and local communities and activism in the struggles for recognition and justice.
Education and prevention campaigns have increased public visibility for gays and lesbians and led to public sphere discussions of “modern” sexuality and gay identity. The AIDS issue is fertile ground for the export of western definitions of sexual identities and practices, as well as gay rights agendas. However, the U.S. AIDS movement is structured by a specific claim to citizenship that is absent in China. This empirical study shows that, after early successes, most local groups led by gay individuals have not been able to fill the gap between identity and politics by simply borrowing strategies and techniques of U.S. AIDS activism. Furthermore, gay groups do not recognize the political significance of peasant activists’ struggles. As a result, gay activists fighting for individual rights do not challenge relations between the state and citizens.
In sum, this paper intends to identify ambiguous influences on transnational AIDS movements and question whether and how these tensions feed or transform cleavages within transnational and local communities and activism in the struggles for recognition and justice.
“Political Actors, Civil Society and Electoral System on Italian Regime of Voting from Abroad: Reparatory Action or New Form of Political Citizenship? A case-study of Portugal and Brazil”
Giulio Mattiazzi, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
This paper deals with citizenship status on political structures and behaviour. The main scope is on new forms of political citizenship. Case study concern the relations between political actors, civil society and electoral system on Italian Regime of Voting from Abroad in Portugal and Brazil. The main objective is to consider whether the Italian Regime of Voting from Abroad represents but a reparatory action Act for historical Italian Diaspora migrants, or whether it is a new experience on post-national citizenship in regard to the political activity of a number of political nonparty actors. The text will try to provide as much as possible, a specific set of assessment about:
1) the current regulation which allows Italian Citizens resident abroad to vote in Italian national elections and referenda and to elect eighteen parliamentarians from abroad;
2) the electoral behaviour of Italian Citizens having the right to vote in Portugal and Brazil comparing it with electoral behaviour in Italy;
3) profile concerning nine deputies and four senators elected in Europe and Latin America constituency;
4) understanding if this process shapes the presence of a new transnational political subjects and new experience on post-national citizenship political activity;
The guiding research questions will be
a) Do Italian Citizens voting from abroad express a new post-national form of citizenship?
b) Does this process contribute to nations-state post-nationalization?
c) Which and how are political subject dealing with this process
organized?
1) the current regulation which allows Italian Citizens resident abroad to vote in Italian national elections and referenda and to elect eighteen parliamentarians from abroad;
2) the electoral behaviour of Italian Citizens having the right to vote in Portugal and Brazil comparing it with electoral behaviour in Italy;
3) profile concerning nine deputies and four senators elected in Europe and Latin America constituency;
4) understanding if this process shapes the presence of a new transnational political subjects and new experience on post-national citizenship political activity;
The guiding research questions will be
a) Do Italian Citizens voting from abroad express a new post-national form of citizenship?
b) Does this process contribute to nations-state post-nationalization?
c) Which and how are political subject dealing with this process
organized?
“Ethical Citizenship: A Senian Economic Approach to Postnational Citizenship”
Miguel Rocha de Sousa, Universidade de Évora, Portugal
Our main aim with this paper is to answer the challenging question: How new forms of citizenship can cope with the economic theories of ethics? Namely, we will assess this question on the realm of economic development and inclusive social policies due to the works of Amartya Sen (1998, 2007, 2009). This is exploratory work on coping ethics and citizenship, assuming economics as a natural language for a human rights approach – see exploratory work by Branco (2009, 2010). Further, we try to address how the systemic Capitalism crisis has raised new doubts in the economic human rights approach – Rocha de Sousa (2010) started to discuss the economic impact of the crisis and how to devise a political solution to the crises. The paper is structured as follows: On section 1 we present the idea of ethics using a Senian approach; on section 2 we present the idea of citizenship, and specially the idea of post-national citizenship in several ways (Estrada, 2007); on section 3 we try to abridge the idea of economic ethics and citizenship, thus we try to foreclose the idea of an inclusive post-national citizenship based on the works of the economics Nobel prize laureate Amartya Sen. On section 4, we try to devise new policy strategies to implement these main ideas on the political reality. Lastly, on section 5 we present a brief conclusion and discuss further extensions of this work, and on section 6 we list the references.
Chair: Graça Capinha, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Discussant: Elsa Lechner, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Panel 17: Citizenship: Critical Frameworks
Room: Sala Keynes
“Liberal Citizenship and Domestic Colonies”
Barbara Arneil, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
There is a growing body of literature that argues the two major theories of liberal citizenship (those of John Locke and JS Mill) were deeply enmeshed with bothcolonization (the processes by which the imperial state takes over the land and/or sovereignty of another country) and colonialism (the theoretical framework by which colonization is justified). In this article, I build upon this literature but ask whether the existence of hundreds of domestic colonies within (as opposed to outside) the borders of Britain and British settler states for citizens (as opposed to foreigners) at the turn of the twentieth century challenges the scope and definition of ‘colonialism’ in previous literature. Liberal colonialism, I argue, seeks to transform those deemed to be ‘idle’, ‘irrational’ and/or custom bound, both at home and abroad, into ‘industrious and rational’ citizens. Domestically this meant housing the idle poor and mentally ill/disabled in labour and farm colonies, respectively in order to break them free through segregation from their bad customs/habits and teaching them, through education and agrarian labour, to become proper citizens. Ultimately, I hope this analysis will help to explain how liberal states could come to embrace rather than reject within their own borders such deeply illiberal practises as segregation, and assimilation against ‘internal’ others well into the 20th century.
“Rethinking Citizenship Through Recognition”
Gonçalo Marcelo, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal
Democratic societies are often riddled by the following problem: how should citizens be included in the democratic process? Some models, which defend an egalitarian, blind process of integration, tend to be at odds with social groups claiming for recognition of their specific identities and rights. The problem is therefore posed as follows: aren’t there any limits to proceduralism? Shouldn’t a society strive to integrate a substantial content of the good life, through its institutions and the rights it grants people within it? However, how can such a society strive for that specific substantial content without disrespecting, eo ipso, the minority groups within it, with their specific worldviews and claims?
This paper will argue that there are limits to normative, ideal theory and to proceduralism. Namely, equal participation within a democratic process – citizenship – is in itself a shallow procedure if people are not respected, first and foremost, as persons, that is, if some degree of intersubjective recognition is not granted beforehand.
In order to address these concerns, we shall start by analysing equality from the perspective of social philosophy. Treating other persons as equals requires first and foremost that we respect them. The paper shall argue that this argument can be grasped from the vantage point provided by theories of recognition (a contemporary form of neo-hegelianism) and which include authors such as Axel Honneth, Will Kymlicka, Paul Ricoeur, and Charles Taylor. Recognition must be mutual, that is to say, in normal conditions, each person should grant his or her partner in interaction a status of a “significant other” or, at least, acknowledge and respect his or her presence. We can even speak of a legitimate moral expectation towards being recognized, demanding recognition.
However, the empirical reality of social relations shows us that our legitimate expectations are often deluded. Lack of recognition easily turns into disrespect or even humiliation. This kind of phenomena, which always imply lack of consideration vis-à-vis certain individuals or social groups, can be the responsibility of institutions (as the analysis of Michel Foucault or Avishai Margalit demonstrate) or individuals. In the latter case, a specific form of humiliation, which denounces a certain sense of superiority consists of looking through other people, not considering them worthy to be seen. This is particularly evident in some cases of racism, but not exclusively. Seeing human beings as non-human, or choosing not to see them at all, is a condition strong enough to impair any possibility of treating others as equals.
If successful, we will show that any procedural or ideal claim about citizenship must first deal with recognition claims: only afterwards can the problem of citizenship be posed.
This paper will argue that there are limits to normative, ideal theory and to proceduralism. Namely, equal participation within a democratic process – citizenship – is in itself a shallow procedure if people are not respected, first and foremost, as persons, that is, if some degree of intersubjective recognition is not granted beforehand.
In order to address these concerns, we shall start by analysing equality from the perspective of social philosophy. Treating other persons as equals requires first and foremost that we respect them. The paper shall argue that this argument can be grasped from the vantage point provided by theories of recognition (a contemporary form of neo-hegelianism) and which include authors such as Axel Honneth, Will Kymlicka, Paul Ricoeur, and Charles Taylor. Recognition must be mutual, that is to say, in normal conditions, each person should grant his or her partner in interaction a status of a “significant other” or, at least, acknowledge and respect his or her presence. We can even speak of a legitimate moral expectation towards being recognized, demanding recognition.
However, the empirical reality of social relations shows us that our legitimate expectations are often deluded. Lack of recognition easily turns into disrespect or even humiliation. This kind of phenomena, which always imply lack of consideration vis-à-vis certain individuals or social groups, can be the responsibility of institutions (as the analysis of Michel Foucault or Avishai Margalit demonstrate) or individuals. In the latter case, a specific form of humiliation, which denounces a certain sense of superiority consists of looking through other people, not considering them worthy to be seen. This is particularly evident in some cases of racism, but not exclusively. Seeing human beings as non-human, or choosing not to see them at all, is a condition strong enough to impair any possibility of treating others as equals.
If successful, we will show that any procedural or ideal claim about citizenship must first deal with recognition claims: only afterwards can the problem of citizenship be posed.
“How Critical is the Critical Citizen? Representations of Citizenship in Deliberative and Agonistic Models of Democracy”
Valerio Nitrato Izzo, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
The deliberative conception of democracy has been a major strand in recent political philosophy . In such a model, endorsed by many leading Western theorists, reason and the exchange of rational arguments in a community open to discussion has been seen as an ideal model to represent political freedom and influence normative and legal process. While critic of the established models of democracy, one of the problems of deliberative democracy lies in its emphasis on consensus, leaving a limited space for conflict and disagreement in the political sphere. At the opposite of such an approach, supporters of an agonistic understanding of democracy claimed for a return of the political, understood as a constant discussion of the political borders of a community, engaging citizens into expression of their wills free from the constraints of deliberative approaches. The problem with agonistic models is that they often lack background to link political freedom to the complex web of practices that the interaction with the institutional level requires. In this paper I will illustrate the features of both models in which they relate to each other and to the concept of citizenship. I argue that both approaches, while adding useful elements for a contemporary conceptualization of citizenship, are not entirely adequate to represent the complex nature of citizenship as a mixture of legal and political elements. Trying to fill this gap I will discuss participatory democracy practices as a useful addition to these models, opening space to a more radical political sovereignty in the deliberative model and as an institutional facilitator in the agonistic model.
“Citizenship and the Paradox of Multicultural Diversity”
Mitja Sardoc, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana, Slovenia
The difficulty in conceptualizing citizenship as a political conception of the person originates from its complexity as any of its existing conceptions entail several distinct and interrelated meanings. Either as a shared status of membership in a polity, a political identity or as a normative ideal of »good« citizen, the notion of citizenship is associated with a number of tensions, problems and challenges that are both complex and controversial. As the existing literature examining the foundations, nature and the value of citizenship in a plurally diverse polity amply demonstrates, some of the most important issues associated with citizenship as a political conception of the person remain contested thus making any conception of citizenship open to different interpretations. A number of objections against the rights-based conception of citizenship have been articulated, each claiming that this conception of citizenship is either too permissive and inefficient on the one hand or too divisive, unfairly discriminatory and oppressive on the other. Furthermore, a set of theoretical objections, political conflicts and practical controversies that arise out of the tension between the two normative commitments of the rights-based conception of citizenship, i.e. the commitment of civic equality and the commitment of equal civic respect of diversity challenge both the redistributive and the integrative function of citizenship in a plurally diverse polity. Yet, existing conceptions of citizenship both misrepresent our commitment to civic equality as well as fail to take with equal civic respect the normative significance of individuals' diverse commitments and allegiances.In order to tackle both the complexity and the controversiality of citizenship as a political conception of the person as well as the tensions, problems and challenges explicated above, this paper has a twofold aim. First, it aims to examine the foundations, nature and the value of the rights-based conception of citizenship and to clarify the various tensions, problems and challenges the rights-based conception of citizenship is faced with. Second, it aims to examine the most important criticisms against the rights-based conception of citizenship together with the liberal response to the various objections arising from the recent discussions on the inadequacy of the theory, policy and practice of the rights-based conception of citizenship.This paper consists of five sections. I start in section I with a number of preliminary considerations associated with citizenship in a plurally diverse polity and proceed then in section II with the explication of the rights-based conception of citizenship as a shared political status associated with free and equal membership in a political community. I identify here the foundational dimensions of citizenship and examine the basic elements of the liberal ideal of free and equal citizenship. I then focus in part III, on a number of objections stemming from the two normative commitments of the rights-based conception of citizenship, i.e. [i] the commitment of civic equality; and [ii] the commitment of equal civic respect of diversity. I proceed then in section IV with the presentation of the traditional and the contemporary criticism of the rights-based conception of citizenship as each of the two critiques focus on different aspects of the foundational features of the liberal institutional framework in general. In particular, I critically evaluate the two models of multicultural citizenship that have been advanced as a critique of the rights-based conception of citizenship. Next, I examine three different objections against multiculturalism and its alleged models of differentiated citizenship associated with a number of paradoxical issues raised by the multicultural conception of citizenship. I then explicate the paradox of multicultural diversity that identifies the largely unexamined effects of the politics of multiculturalism. In the concluding section of this paper, I outline and defend an egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education that is consistent with the liberal educational ideal of openness to diversity. I articulate a modified version of the rights-based conception of citizenship that is both sensitive to the pluralism of diversity and reflective at the same time as well as provide both clarification and defense of the capacities for engagement with diversity in the institutional arrangement and curriculum design of public education. Ultimately, I maintain, the difference-sensitive conception of civic equality I advance in this thesis, i.e. 'civic integrity', provides a sufficient as well as the most reasonable basis of the liberal educational ideal of openness to diversity.
Chair: António Sousa Ribeiro, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Discussant: James Tully, University of Victoria, Canada
Panel 18: Republican Citizenship
Room: A.3.1
“Citizenship and Republican Freedom”
Barbara Buckinx, Goethe University, Frankfurt, Germany
In this paper, I argue that it cannot be permissible, from a neo-republican perspective (cf. Pettit, Maynor), to withhold citizenship rights from long-term residents, and I develop an account of what is owed to such individuals by their states of residence.
In neo-republicanism, individuals minimize their vulnerability to domination as members of a republican state, which seeks to shield its citizens from domination. The law by which the republican state accomplishes this is non-arbitrary insofar as individuals have the necessary means at their disposal to force the government to take their interests into account, and to contest decisions in a democratic forum. When non-citizen residents are subject to the law in a republican state, that law has in an important sense been imposed upon them, and as a result, they lack freedom as non-domination.
What, then, are the obligations of republican states with regard to long-term residents? I distinguish my approach from two recent global republican proposals. In a 2006 article in Social Philosophy & Policy, Waldemar Hanasz argues that the civic republican conception of citizenship must be ‘globalized’ in order to better fit current global realities. I argue that Hanasz exaggerates the decline of the state much as many liberal and cosmopolitan democratic scholars do, and I doubt that a ‘globalized’ republican approach can accommodate global citizenship while retaining its republican identity. I am also not convinced by the second proposal. In a recent issue of Political Theory, James Bohman argues that international human rights courts should ensure that all individuals are accorded basic legal status – a status that is crucial for their enjoyment of freedom. I agree that international institutions may need to intervene to empower non-citizens when their state of residence falls short, but I envision these interventions as political – the incorporation of such non-citizens as refugees in a third state, for instance – rather than legal.
In neo-republicanism, individuals minimize their vulnerability to domination as members of a republican state, which seeks to shield its citizens from domination. The law by which the republican state accomplishes this is non-arbitrary insofar as individuals have the necessary means at their disposal to force the government to take their interests into account, and to contest decisions in a democratic forum. When non-citizen residents are subject to the law in a republican state, that law has in an important sense been imposed upon them, and as a result, they lack freedom as non-domination.
What, then, are the obligations of republican states with regard to long-term residents? I distinguish my approach from two recent global republican proposals. In a 2006 article in Social Philosophy & Policy, Waldemar Hanasz argues that the civic republican conception of citizenship must be ‘globalized’ in order to better fit current global realities. I argue that Hanasz exaggerates the decline of the state much as many liberal and cosmopolitan democratic scholars do, and I doubt that a ‘globalized’ republican approach can accommodate global citizenship while retaining its republican identity. I am also not convinced by the second proposal. In a recent issue of Political Theory, James Bohman argues that international human rights courts should ensure that all individuals are accorded basic legal status – a status that is crucial for their enjoyment of freedom. I agree that international institutions may need to intervene to empower non-citizens when their state of residence falls short, but I envision these interventions as political – the incorporation of such non-citizens as refugees in a third state, for instance – rather than legal.
“Neo-Republican Citizenship: From Concept to Practices?”
Naël Desaldeleer, Université de Poitiers, France
In terms of the practice of the political rights, by whom an individual is a fully-fledged member of the sovereign people, citizenship seems to experience a profound decline. If those who have the right to vote seem to enjoy this status, there are many who are excluded from it in spite of its declared character of generality and abstraction. Recent political theories attempt to find cures to revitalize it, but we may wonder if, after all, citizenship needs more a creation than a reactivation. On this matter, it is impossible not to think about neo-republicanism. Developing an other concept of political freedom – as non-domination – it explains that men who are free according to the liberal concept of freedom are in fact dominated. That is they suffer from arbitrary interference, either real and physical, or internalized and invisible. Being dominated is the negation of the very status of citizenship, which consists in being able to look anyone in the eye, like their equal. Participation in political life follows then from that intersubjective status, and not the other way around. So neo-republicanism asserts that political freedom is not separable from citizenship, and by consequence joins the contestations of its traditional conceptions: far from all those whom we name “citizens” enjoy citizenship.
What transition is suggested by neo-republicanism, from its new concept of political freedom to new forms of practicing citizenship? How citizenship is redefined, if the link with political participation is not primary? Neo-republicanism is not only a thesis about the history of ideas. It possesses two poles – the non-domination principle and the practice of democratic contestability – that contain its end: to create conditions to realize a genuine citizenship. This is a challenge, according to the most well-knowed neo-republican, Philip Pettit. What are the terms of that project for a renewed society? What solutions are suggested by the neo-republicanists to renew citizenship and make it real? Do they consider the true state of contemporary democratic politics and get beyond the frame of an ideal theory? Is it feasible and applicable to the reality of individual aspirations? Does neo-republicanism really offer a new form for citizenship, or does it make do with postulating a new conception of political freedom?
To answer that question, we will study the aftermath of Republicanism. For instance we will highlight how Pettit strove to explore the way from ideal to practice, studying the new forms of democratic practices, and in particular deliberative democracy. But we will also look into other neo-republicans who have emerged and who try to implement the non-domination ideal; amongst them, Cécile Laborde, and her attempt to develop a global theory of citizenship as non-domination.
What transition is suggested by neo-republicanism, from its new concept of political freedom to new forms of practicing citizenship? How citizenship is redefined, if the link with political participation is not primary? Neo-republicanism is not only a thesis about the history of ideas. It possesses two poles – the non-domination principle and the practice of democratic contestability – that contain its end: to create conditions to realize a genuine citizenship. This is a challenge, according to the most well-knowed neo-republican, Philip Pettit. What are the terms of that project for a renewed society? What solutions are suggested by the neo-republicanists to renew citizenship and make it real? Do they consider the true state of contemporary democratic politics and get beyond the frame of an ideal theory? Is it feasible and applicable to the reality of individual aspirations? Does neo-republicanism really offer a new form for citizenship, or does it make do with postulating a new conception of political freedom?
To answer that question, we will study the aftermath of Republicanism. For instance we will highlight how Pettit strove to explore the way from ideal to practice, studying the new forms of democratic practices, and in particular deliberative democracy. But we will also look into other neo-republicans who have emerged and who try to implement the non-domination ideal; amongst them, Cécile Laborde, and her attempt to develop a global theory of citizenship as non-domination.
“Beyond Nondomination: Republican Freedom and the Self-Limiting Empire”
Pawel Marczewski, University of Warsaw, Poland
Political theorists who argue that republicanism could be renewed in order to address the challenges posed by a growing need for effective global political institutions, typically focus on the perspectives for expanding the scope of republican liberty understood as nondomination. Their main goal, as stated by James Bohman, is to show that “rather than a product of ties of common sentiment, communal identification is a product of reciprocal freedom” (Bohman 2008: 193). In the second step they argue that nondomination (i.e. liberty understood not only as freedom from any actual coercion, but also from potential discretionary actions and decisions of rulers) could provide a basis for relations not only between citizens, but also among states. By doing so they aim at providing a theoretical framework for a “republic of republics”, that would offer an alternative both to unresponsive, “soulless world state” and to parochial (and often exclusive) nation states.
In my paper I argue that broadening the definition of nondomination, with intellectual antecedents shown by Sankar Muthu in the thought of certain Enlightenment republicans such as Diderot or Herder (see Muthu 2003), is just one side of republican anti-imperialism. Attempts at theorising “republic of republics” should take into consideration a long tradition of scepticism toward empire in writings of Roman, Renaissance, and modern republicans such as Sallust, Machiavelli or Harrington.
Drawing from their works, as well as interpretations by scholars like John Pocock and Quentin Skinner, I argue that republican approach to the problem of empire was for a long time somewhat Janus-faced. On the one hand, many republicans praised conquest as a way of practising civic virtues. On the other hand, they were fully aware that successful military campaigns posed a threat of corrupting those who dominated other peoples. Hence the Sallust’s cautionary example of Lucius Sulla, “who raised”, as Skinner comments, “a dangerously large army, taught it to covet in Asiatic luxuries, and then used it to seize control of the Roman state” (Skinner 1998: 64-65).
This is not to say that contemporary theorists are unaware of one of the main republican arguments against empire – the threat of dominators becoming dominated themselves in the process of the conquest. James Bohman remarks: “One consequence for the conquering nation is that the control over its new subjects quickly extends to its own citizens. (...) The difference between Commonwealthman and Enlightenment republicans is that the latter recognized that extended empires ultimately undermine the constitutional provision of various powers for citizens” (Bohman 2008: 194-195). My point is that recognition of the threat posed by “extended empires” predates in republican tradition both Enlightenment and Commonwealthman republicans, although such recognition was expressed in the language of corruption, rather than “undermining constitutional provision of various powers for citizens”. This broadening of the vocabulary of contemporary republicanism aims at showing that domination within and among states is not only a matter of extending control from foreign subjects to state’s own citizens, but also a problem of renunciation of self-rule and moderation by citizens themselves.
In my paper I argue that broadening the definition of nondomination, with intellectual antecedents shown by Sankar Muthu in the thought of certain Enlightenment republicans such as Diderot or Herder (see Muthu 2003), is just one side of republican anti-imperialism. Attempts at theorising “republic of republics” should take into consideration a long tradition of scepticism toward empire in writings of Roman, Renaissance, and modern republicans such as Sallust, Machiavelli or Harrington.
Drawing from their works, as well as interpretations by scholars like John Pocock and Quentin Skinner, I argue that republican approach to the problem of empire was for a long time somewhat Janus-faced. On the one hand, many republicans praised conquest as a way of practising civic virtues. On the other hand, they were fully aware that successful military campaigns posed a threat of corrupting those who dominated other peoples. Hence the Sallust’s cautionary example of Lucius Sulla, “who raised”, as Skinner comments, “a dangerously large army, taught it to covet in Asiatic luxuries, and then used it to seize control of the Roman state” (Skinner 1998: 64-65).
This is not to say that contemporary theorists are unaware of one of the main republican arguments against empire – the threat of dominators becoming dominated themselves in the process of the conquest. James Bohman remarks: “One consequence for the conquering nation is that the control over its new subjects quickly extends to its own citizens. (...) The difference between Commonwealthman and Enlightenment republicans is that the latter recognized that extended empires ultimately undermine the constitutional provision of various powers for citizens” (Bohman 2008: 194-195). My point is that recognition of the threat posed by “extended empires” predates in republican tradition both Enlightenment and Commonwealthman republicans, although such recognition was expressed in the language of corruption, rather than “undermining constitutional provision of various powers for citizens”. This broadening of the vocabulary of contemporary republicanism aims at showing that domination within and among states is not only a matter of extending control from foreign subjects to state’s own citizens, but also a problem of renunciation of self-rule and moderation by citizens themselves.
“Political Rights, Republican Freedom, and Temporary Workers”
Alex Sager, Portland State University, USA
A world of high human mobility and global markets requires that we rethink the right to political participation. I defend a human right to political rights for temporary residents: anyone subject to a state’s coercive power should have access to the same political rights as citizens of the state. We should decouple political rights from citizenship and territory and instead base them on individuals’ subjection to coercive political institutions. Political rights include the right to vote in elections and referenda, to run for office, and the freedom of association to join political parties. My account builds on Michael Walzer’s claim that “Men and women are either subject to the state’s authority, or they are not; and if they are subject, they must be given a say, and ultimately an equal say, in what that authority does.” (Walzer 1983: 61) However, Walzer’s account presumes a system of more or less closed, homogenous communities. It also permits the exclusion of temporary workers and “privileged guests” and allows a transition period in which residents gradually acquire full rights. Instead, I argue for norms of political participation appropriate for fluid political communities in which decision-making power occurs at many overlapping levels. I ground my account on a republican account of freedom, arguing that temporary workers require political rights in order to effectively contest arbitrary state power. Republicans define the lack of freedom in terms of “being subject to the potentially capricious will or the potentially idiosyncratic judgment of another.” (Pettit 1993: 5) The state is a coercive institution, backing its laws with the threat of force. I argue that in order for this coercion not to be arbitrary and unjustified, all people subject to the state’s power must have a potential say in the legislative process. I supplement the normative arguments with an analysis of non-citizen voting rights around the world. Though in most countries only citizens possess political rights, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland permit local non-citizen voting rights and Chile and New Zealand allow non-citizens to vote at the national level. In the past, non-citizens voted in local, state, and national elections many states and territories in the United States. These real-world examples provide models for implementing more inclusive political rights and also help identify potential problems and solutions. Though I do not explore these questions in depth in the paper, reflection on the status of temporary workers provides insight into proposals for extending democracy beyond national borders. Some proponents of cosmopolitan democracy have argued for the need to expand people’s democratic powers beyond the nation-state because their interests are affected by international bodies, other states, and multinational corporations. I suggest that a more fruitful approach for democratic inclusion may replace interests with coercion by foreign powers.
Chair: Roberto Merrill, Universidade de Minho, Braga, Portugal
Discussant: Roberto Gargarella, University Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Panel 19: Dynamics of Disenfranchisement
Room: 3.3
“Structural Exclusion and Challenging Citizenship: A New Social Movement Perspective”
George Alex, St. Thomas College, Kozhencherry, India
The rise of liberal democratic regimes and the flourishing of universal adult-suffrage educed self-respect and dignity among human beings. It liberated multitudes from the age-old bondage of feudalism. Indian constitution manifests the values of liberty, equality and fraternity with an imperative to establish a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic, republic. India is known as the largest democracy in the world. However, this strong and vibrant democracy is not free from institutional misrecognitions. The proposed paper critically engages with the liberal concept of citizenship and offers a pluralist paradigm of citizenship with special reference to the Dalit struggles in India.
Dalits are a structurally excluded fraction of Indian society who achieved citizenship by law in 1950, with the establishment of the Republic of India. Dalits (Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes) relegated as untouchables for long, comprise 18-20 percent of the rural population, 12-14 percent of the urban population, and have voting rights. But the right to vote in itself does not imply real representation in the political system. The participation of the Dalits in ‘civil society’ is obliterated by the caste structure. They are, socially, disabled citizens of the Indian polity. Civil society is the mantle of the democratic political system. The hegemonic social groups marginalize racial and caste minorities. Thus, a group of invisible citizens emerged as an antagonistic force to the liberal democratic state. Their struggles are the call for an alternative political space. Violence is defined as a reaction against the hegemonic ‘other’. A thriving democracy which manifests through the peoples movements demands a reconfiguration of civil society. This paper traces the origin and challenges of the Chengara Land Struggle, a struggle by landless Dalits for their right to own agricultural land, which commenced in 2005 in Kerala. This struggle caused a ‘publicness’ of dalits’ in the political sphere . A Just Democracy is the prime imperative of the struggles of the marginalized communities. The central notions of democratic citizenship are equality and justice. The terms ‘equality’ and ‘justice’ are subjective notions. It is the challenge of the liberal democracy to distribute justice without sacrificing equality. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee, on encountering this problem, proposed separate electorate for Dalits as the solution, but the proposal was rejected by the Constituent Assembly, who wished to include Dalits as a very part and parcel of the Hindu flock. The Hindu social system itself works on the premises of the purity and impurity dichotomy. Untouchability is its social manifestation which works in an invisible manner. The Dalits are considered as impure and this becomes a stumbling block to their entry in representational politics. A new social movement encounter for recognition and justice is considered as an alternative to the systemic misrecognition and this is the core perspective of the paper.
Dalits are a structurally excluded fraction of Indian society who achieved citizenship by law in 1950, with the establishment of the Republic of India. Dalits (Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes) relegated as untouchables for long, comprise 18-20 percent of the rural population, 12-14 percent of the urban population, and have voting rights. But the right to vote in itself does not imply real representation in the political system. The participation of the Dalits in ‘civil society’ is obliterated by the caste structure. They are, socially, disabled citizens of the Indian polity. Civil society is the mantle of the democratic political system. The hegemonic social groups marginalize racial and caste minorities. Thus, a group of invisible citizens emerged as an antagonistic force to the liberal democratic state. Their struggles are the call for an alternative political space. Violence is defined as a reaction against the hegemonic ‘other’. A thriving democracy which manifests through the peoples movements demands a reconfiguration of civil society. This paper traces the origin and challenges of the Chengara Land Struggle, a struggle by landless Dalits for their right to own agricultural land, which commenced in 2005 in Kerala. This struggle caused a ‘publicness’ of dalits’ in the political sphere . A Just Democracy is the prime imperative of the struggles of the marginalized communities. The central notions of democratic citizenship are equality and justice. The terms ‘equality’ and ‘justice’ are subjective notions. It is the challenge of the liberal democracy to distribute justice without sacrificing equality. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee, on encountering this problem, proposed separate electorate for Dalits as the solution, but the proposal was rejected by the Constituent Assembly, who wished to include Dalits as a very part and parcel of the Hindu flock. The Hindu social system itself works on the premises of the purity and impurity dichotomy. Untouchability is its social manifestation which works in an invisible manner. The Dalits are considered as impure and this becomes a stumbling block to their entry in representational politics. A new social movement encounter for recognition and justice is considered as an alternative to the systemic misrecognition and this is the core perspective of the paper.
“Women and Family Law: Challenging the Legal Principle of Equality”
Paula Casaleiro, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Patrícia Branco, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
João Pedroso, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Following the democratic revolution in 1974 in Portugal, the legal principle of equality was enshrined in the 1976 constitution, leading to the unconstitutionality of all inegalitarian rules and, consequently, to the elimination of expressed discriminations in the law. This brought profound changes in Family Law, which particularly affected the legal condition of women, with the consecration of the principle of equality between men and women, between the spouses and between children born inside or outside marriage. However, this formal gender equality, based on a universalistic concept of citizenship, is confronted with the persistent material inequalities.
Actually, although almost forty years have passed since the consecration of the principle of equality, material equality is still far from being a reality, which is visible in the inequality of contributions of men and women to family life, the asymmetry of working hours and wages or the difference between the hours that women and men spend caring for the family (Torres, 2008). Moreover, it has long been recognized that the demand for equal treatment before the law, in contexts where men and women are in an unequal situation, such as family and marriage (McCorkel et al, 2000), has a negative impact by putting women at a considerable socio-economic disadvantage (Verchick and Levit, 2006).
In sum, in this communication what we aim to discuss is the achievements and challenges of the (gender) equality principle in the framework of Family Law. For this, first, we will analyze the ruptures and continuities of transformations in Family Law in Portugal from 1974 to the present, through the Civil Code reforms and legislation concerning Family Law. Secondly, we intend to develop a critical analysis of the equality principle in Family Law, questioning if it contributes to the gender social relationship inequalities or if it is a source of equality and, thus, of citizenship.
Actually, although almost forty years have passed since the consecration of the principle of equality, material equality is still far from being a reality, which is visible in the inequality of contributions of men and women to family life, the asymmetry of working hours and wages or the difference between the hours that women and men spend caring for the family (Torres, 2008). Moreover, it has long been recognized that the demand for equal treatment before the law, in contexts where men and women are in an unequal situation, such as family and marriage (McCorkel et al, 2000), has a negative impact by putting women at a considerable socio-economic disadvantage (Verchick and Levit, 2006).
In sum, in this communication what we aim to discuss is the achievements and challenges of the (gender) equality principle in the framework of Family Law. For this, first, we will analyze the ruptures and continuities of transformations in Family Law in Portugal from 1974 to the present, through the Civil Code reforms and legislation concerning Family Law. Secondly, we intend to develop a critical analysis of the equality principle in Family Law, questioning if it contributes to the gender social relationship inequalities or if it is a source of equality and, thus, of citizenship.
“Disenfranchisement and Arbitrary Law-Making in Today’s Citizenship Policies”
Patricia Mindus, Uppsala University, Sweden
Massimo Cuono, University of Sassari, Italy
Disenfranchisement, i.e. being legally barred from exercising political rights, has many faces – ranging from TCNs in the EU to Brazilian illiterates, from mentally disabled persons in Eastern Europe to inmates in Asia. This paper focuses on today’s perhaps most critical form of disenfranchisement, that of non-nationals and the exercise of arbitrary power that lies behind it. In a world with over 9 million refugees and 5.5 million internally displaced people, let alone other forms of migration, the crucial role of defining the “demos” in terms of citizenship policy can no longer be downplayed. The appearance of disenfranchised masses in contemporary democracies questions the state’s sovereign right to define its people. In one meaning, “arbitrary power” highlights the problem of building discriminating legal categories and attributing rights accordingly. Domestic and international courts hence speak of “the reasonableness of the law”, a rhetorical device that proves to be particularly interesting in relation to enfranchisement as a critical component of the political category of “citizenship”. Moreover, the unforeseen quantity of border-crossings challenges a key tenet of democratic theory, namely the principle of affectedness. How can access to citizenship be designed so as to do justice to such a principle in the increasingly complex and non-ideal setting of today’s democratic politics? How can the arbitrary rule of public officials and private agents be reduced in what seems to be playing states against migrants? Which migration and citizenship policies better prevent such recalcitrant injustices?
First, a theoretical framework for setting the issue of citizenship policy-making in today’s liberal democracies is presented, as well as a range of examples illustrating why it enables us to account for differences on the political, legal and social levels of exclusion. Secondly, we discuss the nature and scope of arbitrariness and/or discretionary power within this policy area, so as to stress situations of particular vulnerability for those concerned. Third, we suggest ways, respectful of the rule of law, in which such institutional misrecognition may be addressed. Special emphasis is laid on asylum and deportation policy. The 2009 Citizenship Policy Index as well as the Migration Integration Policy Index will be assessed on the basis of an interdisciplinary method and an outlook solidly grounded in political and legal theory.
First, a theoretical framework for setting the issue of citizenship policy-making in today’s liberal democracies is presented, as well as a range of examples illustrating why it enables us to account for differences on the political, legal and social levels of exclusion. Secondly, we discuss the nature and scope of arbitrariness and/or discretionary power within this policy area, so as to stress situations of particular vulnerability for those concerned. Third, we suggest ways, respectful of the rule of law, in which such institutional misrecognition may be addressed. Special emphasis is laid on asylum and deportation policy. The 2009 Citizenship Policy Index as well as the Migration Integration Policy Index will be assessed on the basis of an interdisciplinary method and an outlook solidly grounded in political and legal theory.
Chair: Paula Fernando, Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra, Portugal
Discussant: Rinku Lamba, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
Centro de Excelência -
Processo de Avaliação de Unidades de Investigação
do Ministério da Ciência e da Tecnologia, 2005
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